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ABSTRACT
Much of the criticism Heidegger has drawn from realism, from postmodernism and even
existentialism, as well from the anti-Nazi protests on his philosophy, could be diluted if a
defaulted connection was made between Heidegger's metaphysics and the Greeks. Being and
Time drafted the blueprint of the origin of predication and world-disclosure from the primordial
intuition of the limitations of action in the face of human finitude. This existential reprioritization
forced a radical reversal of primacy from nature to culture, having assumed the absolute
objectivity of some original world determinacy, the phenomenological structure of which,
nevertheless, was never produced in Heidegger’s seminal work or thereafter.
Existentialism has thus been downplayed as a counterintuitive, fanciful hypothesis, and
will remain so for as long as horizontal temporality has not made itself available to itself as a
negated object of perception in the horizon of disclosure. The objectified subjectivity of Dasein’s
cultural bias should be demonstrable, if there is indeed a determinant even firmer and “causally
prior” to the object of perception in reified nature. And the theory of freedom that is
existentialism will remain a “theory” with a private definition of the term, if both the
phenomenological structures of the “objectification” of subjectivity have not appeared: first as
the objectivity of freedom that is absolute and universal, but no less than as the object that frees
made up from nothing other than the absolute and universal objectivity of freedom.
Heidegger must have felt this most pressing shortcoming in his metaphysics, because in
a later monumental work, The Origin of the Work of Art, he avowed of such an object that is both
the programmatic manifesto of freedom, and frees, pointing to the Greek Doric temple. He must
iv

have realized that the highest objectification of Dasein’s volatile subjectivity was somehow of
“Greek” origin, and as I will argue, in this assumption alone he was right. But his proof was
premised therein in an incomplete, trivial and self-contradictory way that left exposed to counterentrenchment his arguments over both the attribution of the origin of reality, and consequently
also its subjective constitution. From this point on, existentialism has remained doggedly
problematic, if not inconsequential, in being unconnected to its bloodline, that is,
phenomenology, and inasmuch as Heidegger’s incomplete metaphysics has remained
unconnected to his miscued art theory.
My hermeneutic method seeks this elusive, twofold objectification of subjectivity, in
order to justify existentialism by simultaneously making the missing connections between
Heidegger and the Greeks, and between Being and Time and The Origin of the Work of Art. The
connections I am suggesting are both necessary and possible, provided that Heidegger’s theory
of art is modified to grant monumental statuary its due hermeneutic primacy.
Heidegger attributed the disclosure of world in truth-as-untruth to poetry and architecture,
while Gadamer, who advanced Heidegger’s phenomenology to the currently predominant
hermeneutic theory, also gave primacy to poetry and architecture. Their mistake is critical,
because, as I will argue, Greek statuary is the patent twofold objectification of Dasein’s
existential analytic, it is the convergence point of evidence to infer Heidegger’s missing theory
of embodiment, and it is the ultimate origin of Western metaphysics.
Current theories of embodiment, including Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological case from
where a missing dialogue has been attempted to derive Heidegger's theory of embodiment,
typically confine themselves to Dasein’s ontological and ontic corporeality. I suggest that such
theories should have addressed the necessity of the structures of Reason to incarnate themselves
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as the fundamental ontological prescriptions of perception. To address the necessity of this
incarnation in monumental art as a primordial world disclosure, is to explore in this work a
previously untapped tripartite hermeneutic conjecture, where theory of art and theory of
embodiment are already theories of perception.
My hermeneutic hypothesis adheres to, corroborates and advances basic
phenomenological principles, to show how Dasein’s embodied structures in the exclusivity of
Greek statuary have so far been misunderstood, decontextualized, and begged the question,
accordingly as a “mystery” (Hegel), as “godly” (von Humboldt), as a “misunderstanding”
(Buschor), or as “Greek naturalism” (art historians).
Special attention will be paid to works such as the Laokoön Group, the Ptoan Apollo, the
Blond Youth, the Zeus of Artemision and the Gigantomachy. I argue that these cultural fossils
provide the most reliable grounds for a thorough commentary to Heidegger’s implied theory of
embodiment, because they manifest as the art which relates most intimately to the instrumental
modality through which the being-towards-death makes itself phenomenologically available to
itself as the negation of the negation to live. Additionally, and in a postmodern world of
academic wars that have claimed every aspect of Greek culture as stolen from other great
civilizations, such solely uncontested cultural fossils are arguably the unsolicited proof classicists
have been unable to produce regarding the exclusively Greek origin of Western metaphysics.
The most consequential thrust of this work seeks to revitalize Heidegger’s claim
regarding the origin and the chronology of world against competing alternatives such as
Christian metaphysics, science’s Big Bang Theory, or the emasculated feminist case regarding
the metaphysical primacy of the womb. The ultimate contribution this work aspires to, is the
empowering of a presently stalled paradigm shift from the scientific to an existential-
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phenomenological world view. This shift would be akin to the one which procured with the
advent of the Enlightenment between science and religion - a clash still raging in education –
where further progress now demands that humanity leaves behind the disguised alienation which
Heidegger himself coined as “the dictatorship of science.”
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CHAPTER ONE
LOOKING FOR HEIDEGGER’S THEORY OF EMBODIMENT

1.1 Why Looking In “Origin”
Perhaps paradoxically, Heidegger’s metaphysics, that is, his fundamental ontology, is not
grounded in the 1927 seminal work of Being and Time, as it may be expected, but in his 1935
essay The Origin of the Work of Art. Being and Time may explicate the transcendental worlddeterminations of angst, temporality, and care, which disclose reality by allowing beings to
become phenomenologically available in their being for the being-towards-death, but according
to Heidegger in Origin these determinations are themselves subject to whether or not they may
first manifest as art. It is in the artwork, or, as we will see, rather as the artwork, where these
metaphysical inscriptions first manifest as the possibility of world. “Towering up within itself,
the work opens up a world and keeps it abidingly in force”, we read in Origin. (Origin 169) Before
Heidegger, art was about the beautiful; with Origin, this changed dramatically: “Till now art was
about the beautiful and beauty, not about truth.” (Origin 162) The things of the world, including the
artwork itself, can appear only “after” some short of art has determined, not in a causal relation,
how the objects of perception appear: “Nothing can be discovered about the thingly aspect of the
work so long as the pure self-subsistence of the work has not distinctly displayed itself.” (Origin
165)

In this chapter I will first argue that Heidegger is mistaken to regard architecture as the

foundational art form. In the following evocative passage from Origin it is clear how it is not the
work - here the Greek temple - which is contained within a world of an otherwise unaccountable
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origin, but a world that begins to unfold as an expandable morphogenetic field of perception at
the periphery of such monumental art:
Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of
the rock the obscurity of that rock’s bulky yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building
holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in
its violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace
of the sun, first brings to radiance the light of the day, the breath of the sky, the darkness of the
night. The temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of
the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea.
Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus
come to appear as what they are. The Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in
all things physis. It illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call
this ground the earth. (Origin 167-168)

For Heidegger art is the furthermost regress we may reach in our quest for the source of
truth and reality. Whereas the world’s determinations and their disclosures, including the artist
and his work, are founded, grounded, and bestowed in art, art itself as truth is not brought about
by anything else or prior to it; art as truth comes out of a particular sense of nothing. So we read
in Origin: “Does truth, then arise out of nothing? It does indeed if by nothing we mean the sheer
‘not’ of beings, and if we here think of the being as something at hand in the ordinary way,
which thereafter comes to light and is challenged by the existence of the work as only
presumptively a true being.” (Origin 196)
The world disclosed and thus mounting at the foothold of the artwork, is a self-contained
and self-maintained morphogenetic field of perception with a certain entelechy. So we read in
Origin: “A genuine beginning, as a leap, is always a head start, in which everything to come is
already leaped over, even if as something still veiled. The beginning already contains the end
latent within itself.” (Origin 201) When Heidegger describes works that bear the monumentality of
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opening up such a self-contained and self-maintained world, it is usually implicit but it is made
explicit that he means just that one particular world of Dasein which has disclosed itself and
came to us as its ontological preservers to be casually known as “Greek”. “Always when beings
as a whole, as beings themselves, demand a grounding in openness, art attains to its historical
essence as foundation. This foundation happened in the West for the first time in Greece. What
was in the future to be called Being was set into work, setting the standard.” (Origin 201)
To recapitulate, the grounding of Dasein’s fundamental ontology is rather oddly
explicated in Origin, post-scriptum to Being and Time. This is so for several reasons: (a) the
primordial inscriptions of reality are themselves subject to whether they may or may not first
manifest in art or as art; (b) the things of the world, including an epiphenomenal understanding
of the artwork itself, can appear only “after” art has determined how they appear; (c) the being of
a world and its preservers can only begin to precipitate at the periphery of monumental art as a
morphogenetic field of perception; (d) art as truth itself comes out of nothing. In Being and Time,
“art” is only mentioned in two very brief instances, with a few more fleeting and inconsequential
mentions of “poetry” and “literature”. Dasein's fundamental ontology and Heidegger’s
metaphysics begin in Origin.
Nevertheless, scholarship typically looks for Dasein’s fundamental ontology in
Heidegger’s seminal volume of Being and Time. The miscue may be due to the fact that the
competent art form to incorporate the above mentioned primordial inscriptions of reality had yet
to be correctly identified, especially in Heidegger’s misguiding us to poetry and architecture.
Poetry and architecture, which Heidegger and Gadamer thought of as the art forms upon or
through which a world first discloses itself, are relatively unfit to harbor the world’s
equiprimordial determinations of temporality, angst, and care, because unlike the human body’s
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ideation in art, the temple and the poem are not objects wedged in between mind and world.
What makes the rendition of the human figure in monumental sculpture uniquely qualified for
this task, is that the human body is the only world object wedged as an organic frontier in
between mind and world, whereupon, it will be shown, world projects, Dasein’s or otherwise, are
themselves projected.
Since the world-disclosive structures of primitive Dasein could not be found in the
favored poetry and architecture (at last Heidegger did not even attempt to point out these
structures therein), the otherwise Heideggerian claim in Origin that it is rather art that creates
the artist as well as the work and the work’s preservers, remained trivial and inconsequential at
best. For some, it was Heidegger just “being poetic”. Heidegger only obliquely if at all suggests
the obligatory conjecture following from his refutation of substance ontology in Being and Time
and his elucidation of the origin of world in Origin, namely that besides the artist art must also
create its preservers together with their morphogenetic field of perception as “world”. For if the
perceptual culture of Dasein does not simply parachute into a world of otherwise unaccountable
origin, and if the eidetic suchness of the “artist” cannot be seen apart from the eidetic suchness of
the non-artist preservers of the work and their morphogenetic fields of perception, then we must
start taking seriously the possibility that some kind of art may not only be the origin of artist,
work, and the work’s preservers, but through and through the origin of world. The only
alternative would be the absurdity that all preservers are actually active artists of the caliber that
chiseled the Laokoön Group or other comparable arche-techne that discloses the existential
structures of primitive Dasein. The non-literal reading of Origin implies the acceptance of this
absurdity, for if art does not actually discloses world, as the non-literal reading suggests, and art
has only created the artist and the work but nothing else, then how is it possible that there are
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mere preservers besides the artist who have not chiseled such works, but, nevertheless, whose
own world-perception, as well as how these preservers are themselves perceived, are all
absolutely determined by the structures disclosed as the artwork?
To avoid this absurdity and turn a hitherto slack conjecture between Heidegger’s
metaphysics and his aesthetics into a rigorous understanding of the origins and the constitution of
reality, we must bring and keep in full sight both the refutation of substance ontology in the early
Heidegger and a literal reading of the radical claims in Origin, which is considered as part of his
middle work. The implications of this conjecture not only are neglected by Heidegger himself,
but they have been subverted by the mysticism of his late philosophy. Self-justified by this
subversion of the early by the late Heidegger, where it has been noted that capital concepts such
that of care are radically discrepant in between the two periods, and where a relapse to substance
ontology is implied by Heidegger’s concession that Greek art - in general - learned from Egypt,1
scholarship has remained blind to the obligatory and discriminatory conjecture that we are
making here. Some Heideggerian scholars think we can afford to shrug off the literal reading of
Origin.
Amongst these scholars is Julian Young, who in his 2001 book Heidegger’s Philosophy
of Art proposes that the literal reading of Origin is a misunderstanding. Young tags any worldderiving readings such as ours as “Protean”, and figures that in critical passages of Origin such
as those about the unconcealment of world at the periphery of the Greek temple where art as
truth is setting itself to work, and where nature as physis emerges for the first time as that which
it is, Heidegger did not mean that literally; he was merely being “poetic”.2
Young finds two reasons why the Protean understanding of monumental art is wrong. In
the first he sees that “whether or not some artwork may have created the Greek world, it is
5

extremely difficult to see how it could have been the temple.”3 Though he is right – indeed, as we
will see, the temple cannot house the statue, the reverse is true - here Young is himself twice
wrong: once because our linking of Being and Time with Origin will show that the world ensuing
is not merely “the Greek world”, but our world, since the post-archaic Greek world must be seen
as the origin of Western metaphysics; then wrong again because, while the structures of
primitive Dasein do not manifest as architecture, this does not preclude their manifestation in
some other, more competent art, - in our case to be made, in monumental statuary.
Young’s second reason to dismiss the Protean reading of Origin is that it is supposedly
“inconsistent with fundamental positions Heidegger had already worked out in Being and
Time.”4 But, as I am to demonstrate in what follows, quite the contrary is the case. Not only our
reading of Origin is thoroughly consistent with Dasein’s fundamental ontology as this ontology
is explicated in Being and Time, but Being and Time can be explained and defended only through
Heidegger’s radical hypotheses in Origin, albeit only by means of our corroboration of these
hypotheses up against the correct type of art.
Young dismisses the disclosure by art of the possibility of a world from without, as he
misconstrues a “fundamental position” from the writings of early Heidegger (Being and Time
and Basic Problems of Phenomenology) in order to establish the inauthentic world of the they as
a background world constituency which is already there for the work to arrive into. Heidegger
may have said that the self arrives to the they, but never said that so does art. In Being and Time
the origin of the they from the self is as often repeated as it is clear: “the inauthentic they-self is
an existentiell modification of the authentic self.” (BT 268, 318) Nonetheless, with this false
precedence made by Young, “... the role of the artwork is not to create but rather to ‘make
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expressly visible’, to ‘thematize’ a world which is already in existence.”5 But then, one ought to
ask Young, whence the background world of the they?
Young addresses this question by kicking it further down the road. He cites Heidegger’s
obtrusive idea that language (the art of poetry) creates the background world of the they,6 an
explanation as liable to Young’s first objection against the Protean reading - that it is extremely
difficult to see how in this case the art of poetry may have created the world - as is the art of
architecture. Young does not show how poetry discloses the world-prescriptive structures of
primitive Dasein including the background constituency of world as the they, and neither does
Heidegger.
Young is supposedly “phenomenologically speaking”,7 and yet his non-literalist reading
dodges the core phenomenological argument in Being and Time and arguably Heidegger’s most
important contribution to philosophy, namely the refutation of substance ontology. To grant the
they preexistent status to what art may disclose, is to acknowledge merely the world-descriptive
function of non-monumental art, to remain blind to the world-disclosive role of arche-techne,
and thus to ultimately revert to substance ontology. It is only in the absence of the
phenomenological distinctions we are going to make in the next chapter between monumental
and non-monumental, world-prescriptive and world-descriptive art, that Young can beg the
question in saying that “Great art ... brings world out of background inconspicuousness.”8 But,
again, whence this “background”, and whence its “inconspicuousness”?
Young’s dependence on late Heideggerian concepts of a Dionysian, chaotic “It” that
“gives world to us” underscored by Cézanne,9 reintroduces an unaccountable origin of a
perceptual thing-in-itself and is thus a relapse to the understanding of space and time in Kant’s
Transcendental Aesthetic, which Being and Time has decisively left behind. Whether a Kantian
7

ding-am-sich, an Einsteinian Big Bang, a Freudian Id, or the feminist’s primordial womb, the
substrative world into which Dasein is seen to parachute is as alien to what is premised in the
phenomenology of Being and Time as it is flying in the face of the literal interpretation of Origin
and the vindication of this interpretation by Greek art.
Our literal reading of Origin is thoroughly consistent with Being and Time - indeed the
two works cannot stand apart from each other - inasmuch as Greek statuary discloses the theyself, both authenticity and inauthenticity, so that there is nothing left of “world” to be claimed by
substance ontology and the discretionary systems of elucidation that explicitly or tacitly assume
it. Our analysis of Greek statuary in the next chapter will bring forth the origin of the they-self in
multiple ways, that is, in all the embodied structures of primitive Dasein’s temporal and spatial
determinations. What remains unaccounted for in Young’s non-literal understanding of Origin,
namely the world’s background constituency into which both art and artist supposedly parachute
into, emerges and is validated in the newfangled consistency between Being and Time and
Origin. The they part of the they-self appears in the mitda-sein not only as Dasein that has-beenthere in the anthropological history of selves bygone, but more so, it appears as the sedimented
determining manifold perceptions of those selves bygone: cumulatively speaking, it appears as a
reified “nature”. The Western world’s infatuation with the ideality of Dasein’s embodiment in
Greek art owes to our preserving and in coming to terms with this ideality in the disclosure of the
they, as the ideal body of the individual tacitly reveals the possibilities of the they reenacted in
the self, and of the self abeyant in the they. Ultimately, our explanation of the “beautiful” in the
next chapter will be simpler, more intimate, more intelligible, and hence more convincing than
Young’s bleary idea that “The beautiful is, after all, what according to ‘aesthetics’, we respond to
when we abstract from the instrumental categories of normal experience.”10

8

Our regress to Origin as an uncanny text which is post scriptum but essentially precedent
and anticipating Being and Time, justifying Heidegger’s fundamental ontology by providing this
fundamental ontology’s metaphysical grounds, has many advantages. One of them is that it
begins to dissolve the accusations (Victor Farias, Hugo Ott, Emmanuel Faye) that Heidegger’s is
a Nazi “philosophy”. Examining a 1934 lecture, Faye uncritically connects Dasein’s “earth” to
Hölderlin’s “secret Germany”; and in Heidegger’s essay The Fundamental Question of
Philosophy, he understands that, “[f]rom the outset philosophy’s function is to address, in a
privileged, or even an exclusive way, the German people alone. All others but this originally
German man are excluded from the we.”11 Heidegger may have expediently used and abused his
own philosophy in his own given sociopolitical situation. But at this point, and beginning in
Origin as the foundation of his metaphysics, it is clear that Heidegger makes sense precisely
because he does not refer to the German land, or the German people, and because he does not
even address the Greek people or the Greek land in a privileged way. As we saw earlier, where
Heidegger qualifies what is “Greek”, designation, signification, and thematization begins only
“after” the artwork has eidetically designated itself so that the phenomenological availability of
the land, together with its preservers, begins to engender itself from the foothold that the world
launches at the artwork’s metaphysical foundations. Dasein’s land is not necessarily “Germany”;
it is all the earth as the countries and the nations, the planet, and all the universe designated in its
suchness; the reason is that, as we read in Origin: “[t]hat into which the work sets itself back and
which it causes to come forth in this setting back of itself we call the earth. Earth is that which
comes forth and shelters.” (Origin 171) Dasein’s truth-as-untruth initially has nothing particularly
“German” or “Greek” about it, but pertains only to the destiny of the being-towards-death as a
historical people out to resolve their situated being. Because the preservers preserve this truth-as-
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untruth founded, grounded, and bestowed by the work, this destiny and this situation cannot be
reduced exclusively to the private experience of Das Deutsche Volk; the destiny and the situation
is that of the hoi polloi, which is a cultural, that is, essentially perceptual, and not national, nor
racial entity. The “Greeks” is not a racial or national designation: “Preserving the work does not
reduce people to their private experiences, but brings them into affiliation with the truth
happening in the work”, we read in Origin. (Origin 193) The Origin of the Work of Art precludes
such abusive misinterpretations of the existential analytics of Dasein, and thus this text has the
potential to simultaneously begin to defend both Greek culture and Heidegger’s philosophy. The
potentiality of this text - if we modify it beyond Heidegger’s shortcomings - lies in that it
explains cultural values as perceptual determinations disclosed in monumental art, or rather as
monumental art, so that arguments about metaphysics propounded on the anchored relationship
between a given culture and its artistic fountainhead are relatively incontestable.
Fundamental ontology in Being and Time may be recovering the authentic temporal
horizon of disclosure as the recovery of the question of being, but it is Origin which rattles the
foundations of substance ontology. As we will see in later chapters, it is in or rather as art that
the equiprimordial conditions of substance disclosure, namely angst, temporality, and care, are
themselves originally disclosed. If the - otherwise granted - primacy of art over philosophy in the
explication of perceptual determinations has not been clear, this is due to the forms of art which
Heidegger and Gadamer pointed to, and which are incompetent to embody the
equiprimordialities of angst, temporality, and care. Dasein does not disclose itself into its Being
as a temple or as a poem, but in that actually elusive, mystical object that we casually refer to as
a “body”. It is only from the explication of art as the objectified origin of truth in Origin, not
from the existential metaphysics of Being and Time, that it can be shown why the origins of
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Western metaphysics can be traced only through a comparative hermeneutics in competent world
art. Once we have pointed out the objective indispensability of Origin in inferring Heidegger’s
implicit theory of embodiment, we can next see with Origin why such a theory can be inferred
from what Heidegger claimed about art.
1.2 Why Looking In Art
One of the collateral consequences forced in by Origin, is the refutation of both the
materialist and the idealist understandings of science. Heidegger’s claim that the original
disclosure of natural laws takes place as a singular event in art, precludes science’s “discovering”
truths about the world that preexist art and science, awaiting to be understood by the sorts of
Newton, Einstein and Heisenberg. Gravity, relativity, and indeterminacy must be world
determinations originally disclosed as such by the instigation of some embodied art-world.
Heidegger posts several abstract arguments towards this end, but it is only in the case that will be
made here about the hermeneutic primacy of monumental statuary art, that his proofs begin to
seem plausible. Heidegger starts out with the most generic argument, the reassignment of the
opening of perceptual possibilities: “Art is the origin of the artwork and of the artist; ... On the
usual view, the work arises out of and by means of the activity of the artist. But by what and
whence is the artist what he is?” (Origin 182, 143) Perceptual possibilities emerge for both the artist
and the preservers of the work as a social enframing: “Createdeness of the work means truth’s
being fixed in place in the figure. Figure is the structure in whose shape the rift composes itself.”
(Origin 189)

And again: “The establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such

as never was before and will never come to be again.” (Origin 187) If Heidegger is correct here, and
we will demonstrate that he is, the scientist arrives to investigate a world the possibility of which
has already been opened to her by some competent form of art. So we read in Origin:
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Truth happens only by establishing itself in the strife and the free space opened up by truth itself.
But truth does not exist in itself beforehand, somewhere among the stars, only subsequently to
descend elsewhere among beings. This is impossible for the reason alone that it is after all only
the openness of beings that first affords the possibility of a somewhere and of sites filled by
present beings. … By contrast, science is not an original happening of truth, but always the
cultivation of a domain of truth already opened, specifically by apprehending and confirming that
which shows itself to be possibly and necessarily correct within that field. (Origin 186, 187)

As if the claim that it is art which creates the artist was not bizarre enough, what makes it
even more difficult a hypothesis to test, is that Heidegger did not distinguish between
monumental and non-monumental art, nor did he venture beyond generic statements to say
which poetry and which architecture founds, grounds, and bestows the existential analytic of
Dasein. If Dasein is a perceptual culture of morphogenesis and not the Germanic race or the
Greeks, and if there can be more than one variant perceptual cultures ranging from the animal to
what is “human”, Heidegger’s references to the Greek temple, to Van Gogh’s painting, and of
Hölderlin’s verse, leave out legitimate candidates from both inside and outside the perceptual
biases of Western civilization.
There is one suggestion though, in Being and Time, from where we can infer that the
monumentality of the work can be decided by whether the work is made of a certain authentic
historicality, so that it opens up a historiographical horizon for other, non-monumental, or
historically authentic (as opposed to authentically historic) works to be visible as such, since
even the possibility of authentic historicality would have no other venue to initially disclose itself
but in a definitive work of art. An awe-inspiring Egyptian statue may be historically authentic,
but it cannot be more authentically historic than a Greek work, as the Afrocentrist or the
alternative cultural vindicationist wants it in the recent raging cultural wars. Here Heidegger
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agrees with Nietzsche: “Beings do not become ‘more historical’ as we go on to a past ever
farther away, so that what is most ancient would be the most authentically historical.” (BT 382)
For us to be able to tell the difference between the authentically historic artwork (the
work through which any other and all works of art are visible as such) and the historically
authentic artwork (the work which is visible in its suchness through the perceptual
determinations disclosed by an authentically historic work), we would need to let the work talk
to us, instead of us talking to it. Hearkening to the work is the non-factical reading of art. We are
talking to the work when we assign to it its creator, its style and influences, the tools used to
make it, the chronological time and the place and the material from which it was made. And we
let the work talk, when, in order to decide its monumental quality, we intuit the ideational
structures of its constitution, the programmatic inscriptions which may appear as casual forms
integrating the content, so that reason, or unreason, or whatever other programmatic inscriptions
we may meet with in the work, is disguised as Nature. That such a hearkening could attend to
fundamentally variant world programmes, can be easily demonstrated, even if we stayed within
“Greek” art and compared the vocations of two monumental works, say an Ionian to a Doric
temple, the Homeric epos to Sophoclean tragedy, or more manifestly so, the statuary sculpture of
an Archaic kouros compared to works such as the Zeus of Artemision.
Scholars who agree with Heidegger that fundamental ontology must start from Dasein’s
factical concerns would, nevertheless tell Heidegger’s critics that Dasein should not be
understood in terms of everyday human existence. From this discrepancy, evidence from
Classical Greek statuary obliges me to suggest that the search for first principles in fundamental
ontology can be investigated only from a non-factical reading of art. If scholars have failed to
infer a rigorous theory of embodiment out of Heidegger’s metaphysics, it is because of three

13

preoccupations. Firstly, because they are bind to the fundamental ontology in Being and Time,
looking only there for the transcendental structures that allow beings to emerge-into-presence in
their being in everyday practices and prior to any theoretical assumptions. Secondly, in Being
and Time scholarship has no access to Dasein’s embodied ideational structures of meaning, so
that they end up assuming that access to the question of being begins with the hermeneutics of
ontic Dasein. The assumption is that any philosophy arises from the ontic realm of finitude, of
historicity, and engenderment, and it always returns to this ontic realm in order to conform with
reality. Thirdly, even those daring scholars who have ventured into Origin for clues, are therein
tripped up by Heidegger’s mistake to promote poetry as capable of embodying the founding,
grounding, and bestowing of Dasein’s existential analytic. One must already possess the
defensive conceptual armature when entering the bewildering landscape of Origin, and be ready
to dispute Heidegger’s conviction there that it is language that first brings man about into
existence by naming things for the first time and by first bringing beings to word and into
appearance.
None has figured how a major obstacle to infer Heidegger’s rigorous theory of
embodiment can be overcome by a non-factical reading of art. Scholars typically point to the
interrelated constrains which prevent Dasein from making visible to itself the absolute
productivity of its own existential determinations, the limitations posed by the twofold restriction
of the “hermeneutic circle.” The circularity of existence preordains that interpretation of reality
always commences from the throwness of sociohistorical prejudice and from interrupted,
corrupted, finite understanding, so that there is never an exhaustive description of what it is to be
“human”. Disquiet over this matter was even appeased, since Sartre made the existential case to
actually understand this quandary as an advantage, an open horizon that puts an end to
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correspondence theories of reality, from Plato to early Wittgenstein. On their account, Gadamer
and Heidegger did much to show how the hermeneutic situation precludes that there can be an
objective ground from which the essential structures of understanding become transparent. (BT
363, 195, 275).

Be that as it may, and while the hermeneutic circle is understood rather as a procreative,
ontopoetic episode promulgating Heidegger’s “worlding world”, it remains to be reckoned with that the
hermeneutic rapture is simultaneously degenerative, in ever distancing Dasein from digressing to the
singularity event of its own original world disclosure. The hermeneutic circle more or less builds up a

“past” essentially different from that which was originally “there”, rendering that original “there”
into a mere ontic prejudice that must be reified ever-anew. This generative-degenerative buildup
occurs in the process which Gadamer coins as “reconstruction” and “restoration”.12 Both
Gadamer and Heidegger consider the world-generative aspect of the hermeneutic event more
important and valuable than its degenerative aspect, and for the world’s ec-static justification,
rightly so. But the third, degenerative function of the hermeneutic circle has remained relatively
unrecognized, perhaps at its most important implication, namely in that it sustains the asymmetry
between the ontological and the ontic interpretations of history.
When Heidegger writes that it is rather the art that creates the artist, he is either
misunderstood to have meant that the work more or less merely reorganizes the emotional
constitution of the artist, or at most that the experiencing of the work-making somewhat affects
the artist’s perceptual biases. If neither, then Heidegger remains incomprehensible to the
mainstream art historian, who understands that art comes into a world already in existence and in
full force, and definitely not that a world, including the artist, his teachers, his tools, the work
itself, etc., literally comes forth because (although not causally), and thus out of, that art. This
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understanding is clear, though implicit in one of the most prominent figures in the field, Sir John
Boardman’s ontic assessment of the origin of Greek art. In his 1978 and 1985 handbooks Greek
Sculpture – The Archaic Period, and Greek Sculpture – The Classical Period, the acclaimed
Oxford professor assumes a preexisting historical world-background which for Heidegger could
have only been established because of, and thus “after” the given art. But not so for Boardman:
The physical turmoil of Greek history in the early decades of the fifth century was answered in
Greek art by what appears to be a sure and steady progress, and the gradual changes in style
encouraged effortlessly, it seems, a revolution in the sculptor’s approach to his craft. This marks a
turning point in Western art. … The Attic temple programme was inspired by the historical fact
of the city’s recent leadership and military successes against Persia.13

Boardman understands the greatness of Greek art as a realistic representation, a mere
side effect triggered by the specific historical situation into which the Greeks found themselves
facing the invading Persian armies. Historical events come first and art follows. Some half a
century after Being and Time and Origin, Boardman’s publications, which gave the canon to
generations of art historians, remained factical readings of art, oblivious of Heidegger’s radical
hypothesis: to wit, that the foundation concepts which Boardman deploys and integrates in the
above excerpt, concepts such as “historicity”, “facticity”, “physicality”, “situatedness”,
“specificity”, “change” and “progress”, are cognitive and perceptual possibilities prescribed in
the temporal horizon of understanding disclosed by Greek art.
The unrecognized implication of the hermeneutic circle’s degenerative function –
Boardman’s unsuspected predicament - distances us from the original event and reconciles us to
an otherwise inscrutable “past” which actually was never “there”. It also forces the artisticallyinstigated historical consciousness into spinning out a foregrounding that has unfolded
incrementally and cumulatively as a past factical threshold at the disclosive horizon of the
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artwork. It is this perceptually malleable foregrounding that maintains the asymmetry between
the ontological and the ontic interpretations of history, so that the world may continue to “ex-ist”
in maintaining an ecstatic horizon of disclosure. Boardman, Osborne, Toynbee and all our best
scholarship of ontic science of Western history, never get a glimpse of the fact that the
hermeneutic event shyly integrates its own fundamental ontological, prescriptive determination,
and presents it to its own historical consciousness as a mere aftermath.
Besides the maintenance of the asymmetry between the ontological and the ontic
interpretations of history, the hitherto unaccounted degenerative effects of the hermeneutic event
blanket and hush the maintenance of an additional asymmetry, now between artisticallyinstigated fundamental ontologies which disclose to their preservers otherwise incommensurable
worlds. The blanket is lifted only when Dasein is freed from the constrains of science, here
historiography, to reflect on and compare its own embodied world determinations with samples
of alternative cultures’ monumental art. The degenerative aspect of the hermeneutic event –
“degenerative” in that it ultimately encumbers us from recovering the question of Being - has
guaranteed that, no matter how striking, as much unnoticed must remain the asymmetry between,
say, the classical Greek statuary work of Zeus of Artemision with the competent embodied
determinations of Egyptian or Taoist art. We do not even have to venture that far out of the
“Greek” world to see that Dasein’s all-inclusive historical enframing is obliged to reach out and
make its own any perceptual intimations that may otherwise be alien to its own. The
reconstructive and restorative integration of the Homeric archaism into Dasein’s historical
bloodline is just one such paradigmatic case in point, even if our fundamental ontological
analysis remained within things “Greek”. Informed by our case made regarding the hermeneutic
primacy of statuary art, Gadamer would point out that Boardman’s naive understanding of art is
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possible only from an hermeneutic standpoint that has lost sight of its own productive prejudices,
a consciousness that cannot do otherwise but to: “immediately ... recombine with what it has
foregrounded itself from in order to become one with itself again in the unity of the historical
horizon that it thus acquires.”14
Boardman’s inference of the innerworldly historical determinations which supposedly
instigate art, so that art may intuitively appear as a mere effect of a pre-established material
world, requires the cumulative transhistorical effect of this ontic foregrounding, of which
Boardman’s account is only a latecomer. Nonetheless – and, theoretically speaking – as soon as
we have justified and acknowledged the ontological primacy of the work with a non factical
reading of art, an exhaustive sequencing of the primordially accrued ontic foregroundings would
suffice to take us upstream to the fountainhead of Dasein’s absolute productivity of historical
determinations. This retrogressive expedition would exhaust itself to no “earlier” than the
metaphysical first principles which have founded, grounded, and bestowed by the work. The
viability of this exhaustive phenomenological sequencing, though practically an impossible
project, would in theory reset straight the paleo-ontological deficit between fundamental
ontological and ontic temporality, and this is a better, more intimate problem to solve than the
alienating project to infer the origin of the world in the empiricist, scientific assumptions of
substance ontology.
The elusive “Archimedean foundation” is fully disclosed as art, but only if we let the
work speak to us instead of imposing facts to its constitution. It is art, authentically historic,
monumental tragic art, that is, which reveals the exhaustive description of what it means to be
human. What follows here will attempt to show that it is in the statue alone, where the objective
ground from which the essential structures of understanding become transparent. The subjective
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prejudice of throwness and of finitude is itself objectified, if we can determine that the tragic
meaning of what it is to be human is an a priori condition for the horizon of world disclosure.
The tragic truth is a “foundation”, inasmuch as that this truth is the condition of world disclosure.
The tragic truth is a “foundation”, inasmuch as that this truth is the condition of world disclosure
for the being-towards-death; this tragic truth is “objective”, inasmuch as it prescribes that the
hermeneutic circle must remain a subjective situatedness; and this tragic truth is an “exhaustive
description”, inasmuch as, as Heidegger anticipated, the entelechy of Dasein’s world programme
is a “beginning [that] already contains the end latent within itself.”
Launching an investigation only from Dasein’s factical concerns allows the Hermeneutic
Circle to interfere and determine that any research for cultural origins is ill fated, because the
futurally concerned civilization evolves by carrying with it and transfiguring its own past
instances of situation and finitude into its ever new apprehensions of reality. For Heidegger and
Gadamer the hermeneutic circle ultimately is not an impediment but a constructive ontological
event: through it truth and reality is spawned, albeit this truth and reality buries the essential
structures of the understanding as a “merely” hermeneutic event, a mere performance.
This principle must be constantly upheld against all of Heidegger’s critics: that Heidegger
is an a priori anthropologist who distinguishes between three overlapping layers of
epistemological inquiry: the ontic, the ontological, and the fundamental ontological.
Fundamental ontology alone is in the last analysis what we call “phenomenology”, i.e., the
principled science of investigating how and why, in the first place, the being of beings is
interconnected and contextualized to become eidetically available for the being-towards-death.
The ontic and the ontological inquiries are subsumed to fundamental ontology, because, as we
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read in Being and Time, “... the necessity arose for a fundamental ontology which would have as
its theme that being which is ontologically and ontically distinctive, namely Da-sein.” (BT 37)
If the fundamental ontology of Dasein can unearth its Archimedean moment, the origin of
our quest for origins must evince as some sort of a cultural, primordial fossil which is not
contained by, but rather contains the prescriptions of the thetic, eidetic, and finite, existentiell
consciousness, so that the overlapping hermeneutic circles of throwness and finitude leave it
unaffected. Such cast prejudices of a blind adherence to a world, primordial fossils which remain
stubbornly unfeigned to the transformation of the past into ever new and familiar apprehensions
of reality, we casually think of as the art of strange worlds bygone.
Heidegger ponders how things from antiquity can still appear objectively present as
innerworldly things in today’s world. But by talking of “things historical”, it is likely that he
means the historically authentic works, and not the authentically historic. This is suggested in the
following passage from Being and Time:
How are these … things historical when they are, after all, not yet past? … Or do these ‘things’
‘in themselves’ yet have ‘something past’ about them although they are still objectively present
today? … What were the ‘things’ that they no longer are today? … What is ‘past’? Nothing other
than the world within which they were encountered as things at hand belonging to a context of
useful things and used by heedful Da-sein existing-in-the-world. That world is no longer. But
what was previously innerworldly in that world is still objectively present. (BT 380)

Not all ancient works of art are made of the hermeneutic prescriptions of thetic and finite
consciousness, even if they themselves are monumental works by means of their having founded,
grounded, and bestowed discernible, alternative perceptual world programmes. The historically
authentic work is the work which surrenders its monumentality to the hermeneutic circle. It is
Heidegger’s “innerworldly thing”, the Archaic kouros, the Iliad, the laughing Buddha statue, the
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Upanishads, part of an ever modifiable and adjustable, hermeneutically liable “past”, determined
so through our futurally concerned quest for origins. Such a work, because of its
“innerworldliness”, is contained and thus corruptible to hermeneutical modifications by the
thetic, eidetic, and finite historical consciousness.
Contrarily, the authentically historic work contains the hermeneutic prescriptions, being
the origin of the possibility of interpreting any past out of any future. No matter how situated in
throwness and finitude is their interpretation, these works are not liable to hermeneutic
modification, because if they were to be modified, the modifying powers of the understanding
that attempt the modification, i.e., the powers which preserve the work for its preservers in the
first place, would have to turn against and modify themselves out of their own modifying
powers, and thus render themselves impotent to render the modification.
We know that we have arrived at the fountainhead of Western metaphysics through the
competent, non-factical end of the inscriptive evidence of Dasein’s fundamental ontology, when
in the authentically historic work that we examine, we meet with no other than the hermeneutic
prescriptions that enable our examination. The primordiality of the authentically historic artwork
has established itself as the fundamental ontological terminal past, as opposed to the ontic
terminal past which empirical science identifies as a “Big Bang” of ultimately an unaccountable
origin. But this fundamental ontological arrival is an arrival to an objective and potent everpresent that resists the corrupting subjectivity of the hermeneutic circle. For, no matter how
subjective, that is, no matter how provincially thrown and incomplete the interpretation of this
artwork may be, it would still be a tautology to Dasein’s consummate world project, since, just
like Dasein’s indeterminacy, the interpretation is itself a “beginning [that] already contains the
end [of throwness and incompleteness] latent within itself.”
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In monumental works such as the statue Zeus of Artemision, or Aeschylus’ tragedy
Persians, Dasein’s primordial world disclosure encounters as clearly as spectacularly the
resistance of the Other as such, while it reaches out to the Other to eliminate it as such and make
it its own. This is the artwork-originating modality through which, as Heidegger argued,
Dasein’s historical concerns engender and install for itself a certain path out of a threatening
future. The art whose ontological, aesthetic, and moral values are not tautological to the
movement of the understanding of the inquiring agency, is thus encountered as the Other which
Dasein must reach out and make its own in collective memory (koinomnemosyne). Dasein’s
biblio-thetic regiment is obliged to classify and shelf that art (African masks and surrealistic
paintings are prime examples), either as the exciting art of a queer and alien world, or at least as
less intimate instantiations of its own aesthetic evolution. The annexing of alien world-disclosive
art by Dasein’s historicity is executed as if by default, because nothing can be disclosed in
history apart from Dasein’s world: “Da-sein is primordially historical, what historiographical
thematization presents as the possible object of its investigation must have the kind of being of
Da-sein that has-been-there.” (BT 394)
Unlike the historically authentic work, the authentically historic work, though it may
casually and inconspicuously appear in the museum standing amongst other works and
innerworldly beings, is nevertheless the only unconditional constancy amidst the multitude of
innerworldly forms of contingency, uncertainty and ambiguity. In this sense the authentically
historic work is not of this world, - the world is of this work. The hermeneutic competence of
statuary art alone, shows that what makes it necessary for the authentically historic work to
casually appear amongst innerworldly beings, is the necessity that the metaphysical ordinance
which appears as “the work” must engage itself as the world’s implementing instrumentality. The
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world-instigating constancy has to appear in the ideational form of the human body, because
only this intermediary comportment between mind and world that speaks of itself while speaking
from inside that world can connect noumenal Reason with phenomenal Nature, by means of its
own embodied involvement in existential anxiety.
Heidegger’s incomprehensible claim that art creates the artist and her world, begins to be
vindicated only after we have made the distinctions between the monumental and the nonmonumental, the authentically historic and the historically authentic art. The distinction will
direct us to interpret the most competent works, since we already saw that, even if we remained
limited within “Greek culture”, we met with art that founds, grounds, and bestows
incommensurable worlds. These initial distinctions already suggest that in our arriving before
some art rather than another, our presented consciousness may realize that it is standing before
the ideational embodiment of its own world programme, this encounter affirming that a world, at
least this world, is indeed founded, grounded, and bestowed in art as Heidegger radically
proposed.
We conclude this section by having assessed why Heidegger’s theory of art should be the
commencing text for an investigation which seeks to infer the implicit theory of embodiment out
of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, instead of starting from Dasein’s factical concerns. The
artwork begins revealing its essence as the metaphysical decree of world interpretation, when its
phenomenological structures are allowed to talk louder than our own imposition on it of the
work’s factical presence.
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1.3 Why Looking in the Statue
It seems a paradox, that an elusive theory of embodiment sought after a metaphysics that
anticipates a world first disclosed in art, would not have considered the human body rendered in
statuary.
Heidegger addressed the phenomenological structures of the human body only as an
existentiell comportment. The body in itself is not worth much attention for Heidegger, since it is
thrown in Dasein’s spatiotemporality that is already there, prior to the body’s capacities for
sensation. Empiricism saw the body as the converging receptor of primary and secondary
sensations, but for Heidegger the body is hermeneutically inconsequential because it is not the
origin of perception. Scholarship has followed in this misleading path, having conceded to
Heidegger’s conviction that the body may give us access to beings but it does not constitute a
disclosive horizon that bestows meaning to beings, and that our body makes sense to us only on
the basis of an already opened horizon.
This particular conjecture does not take into account the larger picture in Heideggerian
metaphysics, where Dasein’s disclosive horizon in question must have itself become
phenomenologically available as some form of art, that horizon being the transcendental law
with which the human body must intimately and consummately identify. The natural world as an
incomplete state of affairs can be interfaced with only by that transcendental law which
embodies itself as the instrumentality of incompleteness towards the implementation of Dasein’s
teleological world programme. By “world programme”, we understand the programmatic
projection which Heidegger meant in writing that “understanding in itself has the existential
structure which we call project.” (BT 145) As it turns out, and as I will argue in my analysis of
Greek statuary in following chapters, the physical human body does constitute some sort of
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Dasein’s transcendental disclosive horizon, for otherwise our bodies would not make sense to us
as us as finite beings, if these bodies were not the instruments through which Dasein’s world
programme is implemented.
The anticipation of what the human body ought to look like according to some tacit law
disclosed in art, also explains our sheer horror and alienation when the human body is opened up
in accident, dismembered in war, or anatomized by science, or when we are confronted by
otherwise natural deformities of the human body, obesity the simplest one, or the more severe
ones usually found in third world countries with poor water conditions; the parasite mycosis
disease reconfigures the human extremities into shapes that resemble broccoli florets, which we
find an utterly uncanny sight.
Accordingly, Heidegger makes a grave hermeneutic mistake, a mistake which exposes
his philosophy to criticism from all quarters, when he attributes to the temple the original
disclosure of how the human body ought to look like. He does this when he writes in Origin that,
“[t]he temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on
themselves.” (Origin 168)
We read previously that Heidegger thinks the human body makes sense to us because it is
equal to all other innerworldly beings within Dasein’s disclosive horizon; but actually the human
body would not make sense to us - it would indeed appear a horrid sight - if within this horizon it
stood equal to other innerworldly beings such as broccoli. Our body makes sense to us as us only
in its somehow resembling the transcendental law of disclosure; to be more specific, when the
body is assembled by the phenomenological structures of the equiprimordialities of angst,
temporality, and care. Although it has not been noticed by neither art theorists nor
phenomenologists, in this embodied equiprimordial gathering the body resembles that one
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unique world object wedged in between mind and world. Because the human body is the only
configured phenomenological objectification wedged exactly at, and entirely occupying,
Dasein’s critical interface between mind and world, the body is more of a being than any other
beings, the body thus constituting the only exception in Heidegger's understanding that “[t]he
being of beings ‘is’ itself not a being.” (BT 6) If a given possibility of perception is enacted and
engendered by Reason, and if the phenomenological structures of the body as art are found to be
identical with the structures of Reason, then the body is the origin as the provenance of
perception, though not quite how the empiricists thought of it.
Were we able to demonstrate that some rendition of the human body in statuary art is
consummately made of those transcendental equiprimordialities, we would have shown that the
human body – that particular rendition of the human body – is the disclosive horizon of Dasein.
From this proof we can further derive Heidegger’s implicit theory of embodiment that connects
his philosophy with Greek tragic art, and thus to ultimately answer his critics and the question
regarding the cultural origin of Western metaphysics.
Heidegger’s failure to identify the human body as a fundamental ontological intimation
and consummation of Dasein’s metaphysical grounds, may be attributed to two preoccupations.
The first one can be seen as an uncritical conformity to the German romantic tradition which saw
art as the representation of beauty instead of as the disclosure of truth, stemming all the way back
to Winckelmann. The understanding of statuary art as representation is consistent in
Winckelmann’s analysis, and Paragraph 29 of Section One of his pioneering History of Ancient
Art, set out the tone by reckoning that architecture must be more “ideal” than sculpture, because
statuary is a “mere imitation” of the human body; on the other hand, architecture does not imitate
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anything actual, but “was obliged to discover its own rules by repeated trials, and establish them
by general approval.”
The second preoccupation may be Heidegger’s regard of the body as yet another representation amongst innerworldly beings. Kevin Aho, who attempted an ontic and ontological
inference of Heidegger’s theory of embodiment, rightly observes that Heidegger’s “... early
project is still to identify the metaphysical ground that gives meaning to beings. The result is a
tendency to re-present what is ontological - namely, the meaning of being - in terms of an object,
reifying the happening or event of being as a being, as something ontic …”15 In Origin, however,
Heidegger momentarily implies that the statue, as well as the temple, are not representations.
The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on
themselves. This view remains open as long as the work is a work, as long as the god has not fled
from it. It is the same with the sculpture of the god … It is not a portrait whose purpose is to
make it easier to realize how the god looks rather, it is a work that lets the god himself be present
and thus is the god himself. (Origin 168)

In Origin, the essence of the statue appears only within a world already disclosed by
architecture. But, as we premised earlier and will comprehensively argue in the next chapter,
architecture is not the arche-techne. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology could not have been
more wrong in premising that the world as an eidetic morphogenetic expansion begins to unfold
for “the first time” at the perimeter of the temple. The following passage is as unequivocal as it is
erroneous on multiple accounts (my italics):
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rockcleft valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out
into the holy precinct through the open portico. By means of the temple, the god is present in the
temple. This presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a
holy precinct. It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around
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itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing,
victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The
all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people. Only
from and in this expanse does the nation first return to itself for the fulfilment of its vocation. …
‘the temple-work, in setting up a world ... causes it to come forth for the very first time.’ (Origin
167, 171)

In fact it is the other way around. Again: if we can read beyond the work’s factical
presence and demonstrate that some monumental disclosure of the human figure in sculptic art is
essentially made of the transcendental equiprimordialities of angst, temporality, and care, that is
to say, if some statuary art is found to intimately and consummately manifest Dasein’s existential
analytic, thus idealizing the human body as the only innerworldly object wedged in between
mind and world being their connective interface, then we would have shown that it is rather the
statue that houses the temple. Heidegger asks: “With what essence of what thing would a Greek
temple agree?” (Origin 162) The answer he expects is that “it agrees with nothing”. We answer: the
Greek temple agrees with the essence of the statue presented as the statue, because the
phenomenological structures of the temple as such are perceptually affordable only by the
perceptual possibilities disclosed by the statue. Conversely, just because the said transcendental
equiprimordialities evidently are not present in the temple, or rather as the temple, then the
statue would not be disclosed, or at least would not be disclosed as such, if, as Heidegger
thought, it was the temple that is setting up a world.
The presence or absence of the transcendental equiprimordialities of world disclosure in
the work, or rather as the work, is our only way of validating both the work as the possible origin
of a preservable collective consciousness, one possible version of which Heidegger describes as
“Dasein”, but also for qualifying statements about the identifying of the work’s preservers to the
work. Were we to mistakenly use the temple as the origin of the ontological, aesthetic, and moral

28

constitution of the people, the temple being an art form where the perceptual inscriptions are
arguably absent, we would have lost sight of the grounds from which to infer the people’s world
programme. To art historians the structures of Reason may have been regnant on a Doric temple,
but the equiprimordial conditions of angst, temporality, and of care, which precede thought (the
case Heidegger made against Descartes), and which though themselves not innerworldly beings
nevertheless do summon and gather the structures of Reason in the ideal human body, are not
even implicitly present in the temple’s rhythm.
With such a loss of sight, fundamental ontology can be easily warped and slanted
according to the whim of circumstantial political motive to alternative world programmes - now
actually mere existentiell policies - that may be ignorant to the “human condition”. In pointing to
the (relatively speaking) hermeneutically vacant temple as the origin of the people, the Freiburg
professor in 1935 exposed himself to accusations that his “philosophy” is actually Nazi
propaganda in disguise. Faye could not help but make it a point that Heidegger was “referring to
the temple as an ‘enrooted and outspreading middle, in which and on the basis of which a people
founds its historical sojourn’.” This at the time when Hitler was speaking to the NSDAP at the
Zeppelinfeld in Nuremberg, amidst a sea of swastikas, around the Zeppelintribune, a large
structure of colonnades and basins intended to recreate the Greek atmosphere of the Pergamon
Altar. Faye is justified in seeing Heidegger the Nazi, “[t]o speak two months later [than Hitler’s
speech], in his lecture, of the ‘temple’ in which the people ‘comes to itself’ (which is not a Greek
but a Nazi conception) and of the ‘clearing’ ... such was the way chosen by Heidegger to
celebrate the congress …”16
Gadamer fostered Heidegger’s arguments on the primacy of architecture, but fell even
further afield. In his connecting Heidegger with the hermeneutic tradition from Schleiermacher,
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to Husserl, Ranke, Droysen, and Dilthey, Gadamer advanced and established the currently
predominant hermeneutical theory. In this theory the hermeneutic primacy of monumental
statuary is given a mere decorative role. Gadamer sees that the most plastic of the art forms is
architecture, because of its creating and bestowing original space to the other arts. The following
passage, underscoring Gadamer's implicit adherence to substance ontology by his understanding
statuary art as a mere representation, is from his Truth and Method.
Architecture gives shape to space. Space is what surrounds everything that exists in space. That is
why architecture embraces all the other forms of representation: all works of plastic art, all
ornament. … By embracing all the arts, it asserts its own perspective everywhere. That
perspective is decoration. … Even the free-standing statue on a pedestal is not really removed
from the decorative context, but serves to heighten representationally a context of life with which
it is decoratively consonant. ... Hence, given its comprehensiveness in relation to all the

arts, architecture involves a twofold mediation. As the art which creates space, it both
shapes it and leaves it free. It not only embraces all decorative shaping of space,
including ornament, but is itself decorative in nature. ... [I]t is clear that architecture
explodes that prejudice of the aesthetic consciousness according to which the actual work
of art is what is outside all space and time, the object of an aesthetic experience.17
Gadamer is correct to point out architecture’s role in ruining the understanding of art as
spatiotemporal transcendence. With the foundation of a certain rhythm, a given architectonic of
meaning frozen in stone may suggest the “aesthetic” which, as such, grounds consciousness in
situational spatiotemporality. Nevertheless, Gadamer will be first proven wrong, just in case we
demonstrate that statuary does transcend spatiotemporality if it is made out of the equiprimordial
horizontal temporality and care as the conditions respectively for the possibility of vulgar time
and the res extensa. But even before this demonstration, Gadamer gives space an indefensible
primordial status. On a first account, this primordial status is indefensible because it is not giving
us a good reason to dismiss Heidegger’s conviction that, “[t]he temporality of factical being-in-
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the-world is what primordially makes the disclosure of space possible [my italics].” (BT 417)
Architecture may generate and bestow space, indeed, it does manifest as space, but itself belongs
to the precedent horizon of temporal disclosure, which evidently does not present itself as
architecture. The temple is space, and does create space for the statue to appear within; but the
temple must first appear itself within the world disclosure of the primordial temporal horizon,
which, as I will argue in the next chapter, consummately manifests as the statue. If the temple is
frozen primordial spatiality, the statue is frozen primordial temporality. The existentiell
proposition that before the statue can appear in the temple, the temple must first itself be erected
within the Heideggerian earth’s spatial expansion, is ontologically counterintuitive, because the
perceptual horizon which opens up the possibility for the earth upon which the temple is erected,
is itself temporally pressurized, and as such, of a higher primordiality and is first disclosed as the
statue. If the temple’s opening up of space was the original disclosure of the “there”, as the Da of
Dasein, then the temporal horizon of disclosure would have had to walk in, in that opened space,
by means of the temple’s preserver constituting the part of Dasein that is sein, a false assumption
that would revert us to Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, where space and time belongs to a
priori cognition. But for Heidegger space and time are not receptacles of beings, nor do they
belong to the “I”; they belong to Dasein, and are first disclosed to the preservers of some art
form as an art form. That art form is not the temple, because the temple appears not as time, but
as space.
As the next chapters will explore in detail, both primordial temporality and the possibility
of regional expansion being grounded in temporality first appear as embodied formal provenance
in what we otherwise casually understand as the “statue”. The statue’s agalmatic quality, from
the Greek noun agalma dubbing for both “statue” and “fascination”, earns its monumentality in
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fascinating us by means of its inconspicuously giving flesh to nothing more or less than our own
fundamental ontological world project. As an ideation, it is the statue rather than the temple
which is the most immanent art form to appear the closest to the instrumentality which
implements Dasein’s world project. The temple is not instrumental to that project, first because
Das Man does not appear and act in the world embodied as a temple - for the same reason that it
does not appear as a poem - but also because in its objective imposition the temple just is, it is
homeostatic and devoid of kinaesthesis; it does not ek-sist, i.e., does not “stand-out-of-itself”,
and thus cannot project the situated subjective fitness needed to interface itself with a world
which is only because it is yet to be. To originally and manifestly unleash Dasein’s world project
into a world, the competent art form must embody a kinaesthetic contingency, since, as
Heidegger notes: “[b]ecause of the kind of being which is constituted by the existential of
projecting, Da-sein is constantly ‘more’ than it actually is.” (BT 145) The Doric colonnade may
have institutionalized in spatial monumentality the objective structures of Reason, as art
historians will reckon, but in its lithic articulation the temple is static; it lacks the regional
situatedness and does not incarnate the temporal existential pressure to instigate the kinaesthetic
expansion for the ever more disclosure of eidetic spatiality. The temple posits itself as it is, and
in this positing context it may found, ground, and bestow thetic spatiality, but “thesis” in Greek
means more than to be positioned; as we will further see in detail, it means to be situated.
Heidegger anticipates such subtle loss in the translation of the word “thesis”, both when he
writes that “the rootlessness of Western thought begins with the translation of Greek words by
Roman”, but also when he acknowledges the kinaesthetic disposition of the situated being, in
pointing out that “‘thesis’ means setting up in the unconcealed.” (Origin 149, 186) Gadamer thinks
that architecture is the most “plastic” art form. But “plathein”, “to give shape”, to “morph”, is a
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kinaesthesis, the creative force which makes itself manifest in the work. If Heidegger’s
fundamental ontology can embody itself in the world of experience, this creative force is enacted
by the existential pressure of the understanding of finitude, and from that initial pressure, then
through the regional expansion that seeks to thematize and sort out every contingent motive.
For the above reasons, it should begin now to become obvious what a monumental
hermeneutical mistake it is to demote statuary art to a mere decorative role, and divert our
attention to architecture and language. Charles Waldstein does not go as far as to connect
classical Greek statuary with Dasein’s existential analytic, but he already understands the
unparalleled heuristic value of ancient statues, as being “things in themselves”. In his Essays on
the Art of Pheidias, he knows the difference between “[a]n inaccurate passage from any
miserable scholiast of the 12th century who happened to write Greek, [having] more convincing
power over the word-enslaved minds of many modern scholars than the life-long careful
comparative study of form in the things-themselves.”18
Gadamer follows Heidegger’s understanding of the hermeneutic circle as an ontological
event, but plays upon Heidegger’s half-heartedly entertaining the idea that language holds a
privileged hermeneutic position in the domain of the arts. Twice in Origin Heidegger clearly
voices this position; first by writing that “... the linguistic work, poetry in the narrower sense, has
a privileged position in the domain of the arts. ... Language, by naming beings for the first time,
first brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to their Being
from out of their Being”; and then again: “... since language is the happening in which beings
first disclose themselves to man each time as beings, poesy - or poetry in the narrower sense - is
the most original form of poetry in the essential sense.” (Origin 189, 199) But Heidegger is also
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admitting that it is arbitrary to trace back all the other forms of art, sculpture included, to poetry.
(Origin 198, 199)

Gadamer, however, thinks that the original ontological event describes itself
phenomenologically even in everyday, relatively non-poetic, that is, non-creative but rather
descriptive language: “The articulation of the logos brings the structure of being into language”,
he writes. “Human thought regards the infinity of this presence as its fulfilled potential, its
divinity. ... in language the order and structure of our experience itself is originally formed and
constantly changed.”19
The expectation that language originally discloses and archaeologically preserves in
everyday discourse a world’s primordial grounds of objectification, on first account does allow
for both fundamental ontological and factical investigations of the sedimented linguistic
evidence. In the cases we undertake, the fundamental ontology of a world programme may be
derived from that world’s monumental linguistic narrative, and Eric Havelock, E.R. Dodds, and
Bruno Snell do exactly that when they draw the blueprint of the fundamental ontology of
Archaic Greek culture, detecting in the Homeric verse a sense of primordial spatiotemporality
which we find to be alien to Dasein’s. But in our context of seeking the embodied existential
analytic of Dasein, the archaeological analysis of linguistic sedimentation ultimately proves to be
insufficient and unreliable.
Insufficient, because, at least in the case of Dasein’s perceptual project from within
which we can have a say, it is not as a poem that “sein” is thrown into the “Da”.
Phenomenologically speaking, the being of beings manifests in embodying itself as Das Man,
that is, an instrumentality which acts upon its own existential predicament, not when it merely
talks about it as Gadamer’s “divinity of Logos” and as a “fulfilled potentiality”; Dasein is
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thrown, and thus it is not an immortal divinity. Heidegger understands that Dasein has a world
only because that world resists Dasein's will to live: “Only because things offering resistance are
disclosed on the basis of the ecstatic temporality of taking care ...” (BT 356) Were it for Dasein to
be a noumenal ecstasis alone, Gadamer’s divine Logos reaching out to thematize every motive,
this noumenal being-there-ness would not suffice to produce a world; Dasein would not have a
world if it did not actually have some-thing to throw against that world as its own reified thing.
That some-thing, is on every single first account no other than Dasein’s “human” body, be it the
arm that extends the bow to sling an arrow, the mouth that screams behind a megaphone to a
street protest against injustice, or the foot which accelerates an automobile.
Suppose we were to rely on language, or worse on language alone; what sort of an
archaeologically preserved text would we choose to bear the original disclosure of Dasein’s
fundamental ontology? And what text would it be, that would make no less than the elusive
connection between Heidegger’s conception of Dasein and Heidegger’s challenged
preoccupation with the Greeks? The rational Platonic dialogue, or maybe more so the Greek
tragedy, should be such monumental texts upon which to investigate the fundamental ontology of
Dasein’s existential predicament. But unlike in the case of statuary art, the origin of such texts is
itself disputable and disputed by cultural vindicationism premised on seniority. The ultimate
effect of this disputation is that the hermeneutic potentiality of such texts is diluted. These texts
are then at best forced to partake on equal membership in a pool of perceptual cultures that are
actually alien to Dasein’s fundamental ontology. The Archaic Greek was just one of many such
visible alien perceptual cultures, which are supposed to have evolved within the world model of
substance ontology.
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Contrarily, statuary art allows a thorough fundamental ontological analysis, because the
qualified statue arguably incarnates the structures of Reason as the instrument of the worlddisclosing equiprimordialities of angst, temporality, and care. Statuary art is not subject to
surreptitious cultural modification, if the statue remains physically and essentially intact to reach
any subsequent interpreter. And neither has the hermeneutically competent statue ever been
disputed - it would be laughable - since, as we already mentioned, a strange silence has prevailed
regarding post-Archaic Greek statuary, amongst all those who have otherwise claimed every
single Greek cultural aspect as either stolen or appropriated from more senior civilizations.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EMBODIMENT OF HORIZONTAL TEMPORALITY
2.1 Figure as the Structure in Whose Shape Time Composes Itself
Heidegger does not provide the necessary analysis of how angst, temporality, and care,
that is, primitive Dasein, originally manifest as art within the world to which these determining
equiprimordialities are said to be giving shape. Was he to provide this analysis, in order to allow
an interface between these equiprimordialities being a transcendental law of disclosure on the
one hand, and on the other the phenomenological structures which appear in the disclosed
horizon for the being-towards-death, Heidegger would have to somehow trace the transcendental
law manifesting as poetry and/or as architecture.
The closest Heidegger ever comes to yielding something about this necessity, are the
ideas in Origin that the artwork instigates a rift for truth as strife that sets itself to work, and that
the artwork as a structure is composed by this rift. This, we may surmise from the following two
passages: “In setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work is an instigating of this
strife”; and “[c]reatedenss of the work means truth’s being fixed in place in the figure. Figure is
the structure in whose shape the rift composes itself. This composed rift is the fugue of truth’s
shining.” (Origin175, 189)
But is this “rift” the transcendental law of disclosure, which, nonetheless, as we premised
in section 1.7., must embody itself as the interfacing instrumentality to prescribe the world’s
incompleteness? It is not. Conceptually, the rift may, indeed, be the patent manifestation of the

37

world’s incompleteness and the world’s contingency; but the rift is itself an already conditioned
ontological event (Eregnis), since we know from Being and Time that the condition of the
possibility of innerworldly beings is not the rift, but something even more primordial: it is time
as the intuition of finitude. (BT 419) The origin of any meaningful possibility, writes Heidegger,
thus including the possibility of the rift as such, is time. (BT 325) Thus horizontal temporality, as
the origin of all origins, ought to be embodied in the most monumental form of art, or rather as
that art, “earlier” than any other noumenal or phenomenal phenomenological structure. For the
being-towards-death the strife in which innerworldly beings are disclosed, and hence the rift
within which this strife is objectified, is possible only in the lapse of irretrievable time.
Heidegger refers to Van Gogh’s painting of the peasant’s shoes as a work instigating the
rift. In my understanding, this painting discloses the strife between world and earth, where the
“world” is the existential necessity of the being-towards-death to toil in the face of ananke,
while the “earth” is the peasant’s toiling fields out of which ananke is transiently appeased. It is
the strife in the rift opened by this opposition, which discloses, that is, configures as a regional
res extensa, the given shape of the painted peasant’s shoes. As Heidegger sees it, the figure of
the shoes is “the structure in whose shape the rift composes itself”. The disclosed shape of the
shoes may intimate the rift which has opened in human experience to give the shoes their form,
but the shoes’ form, their “figure”, says nothing about the even more primordial and binding
truth which has made possible any and every rift, the “whence” of the strife, that is, the truth of
the being who in its own being invents and uses the shoes as such because its own being has
become an issue. This painting is “art” because its creativity describes a possibility of experience
within a given perceptual field by composing otherwise disparate parts of world and earth into a
meaningful unity. But this art is not monumental, inasmuch as it merely describes, that is, it does
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not prescribe the domain. As Heidegger wants it, the art which would prescribe the domain
should be an art that manifests itself as the disclosure of the temporal horizon within which
innerworldly things such as peasants’ shoes and the Peasant’s Shoes may appear in their
suchness.
But if primordial horizontal temporality conditions the possibility of experiencing the rift
as strife in art, how would it be possible for the work to be structured as primordial horizontal
temporality? How can the subjectivity of time - death pertains only to the “I” or to a sum of “I”s
as the “they” - objectify itself as the world-disclosive idealization we understand to be the
“artwork”? “The they never dies because it is unable to die ... death is always my own ...”, notes
Heidegger. (BT 425) If a world is first disclosed in art, and if time is the origin of predication for
the being-towards-death, then art in its most monumental manifestation ought to appear as raw
temporality. To rectify Heidegger on his own terms, we now have to say that: figure must be the
structure in whose shape time composes itself.
In chapter 1 we suggested why finite time, being the prescriptive transcendental law and
ultimate origin of predication, cannot manifest as poetry and as architecture. We argued despite
of Heidegger and Gadamer, that time as the transcendental decree must instead appear – and be
misunderstood as an idealization - in statuary art. In understanding the Greek body as the
instrumental negation of the negation to live, we do not necessarily imply a dependency on the
conclusions of Hegelian dialectics, but at this point only give Heidegger’s “being-towards-death”
the body that such a being can live by, and in this living to free itself by negating death. The
double negation involved appears uniquely in Greek statuary as a muscular narrative, where the
“muscle” is essentially intelligible as the phenomenological structure of affirmative
instrumentality towards action; it is this double negation that we positively understand as our fit
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“body”. In more tangible and visible terms, the embodiment of the double negation is patently
noticeable in the comparison between Archaic and Classical Greek statuary, where the Archaic
body lacks all the kinaesthesis and the intelligibility that makes us identify rather with the latter
kind of idealized embodiment and makes our art historians say that it is only the Greek masters
of the Classical era who “finally understood the human body.”
This chapter will demonstrate that the “muscle” as an ideation is fundamental ontology’s
ultimate subject of inquiry. What ontic science casually understands as the “muscle”, “is”,
preontologically speaking, primordial temporality having embodied itself ideally so that it can
act upon its own world programme. But before we begin letting the statue talk to us, instead of
our imposing on it our factical concerns, let us first be familiarized with what we are up against
in our radical interpretation, by laying down an account of some narratives that are dependent on
substance ontology, in which the muscle has either been misunderstood or triggered
dumbfounding questions.
2.2 The Muscle As Cultural Predilection
The muscle does not attain a monumental phenomenological structure “earlier” than the
Severe Style in Greek art, evinced by the Zeus of Artemision, even in world perspective. The
“gadget” slowly begins to burgeon in Greek medical discourse only after it has been introduced
in Greek art. For, while in Galen’s works of the mid second century A.D. the word mys (for
“muscle”) shows up 460 times, and in Hippocratic attributions established between 450 and 350
B.C.E.

it appears 14 times, in the Homeric saga it is totally absent.
In world perspective, the record from a rare fleeting moment of a first, unadulterated

encounter between two variant art-worlds, proves even more incredible. In his book The
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Expressiveness of the Body – and the divergence of Greek and Chinese medicine, Shigehisa
Kuriyama reports that when in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Europeans began to
study Chinese medical teachings, the descriptions of the body they encountered struck them as
“phantastical” and “absurd”, “like tales of an imaginary land.” “[A]ccounts of the body in
diverse medical traditions”, writes Kuriyama, “appear to describe mutually alien, almost
unrelated worlds ... Chinese doctors lacked even a specific word for ‘muscle’. Muscularity was a
peculiarly Western preoccupation.”20
Kuriyama traces the divergence of the “alien worlds” already well-developed at around
25-220 C.E.; in China by the end of the Later Han dynasty and in Greece beginning sparingly
with the Hippocratic opus, clearly with the Hellenistic doctor Galen of Pergamon, and entirely
embracing early renaissance Europe at the time of the anatomist Vesalius. Kuriyama offers a rare
glimpse to incredulity once we momentarily escape the shifty spell of realism regarding the
origin of the muscle:
Comparing the musculature portrayed in Vesalius’ anatomy [Figure 1] and the total absence of
muscles in the acupuncture man [Figure 2], we see almost irresistibly a puzzle about blindness,
about how observant Chinese doctors overlooked, strangely, one of the most prominent features
of the human body. Yet historically, the vision of muscularity was in fact the exception. Interest
in individual muscles and indeed the very notion of muscles – as distinct from flesh, tendons, and
sinews – developed uniquely in medical traditions rooted in ancient Greece. Elsewhere, as in
China, ‘ignorance’ of musculature was the rule. … When dissectors inspected the body in ancient
China they didn’t see the nerves and muscles that Greek anatomists found so arresting.

21
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Figure 1: Vesalius, Fabrica, 1543 AD
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Figure 2: Hua Shou, Shisijing Fahui, Acupuncture Man, China, 1341 AD

The disquieting view into this alien intercultural encounter leads Kuriyama into asking
pre-scientific, phenomenological questions, free from our own cultural biases and the debilitating
spell of substance ontology. Only such a rare epistemological environment can elucidate the
disclosive horizon event and the prescriptive origin of the essence in question. And although
43

Kuriyama still sees art as a representation, this does not stop him short from asking spectacularly
unassuming questions that force the rather odd convergence of theory of art, theory of
embodiment, and theory of perception that we ourselves have attempted here:
Greek artists represented figures with bulging ripples well before these ripples would have been
identified as muscles, and they represented ripples even where, anatomically, no muscles exist.

Yet if not as muscles, how did sculptors conceive these bulges they emphasized so? What
did these ripples originally signify? And what change in consciousness transformed them
into muscles?22
Kuriyama remains dumbfounded by the questions which his research orientation cannot
confront, lacking the conceptual tooling that we get mainly from Heidegger’s fundamental
ontology and from Gadamer’s hermeneutics; and yet even the formulation of such unassuming
questions alone is a vast progress, a solid launching pad for our own investigation. Kuriyama’s
report is indispensable in that it casts doubt from inductive, empirical observation, from
“phenomena that show up in everyday practices, prior to theoretical assumptions”, as Heidegger
wants, a doubt to the idea that the muscle is a universal essence, much less that the muscle is a
gadget invented by mollusks at the bottom of the oceans half a billion years ago. In conjunction
with Heidegger’s claim that science commits to the mere expediting of perceptual world projects
first disclosed in art, Kuriyama’s intercultural report suggests that Dawkins’ narrative is
epiphenomenal to the muscle as a phenomenological structure first disclosed in art. That is,
provided our pending demonstration that “muscle consciousness” partakes an embodied
metaphysical law, a fundamental ontological horizon of disclosure which makes Dawkins’
scientific narrative possible in the first place.
For phenomenology there is no world aside from a culturally-derived perceptual
construct, before any scientific investigation is possible the being-towards-death must find itself
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embodied into a world of its own making, no less than by a modality through which the beingtowards-death must find itself in that which it investigates. It is this metaphysical mandate for
natural conviviality that sends the theoretical biologist to the bottom of the oceans, because as it
is the case that Dasein must belong to its world, so it is that the world must belong to Dasein,
hence that the “gadget” must be found both in Dasein’s embodiment (as pectoral, abdominal, etc.
muscle), and in Dasein’s disclosed world (here starting out from the mollusk). Though this
cannot be pursued here, one must return to this point by the need to make the connection which
Heidegger’s critics saw missing between the subjectivity of the temporally-determined being,
and its objective world.
In the previous section we paraphrased Heidegger, to postulate that, as far as monumental
and authentically historic art goes, the figure must be the structure in whose shape, not the rift,
but time composes itself. With this postulation, and with all that we have thus far premised from
Heidegger’s reexamined fundamental ontology, we will next set out to answer Kuriyama’s three
pre-scientific aporias in the following order: (a) “what did the ripples originally signify?”; (b)
“how did the sculptors conceive the bulges?”; and (c) “what change of consciousness
transformed them into ‘muscles’?” To the first, our answer will be that the original signification
of the “ripples” partakes the primordial embodiment of Dasein as art, and as the disclosive
horizon of primordial temporality. To the second, we answer that it is actually the “bulges” that
conceived the “sculptors” as such, and not the other way around. And to the third, that the
change of consciousness which transformed the “ripples” into “muscles”, has been the entire
project of Western science, currently advanced in Richard Dawkins’ theoretical biology. But let
us take upon one question at a time.
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2.3 Time as Muscular Motility for the Movement of the Understanding
The pre-muscular ripples signified the embodiment of the origin of signification. The
ripples are an “origin”, as Heidegger saw it, of “that from which and by which something is what
it is.” (Origin 143) The “ripple” is the original, pre-scientific structure of this origin, and, precisely
as Heidegger predicted, and Kuriyama verifies extemporaneously, it appears first in art, as
“ripple” before it appears in science as “muscle”. This “origin” is not a foundation, as in
substance ontology, but an horizon as a whereupon of the disclosure of being. This origin first
appears in art as “ripple” before it appears in science as “muscle”, because as we premised
earlier, Dasein must embody and appear to itself in its nascent form as an instrument of its own
world programme, within a world of its own making and prior to any scientific investigation of
itself. The primordial signification of the signifier essence is possible only because this
primordial signification is necessary for the disclosure of any other subsequent innerworldly
beings into that endocrinological morphogenetic field of perception we casually call “culture”.
Time composes itself as a ripple in the figure, so that the figure, i.e., Dasein’s idealized
embodiment, can comport itself ideally into its own world by becoming the most intimate
instrument of resistance against the such and such of the world which ultimately resists Dasein’s
will to live. This congenial approximation between (“Western”) mind and (“Western”) world
derives the unparalleled “naturalism” which art historians find in Greek Classical statuary. To
negate the negation to live, is for the being-towards-death to resist this negation piecemeal
through labor and toil. As some neuroscientist put it, in this task the muscle is indispensable,
“whether in whispering a syllable, or falling a forest.” The “ripple” becomes “muscle” first in
view of this expenditure in labor and toil, and then as the object of the scientific inquiry which
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sets out to qualify the conviviality of the human with the natural world and to quantify the
“gadget” in order to increase human efficiency against a threatening nature.
At the origin of all quests for origins the “content” is raw, primordial temporality, and
“form” is the structure of the figure which integrates within itself the raw temporality until
Dasein embodies itself so that Reason may appear as Nature. As we will see in next chapters, the
embodiment of temporality in Greek art is just one and the most primordial of the “contents”, or
metaphysical mandates, through which the embodiment of Reason appears as Nature in Greek
statuary art in order to prescribe and act upon a particular field of perceptual possibilities.
Winckelmann, who may be responsible for Heidegger’s erroneous conviction that
architecture is Dasein’s original world disclosure, nevertheless did see the transcendental
rootstock of resistance having taken the natural form of the muscle in the statue, although he may
have understood it as a form of preternaturalness. In his analysis of the Laokoön Group,
Winckelmann reckoned with both the consummate relation between the muscle and resistance,
as well as with the unearthly origin of the muscle narrative. This reckoning is evident in the
following passage from his History of Ancient Art (my italics):
The serrated muscles on the sides, as well as others, are more prominent, active, and contractile
than is natural. … The action of these muscles in the Laokoön is carried beyond truth into the
limits of possibility; they lie like hills which are drawing themselves together, for the purpose of
expressing the extremest exertion in anguish and resistance. … Laokoön is an image of the most
intense suffering. It manifests itself in these muscles … every part of the body seems as if
straining with agony.
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Yet the consummate identity between primordial temporality and the muscle seems to
elude Heidegger. In Being and Time the only structural disclosure of primordial temporality
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comes in the concept of the temporalization of temporality, where “[t]emporality reveals itself as
the historicity of Da-sein.” (BT 322) The asymptotic inference follows from the fact that for
Heidegger time is the horizon of any meaning, and as such it precedes and does not concur with
bodily comportments.
The closest that Being and Time ever comes to see the muscle as embodied primordial,
horizontal temporality, is when Heidegger refers to Hegel’s vulgar understanding of time,
whereupon it is said that “this negation of negation as punctuality is time.” (BT 430, 431) The
connection is missed again at this point - earlier we saw why factical body structures like the
muscle are expected to be understood only untheoretically, in everyday practices - now because
of Heidegger’s underplaying the concept of resistance. Resistance is the concept that suggests the
hidden affinity between time and the muscle.
Heidegger grapples with this key concept in Being and Time initially to refute Descartes’
substance ontology, in terms of the resistance of the res extensa. But then he argues that
innerworldly things are not disclosed in their resistance to reveal themselves, but resist only after
they have already been fully disclosed in attunement. This is because: “[w]e encounter resistance
in not-getting-through, as an obstacle to wanting-to-get-through. But with this willing, something
must already have been disclosed, something which drive and will are out to get.” (BT 210) And
also because:
[B]eing affected by the unserviceable, resistant, and threatening character of things at hand is
ontologically possible only because being-in as such is existentially determined beforehand in
such a way that what it encounters in the world can matter to it in this way. This mattering to it is
grounded in attunement, and as attunement it has disclosed the world, for example, as something
by which it can be threatened. (BT 137)
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It is shown here that for the object to resist, something that matters must already have
been disclosed about the object; but at best it is not clear here whether that disclosure is granted
by default or whether it must be won through a more primitive encountering, where resistance
must be involved by necessity for the possibility of attunement in the first place. At another point
Heidegger also implicitly admits a pre-formative mode of struggle against the world’s resistance
to reveal itself, when he points to the privative function of the Greek word a-leitheia. “Truth
(discoveredness) must always be wrested from beings. Beings are torn from concealment. The
actual factical discoveredness is, so to speak, always a kind of robbery.” (BT 223) In view of the
need to further demonstrate the identity between time and the muscle, we can show without
contradicting, but rather complimenting what is argued in Being and Time, that Dasein does meet
with a resisting object in the process of attunement and prior to the object’s being an obstacle or
being hard to acquire; we will clarify that objects are disclosed in their resistance, or rather
because of their resistance.
What decides primordially that innerworldly beings must resist even prior to their
possibility of becoming obstacles or being willed as proprietary objects, is Dasein’s situational
manifestation. The origin of predication is precisely Dasein’s predicament of having to
determine an object which resists this determination. Ultimately this predicament is grounded on
primordial temporality, since Dasein does not have “all the time in the world” to determine the
object; Dasein is always rushing towards death. This hermeneutic predicament distresses prephenomenal Dasein and pre-pressurizes its existence, thus objectifying Dasein as a threatened
being, prior to the object’s obstructionary or proprietary resistance. It is this, more primitive
predicament, this manifestation-of-being-in-a-situation, which dialectically discloses the object
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in attunement in the first place, only because initially there is some-thing to be attuned to the
object of perception.
Heidegger explicates the intricate phenomenological undertaking of Dasein’s determining
the thing at hand, through the concepts of attunement and of anticipatory resoluteness. These
concepts are expansive enough for the analysis of the hermeneutical event in terms of other,
subservient concepts (mood, fear, curiosity, meaning, ambiguity, thematization, understanding,
etc.), but they are too broad to net the simpler idea which otherwise permeates Being and Time,
namely that for Dasein signification comes out of situation. But then it is even more unfavorable
to our case that in Heideggerian discourse these two latter concepts of signification and situation
are themselves rendered impotent to reveal the kinship between time and the muscle through the
intermediary concept of resistance. This is for two reasons: first because Heidegger discusses
signification only as a linguistic rather than a fundamental ontological event, justifiably so only
if we remain within Heidegger’s error that Dasein’s world project is first disclosed in poetry. But
if the situation which signifies the suchness of the object manifests not in poetry but in statuary
art, as we have suggested, then any artistic monumentality that may have been signified out of a
situation in poetry, or rather, as poetry, is already a distant and dimmed if not distorted echo of
the original, embodied fundamental ontological event. The closest that Heidegger ever comes to
seeing the dependence between signification and resistance in terms of time in Dasein’s
comportment as a temporal being, is when he realizes that “[t]he ‘origination’ of ‘significance’
can be clarified ... only in terms of the temporality of discourse ... [my italics]” (BT 350) Second,
now also the concept of situation has been debilitated, because Heidegger has veered off from
the Greek, to the Latin linguistic rendition of the concept, where, as it often happens in between
these two languages, something important is lost in the translation. In explicating the
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existentiality of the “being-there-ness”, Heidegger is prone to treat more of the spatial rather than
the existential determination of Dasein, forced as he is to derive the concept of “situation” from
the Latin in situ. The distracting bias of understanding Da-sein’s “situation” as being in the
there, rather than being in the is, is clear in the following passage (my italics): “Situation is the
there disclosed in resoluteness-as which the existing being is there. ... Resoluteness brings the
being of the there to the existence of its situation.” (BT 300) The issue may seem trivial or
overemphasized, until we see what is lost in our visiting the corresponding Greek word for
“situation”, which is katastasis. The Greeks may use thesis for (viewed) spatial determination,
for position, but may use katastasis to denote situation not as a spatial, but as that categorical
dwelling of being, opposite to idleness, in which new possibilities of disclosure have become
imminent by means of an onrush of existential resistance towards the inevitability of
decidedness. This dwelling is dialectical and categorical – the “kata” in “katastasis” - because in
katastatic situation the forms of resistance have themselves on both sides of the hermeneutic
event become eidetic, that is, accountable for under the categories of the understanding, so that
the embodied will and what resists it are now already reified or things-at-hand. And this dwelling
is also a “stasis”, because this dwelling is a standup, a lingering in what Heidegger coined as
anticipatory resoluteness. Dasein’s mode of attunement is world-constitutive when it becomes
katastatic, i.e., situated in the is and not in the there, the latter of which Heidegger would see as a
“standing reserve”. Of course the concept of katastasis is otherwise comprehensively expressed
by the rest of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in art, as a happening of truth in strife. World
disclosure obtains only “when” Dasein is katastatically situated: “Beings are discovered only
when Da-sein is, and only as long as Da-sein is are they disclosed.” (BT 227)
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The point here is that our access to the hidden identity between time and the muscle is
hinged on our demonstration that resistance is met with in both the phenomenal as well as the
noumenal realms. In true phenomenological terms, we need to demonstrate that the thing at hand
resists no less its hermeneutic determination than its material overcoming and acquisition, so
from this unexplored equilibrium the possibility may yield that that which resists Dasein’s loss
of world on either realm, is actually one and the same efficacy.
Heidegger goes as far as to tell us how the “subject” as an existential center of cognition
must have already identified itself for itself when it reaches out to the world to acquire only what
matters. But since: (a) “the primordial ontological ground of the existentiality of Da-sein ... is
temporality” (BT 235), (b) “time as within-time-ness arises from an essential kind of
temporalization of primordial temporality”, (BT 333) and (c) “temporality first [shows] itself in
anticipatory resoluteness”, (BT 332) there must also “be” a pre-objectified immanent dwelling of
katastatic situation where in the lapse of this primordial temporality Dasein projects itself now
as an effective, that is, “muscular” motility in the, and for the, movement of the understanding,
in order to dialectically resist a pre-objectified world that resists its disclosure. To simply put
the corresponding identity between the ontological and the fundamental ontological levels of
investigation, where the biologist discovers the mollusk inventing the primitive muscle, Dasein
discloses itself as a primordial “gadget” for the phenomenologist.
In this pre-existentiell encountering of itself the resisting primordiality of Dasein “is”
nothing yet but raw, “time-calculative” temporality, (BT 235) because it has nothing else to identify
itself with. It has at this point no signified “there” in situ, other than its futural concerns, no
reified structure to dwell into or grasp itself from, other than the precious irretrievable ticking
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away that resists Dasein’s factical potentiality-of-being. In this, as critical as unbearable an
immanent motility, “[t]emporality ‘is’ not a being at all.” (BT 328)
What is already disclosed in attunement is not yet the object, but so far only the
resoluteness to reach out and determine this rather than that object for the attuned, thrown beingtowards-death. What is initially willed is not the acquisition or avoidance of the yet-to-bedetermined object, but at this “earlier”, constitutive phase of Dasein, the determination alone of
whether the object in question fits what is anticipated by Dasein’s existential pressures and the
perceptual history with which Dasein arrives at the hermeneutic event. The disclosure of the
object in its importance ensues infinitesimally piecemeal in the punctuality of lapsing time, so
that there is still disclosive resistance even with the object having already been somehow willed.
At the early phases of the hermeneutic event the object is only partially and thus inconclusively
determined, otherwise the object’s properties would have been determined once and for all, thus
depressurizing and shutting down the otherwise constantly stressed temporal horizon of
disclosure. Appropriately: “Beings are not completely concealed, but precisely discovered, and at
the same time distorted. They show themselves, but in the mode of illusion. Similarly, what was
previously discovered sinks back again into disguise and concealment.” (BT 222) At the outset of
the hermeneutic encounter between the potentially willing and the potentially willed, only a
diminutive and inconclusive portion may appear out of what the potentially willed object may
actually turn out to be, if Dasein’s existential needs sustain the pressure for further disclosure.
Phenomenologically speaking, different situational orientations, or modes of attunement of the
perceiving “I”, may disclose variant and often mutually exclusive properties of the object. Hence
the being of the object is disclosed only after the “I” of perception is situated, as a follow up of
this or that mode of attunement, so that the object may matter in this or in that way. What matters
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initially, is the ongoing need for at least a partially conclusive appearance upon which the
decision can be made on whether the object of perception is actually willed as acquisition or
avoidance, whether and how the object matters. In other words, what “drive and will” is initially
projected, is not “to get” or to “avoid” the object, but first of all to determine it. The willed-fordefinition object remains unserviceable, that is to say, partially or entirely unsignified, for as
long as the willing “I” of perception is not situated, or as Heidegger would say, “attuned”. The
object discloses itself as an itinerant contingency, and only for as long as it becomes and remains
relevant to Dasein’s existential needs. Finally, for the object - any object and the world in its
entirety - to have become relevant, is in the very last analysis to have at least implicitly or
indirectly either resisted or supported Dasein’s will to live. “Da-sein awaits its potentiality-ofbeing-in-the-world in such a way that it reckons with and on whatever is in eminent relevance for
the sake of its potentiality of being.” (BT 412)
What makes a thing resist its phenomenological disclosure and subsequently its
proprietary availability for any given attuned will to live, may be the object’s unknown origin, its
prejudiced utilitarian orientation, or its already competing belonging to alternative
interpretations. The pre-scientific revision of the “ripple” into “muscle” that we already
discussed resembles the primordial such ontological symptom. This is a history of
phenomenological structures resisting Dasein not merely in their physical acquisition, but also in
their perceptual determination in the movement of the understanding.
The movement to first behold the object in determination through attunement, then either
physically avoid it or acquire it, is exteroceptive and ecstatic both as an hermeneutic bias and
only afterwards as a physical action of evasion or appropriation. Heidegger does not make this
important distinction, but it is by this, primordial temporal ecstasis, that the chronological age of
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the world ever increases, not only by the archaeological and cosmological discovery of the
world’s reified past, since this latter thrust accumulates only the determined results of the
investigation. Although only the compiled durations of the hermeneutical events that result into
reification and therefore spatial manifestation are visible and measurable in Dasein’s ontological
datability, while the intermediary critical and unbearable ticking of the attuning Dasein remains
unmeasured, the existential age of the world increases asymmetrically also and mainly by the
horizontal compilation, the accruing duration of hermeneutic resistance and the movements of
the object’s evasion and appropriation. The movement of the understanding to determine the
object of perception is enacted by default on the whereupon of the lapse of irretrievable time for
the being for which its own being has become an issue, while the motility in the physical world
to obtain or avoid the object that may palliate the existential issue is possible only
circumstantially and by means of Dawkins’ “gadget”. Dasein’s grounding in futural temporality
preordains that Dasein is threatened through a life-negating present descending from a lifenegating future, since for Heidegger “[r]eality is resistance” (BT 209) and “the present arises from
the future”. (BT 427) Accordingly, Dasein’s embodiment is muscular because the metaphysical
disclosure of temporality as a resistance to Dasein’s existence must itself be resisted in nature.
2.4 “Zeus” and the Foregrounding of Consciousness
So far we have responded to Kuriyama’s first of three questions: the “ripples” originally
signified the embodiment of Dasein as primordial temporality. But without the missing
connection that we are making here between Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and Greek art,
Kuriyama’s answers, when venturing to explain what he saw as an “enigma”, take the form of
generalities such that, these observations: “... construe the origins of muscle-consciousness in
terms of a shift from a teleology of cosmic motion to the spontaneous movements of autonomous

55

agents.”24 Nevertheless, even from the perspective of the historian circumscribed by his ontic
project, Kuriyama does make an implicit connection between the muscle and the embodiment of
the being-towards-death, a connection entirely missed by Heidegger, by phenomenology, and by
the aforementioned circulating ontic theories of embodiment. On the background of our own
phenomenological analysis of the hidden identity between the muscle and the grounding of
Dasein as a finite being, Kuriyama’s factical concerns make perfect sense:
[T]he rise of the preoccupation with muscles, I suggest, is inextricably intertwined with the
emergence of a particular conception of personhood. Specifically, in tracing the crystallization of
the concept of the muscle, we are also, and not coincidentally, tracing the crystallization of the
sense of an autonomous will. Interest in the muscularity of the body was inseparable from a
preoccupation with the agency of the self. … The obsession with muscles reflected the birth of a
new experience of embodied life and an altered perception of persons.

25

Of course Kuriyama is not the first to have seen an “illusion”, a “puzzle”, and an “enigma
[in] the European muscular body.”26 In his Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel had
resorted to mysticism in order to explain the Greek body, meanwhile having elevated the Greek
above all world art, because of its “spiritual secret accord.”27
What is so “godlike” about Greek classical statuary, however, what we find so
“beautiful” about it, is no more than our recognition upon it, as preservers, of our own existential
world-project. What distinguishes Greek art from any other comparable idealizations, is that,
because of its being the embodiment of primordial temporality, this idealized embodiment alone
appears as time, instead of in time. Upon our letting the work speak to us instead of us imposing
to it the factical concerns of the museum, the primordial signifier signifies itself as muscular
narrative, as Dasein’s resistance to what resists its will to live, and the monumental truth of
Dasein’s existence as a finite being sets itself to work.
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In the world’s history of art, the insurrectionary embodiment of temporality first registers
with Zeus of Artemision, [Figure 3] and climaxes with the Laokoön Group [Figure 4] some three
centuries later in Dasein’s independent datability. The relational structuring of existentiell
temporality, what Heidegger calls “datability”, which lapses in between these two subjects of
investigation for fundamental ontology, belongs only to Dasein’s foregrounding as the means
through which the being-towards-death reaches out in care to connect in a cogent and meaningful
whole a world which otherwise would not be its own.

Figure 3: Zeus of Artemision, Greece, circa 480 BC
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Figure 4: The Laokoön Group, Greece, circa 150 BC
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As an embodied world-disclosure, the art of Zeus prescribed the hermeneutic visibility of
the muscle in its eidetic suchness; it enacted the understanding that the “ripple” in art would be
seen as “muscle” in medicine when the scientific project took over the disclosure by art. In this
prescription Dasein reckons with the muscle’s archetypal forms, foregrounding them as the
“before” of Dasein’s inaugural objectification in vulgar chronology. Whereas an alternative artworld disclosure, say the Buddhist embodiment of the Chinese morphogenetic field of
perception, may have not afforded the visibility of the muscle whatsoever, Dasein’s factical
project not only finds the muscle to be part of its own embodiment, but is out to connect its body
with the world by finding the muscle also in both other world art and in the world of nature. This
ecstatic reckoning, out of the concern of being for its own being, is possible through the
temporalization of primordial temporality, “‘in which’ objectively present things come into being
and pass away”. (BT 333) The first objectification of “things-muscle” that comes into being in the
temporalization of primordial temporality, is Dawkins’ mollusk. This is the primordial
connection of muscular, that is, of the primordially temporal Dasein, with the natural world, the
“Big Bang” of the world’s fundamental ontology in phenomenological terms; it is also the
theoretical leadoff of the missing connection between Dasein and the natural world which
Heidegger’s critics have demanded. Through this ecstatic reckoning Dasein connects
primordially with the conglomerate of living agency in the motility of the ascendance of life
from the bottom of the oceans, where Reason comes to appear as Nature.
Accordingly, now towards an unbreakable and inexhaustive continuum from nature to
culture, Dasein must also connect itself with the dawn of its own embodied objectification, by
unearthing “things-muscle” as ideational representations in the primordial consciousness of
Dasein’s physical self. Dasein connects itself with nature by understanding its own derivation
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from nature in time, although it maintains the separation between the signifier (humanity as a
historical being) and the signified (nature), because: “history signifies ... the transformations and
destinies of humankind, human institutions and their ‘cultures’, in contradistinction to nature that
similarly moves ‘in time.’”(BT 379) As a historical being, Dasein simultaneously stretches along
towards its end and towards its beginning. The ecstatic retrieval of Dasein’s past as a havingbeen-there, has currently taken the connection of Dasein with the dawn of the consciousness of
its physical self as far back as the Lower Paleolithic Era in the Middle East, to the first known
artistic rendition of the human body, dated circa 233,000-800,000 years “ago”. The Berekhat
Ram Statuette [Figure 5] is described as the carving on volcanic tuff of the natural resemblance of a
protohominid female figurine.28 Muscular definition is yet too much to ask for from this earthly
mass, marginally cognizable as it is of human origin and representation.
But then the archaeologist will ask: if Zeus came first so that through Zeus’ art-world
disclosure the appearance of the Statuette as such may have become possible, how is it possible
for the protohominid who carved the Statuette to have already lived so long before the Greeks, so
that some Greek may have eventually descended from the protohominid to carve Zeus? This
paradox owes to the degenerative function of the hermeneutic circle which sustains the
asymmetry between the ontological and the ontic interpretations of history, a function we
introduced in section 1.2. The upset priority is viewed as a paradox only from an hermeneutic
standpoint which has lost sight of its own productive prejudices, or, as we already have had
Gadamer put it: “from a consciousness that cannot do otherwise but to immediately recombine
with what it has foregrounded itself from in order to become one with itself again in the unity of
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Figure 5: Berekhat Ram Statuette, Israel, circa 800.000-233.000 BC
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possible ontological interpretation of Dasein behind the ontic:
The being that we ourselves always are is ontologically farthest from us. The reason for this lies
in care itself. Entangled being-together-with-the-‘world’ initially taken care of, guided the
everyday interpretation of Da-sein, and covered over ontically the authentic being of Da-sein,
thus denying the appropriate basis for an ontology oriented toward this being. (BT 311)

Heidegger also anticipates our own radical agenda here to make the defaulted connection
between his metaphysics and the Greeks, by violating the ordinary and mundane order of history:
[T]he kind of being of Da-sein requires of an ontological interpretation that has set as its goal
the primordiality of the phenomenal demonstration that it be in charge of the being of this being
in spite of this being’s own tendency to cover things over. Thus the existential analytic constantly
has the character of doing violence ... Every ontologically explicit question about the being of
Da-sein has already had the way prepared for it by the kind of being of Da-sein. (BT 312)

The paradox would begin to dissolve once we realized that in our immediate, existentiell,
factical and unreflective understanding of time, we arrange the signified historical events as it
were by default into a rigid linear succession from past, to present, to future. Be that as it may, it
is a critical point of understanding Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to take account of the
contingency of the historical event-signification as a merely quasi-established temporalization in
Dasein’s each and every ecstatic hermeneutic episode. Heidegger shows that Dasein breaks off
with tradition at each and every instantiation of the hermeneutic event in the temporalization of
temporality, since this event is always no less than a rapture: “Temporality temporalizes itself in
the ecstatic-horizontal unity of its raptures.” (BT 397) For Heidegger the compiling mutations of
the temporalized historical event remain subject to constant and infinite possibilities of
reinterpretation and recombination from their foundations, and even within the same individual’s
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consciousness, far more so in Dasein’s sedimented sum of the they. In Heidegger’s condensed
wording:
[T]emporality temporalizes itself in every ecstasy … Temporalizing does not mean a ‘succession’
of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier
than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present, in the process of
having-been. (BT 350)

Heidegger’s at this point obscure concept of the temporalization of temporality, explains
our difficulty to accept the otherwise rigorous and cohesive evidence presented so far here,
suggesting that the world disclosed by Zeus is a world of a higher constitutive primordiality than
the historiographical world foregrounded by the hermeneutic possibilities disclosed by Zeus, and
an art-world to which the protohominid and the Statuette as such belong. The causal precedence
of the art which disclosed the Greek sculptor of the statue of Zeus over the art which implies the
“prior” existence of the protohominid sculptor of the Statuette is not anymore incomprehensible,
once we reckon with the mind-bending hermeneutic necessity that the history of the world is
reenacted afresh, in every ecstatic world interpretation, so that the compiled idiosyncratic
recombination in the practically infinite ecstatic foregroundings of some 250 generations of
humanity that distance us from the ontic datability of the Greeks and Zeus, ought to have actually
put the cart before the horse so that the Statuette comes before Zeus.
The complete restoration of the true priority of the fundamental ontological to the ontic
origin of the world would require no less than the production of the equivalent of a genomic
algorithm of Dasein’s entire perceptual history. In it, the reversal of the they’s compiled
hermeneutic effects would be retrieved from each and every of the practically infinite ecstatic
temporalizations of temporality in Dasein’s total historical consciousness, as this consciousness’
absolute productivity. For Heidegger historiographical disclosure and the selection of what may
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become a subject of history temporalizes itself out of Dasein’s futural concerns, so that the past
is not a fixed bestowal, but constantly selected, that is, prioritized, according to those concerns,
and thus idiosyncratically expansive under the threefold limitations of the hermeneutic circle and
out of Dasein’s futural concerns. To trace back, as it were in a reverse engineering, the very first
Heideggerian “preserver” of the perceptual prescriptions disclosed by Greek art, and this
preserver’s nascent foregrounding of an expansive factical past established as if immediately
anteceding the enactment of the perceptual prescription, – this is what the archaeologist would
ultimately demand.
Ultimately Heidegger does not address this most pressing issue of his systematic
metaphysics regarding the origins of the world as an idiosyncratic perceptual construct, although
in Origin he is clear both that a world is first disclosed by a work, and that the preservers of the
work can come only “after” the work has disclosed the world within which the preservers
preserve. This is made explicit in many contexts, amongst them in that: “… the temple-work, in
setting up a world … causes it to come forth for the very first time …” (Origin 171); and in that the
work anticipates preservers: “waiting for them … to enter its truth.” (Origin 192)
As a pressing issue, the question of provenance perhaps emerges only in the context of
Heidegger’s neglected theory of embodiment, having become important in the fundamental
ontological connections between Being and Time and Origin that only we have made here. These
connections from Heidegger’s seminal works suggest that for the Heideggerian metaphysics the
terminal origin of the they is not the sum of individuals, but art, while what we already have and
will further argue here, suggest that the origin of the they is Greek statuary.
And yet here once again Heidegger’s metaphysics is corroborated by Greek art: Zeus’
and Laokoön’s bodies may appear as the bodies of an individual man, but what this art’s ideality
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actually discloses is the prescriptive embodiment of the they, for the simple fact that Zeus’
muscular and proportional embodiment (and as we will later see, also Laokoön’s) is too ideal to
be the representation of just any individual man. This ideal individuality has puzzled art
historians throughout the history of the discipline.
Art historians typically reckon with the unaccountable ideality of the body in Greek art in
various ways, all of which are blinded in their factical understanding of statuary art as a
representation. Winckelmann explained away the ideality as a selective aggregate of real
elements elevated beyond its parts: “[t]he shape of beauty is either individual, that is confined to
an imitation of one individual, or it is a selection of beautiful parts from many individuals, and
their union into one, which we call ideal, yet with the remark that a thing may be ideal without
being beautiful.”29 Lessing, mistakenly attributed the ideality of the Laokoön on the sculptor’s
influence by Virgil’s account of the Homeric myth, where the Trojan priest and his two sons
were attacked by poisonous serpents sent by Apollo as a punishment to the priest’s protesting the
admittance into Troy of the wooden horse of Ulysses. This account, as it turned out, was itself
actually written a generation after the work was rendered. As it is the case with the
understanding of many art historians who followed the trailblazing German romantics, for them
the artwork’s function is not prescriptive, but descriptive. For Lessing sculpture is the copying of
nature, and Laokoön’s ideality, it’s “highest beauty”, supposedly owes to an adoption, from the
artist’s having:
[A]imed at the highest beauty compatible with the adopted circumstance of bodily pain. The
latter, in all its disfiguring violence, could not be combined with the former; therefore he must
reduce it; he must soften shrieks into sighs, not because a shriek would have betrayed an ignoble
30

soul, but because it would have produced a hideous contortion of the countenance.
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Palpable evidence for the deceptive ontic prioritization of Dasein’s foregrounding, is that
the prejudice which signified Zeus could not have been prescribed by the Statuette, for one thing
because the latter world-disclosive art is evidently not the embodiment as art of the prescriptive
horizon that can disclose innerworldly beings in their definite, resolutive suchness. The Statuette
is evidently not the embodiment of primordial temporality, Zeus is, and Heidegger showed that
historicity and thematization are ultimately grounded on primordial temporality through the
intermediary determinations of relevancy and care, which, as we shall see further, are also
embodied as Zeus: “If letting things be relevant constitutes the existential structure of taking
care, and if the latter as being together with ... belongs to the essential constitution of care, and if
care in its turn is grounded in temporality, then the existential condition of the possibility of
letting something be relevant must be sought in a mode of the temporalizing of temporality.”
(BT 353)

This artwork’s world-disclosure is evidently not horizontally temporal, perhaps for
similar reasons that the world-disclosure of the “Greek” Archaic kouros statue is also not
horizontally temporal. The Statuette is intelligible and signifiable as such in historical
consciousness only from Dasein’s futural concerns, that is, from the disclosive horizon of
primordial temporality embodied as art in Zeus. As we saw earlier, for Heidegger “… even
historiographical disclosure temporalizes itself out of the future.” Because of Gadamer’s
spontaneously foregrounding consciousness, historiographical objects such as the Statuette are
understood in their specificity and historicity and owe their hermeneutic constitution to Dasein’s
temporal grounding, although they in themselves – together with the indeterminable perceptual
field they prescribe if qualifying as world-disclosive art – may not “have-been-there”. Heidegger
invites confusion not providing for the radical exclusion of alien art-worlds such as the Statuette
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and the Greek archaic kouros statues, when he writes that: “Remains, monuments, and records
that are still objectively present are possible ‘material’ for the concrete disclosure of Da-Sein that
has been-there [my italics].” (BT 394) On the other hand Heidegger also indicates a need for
foregrounding when he allows a distinguishing between a culture of “our own”, of “foreign
cultures”, and of the need for a “synthesis”, in writing that: “With special regard to the
interpretation of Da-sein, the opinion may now arise that understanding the most foreign cultures
and ‘synthesizing’ them with our own may lead to the thorough and first genuine enlightenment
of Da-sein about self.” (BT 178)
Despite our unfolding case here, the kouros typology has been routinely seen by
classicists a direct progenitor of Zeus’ introduction of the Severe style, with some very important
intermediary renditions which we will briefly examine further on. The Kouros of Mount Ptoon,
perhaps the zenith of Greek Archaic statuary, of circa 530-520 B.C. [Figure 6], is a statue that
stands at 1.60 meters tall to his knees, as his legs are lost from below the knee cups. In Dasein’s
existentiell historicity this youth is said to have stood in his Pharaonic rigid frontality at the
entrance of the Apollo sanctuary in Boeotia. The slender bodily posture, left leg advancing
confidently, the arms bent slightly forth on the sides in an eagerness for an impending
participative action, the resolute chest beaming forth like that of a dasher at the finish line, all
concord towards an overall exaltation. Although, as Ridgway notes, motion is not
biomechanically expedited, there is a kinaesthesis denoted by a barely restrained eagerness,
entirely uncharacteristic of the Egyptian canon from which the kouros was cut.
Besides the conspicuous presence of muscle narrative itself, the biomechanical contingencies for
the possibility of embodied motility are collaterally engendered by subtler embodying
permutations which are distributed throughout a rendition, and which are most clearly
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discernible in comparative hermeneutics, in our case between the Ptoan Kouros and Zeus. Facial
expression, structural torsion, intentionality, the breath, and the gaze, are such contingencies
hearkening to the presence of musculature as the embodiment of primordial temporality towards
an unprecedented disclosure of kinaesthesis. Insurrectionary transfigurations must manifest from
no precedence whatsoever, to ground, found, and bestow the embodiment of the essential truth as
monumental artistic disclosure, in Heidegger’s understanding to “... bring forth of a being such
as never was before and will never come again.” (Origin 187) The metaphysical “negativity” which
Heidegger saw in having said that “time is ‘abstract’ negativity”, (BT 435) embodies itself as
muscle narrative that resists the negation to live, now in physical specificity; in doing so, it alters
the body profoundly and consummately.
The incarnation of negativity as the inevitability of time lapsing re-prioritizes what
matters in the disclosure of corporeal constituency and signifies newfangled phenomenological
structures now as a communal membership in regional expansion. Unlike a “space”, a “region”
is allotted and dwelled. From this inevitability of allotment and dwelling, the human body will
now appear as space instead of in space, following up the necessity of Dasein’s embodiment to
have also appeared as time instead of in time. In doing so, the embodied negation necessitates,
dictates, re-prioritizes, regionalizes and excludes over bodily features which may have had
already appear in “previous” renditions of alien embodiments (separate phenomenological
structures of “legs”, “hands”, “heads”, etc.) and which should be considered as intuitions of the
“human body” not as such and in themselves, but only through the compulsory foregrounding of
Dasein as the embodiment of the disclosive primordial temporality.

68

Figure 6: Ptoan Kouros, Greece, c 525 BC

This dictation, re-prioritization, and exclusion is grounded in the embodiment of
primordial temporality, and, being a necessity for the being concerned for its own being, it now
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becomes the equiprimordial constitution of Dasein as the Heideggerian concept of “care”. It is
the muscle, that is, the embodied intuition of finite temporality as an existential pressurization,
which dictates that the body must engender transitional planes in between features, them planes
turned into features themselves both in resolution as higher definition and in resolution as
resolve. The heedfulness to this embodying task is itself grounded in finite temporality.
Heidegger showed how “Care itself has been ontologically defined and traced back to
temporality as its existential ground.” (BT 351)
Heidegger brings to our attention an archetypal Roman fable, (BT 198) a “pre-ontological
document” as he sees it, where Care was crossing a river and she picked up some Earth clay and
shaped it into the human body. Care let Jupiter (Zeus in Greek mythology) to bestow the clay
with spirit. The metaphysical dispute over which deity the clay would be named after, either
Care, Earth, or Jupiter, is decided by Saturn (the god Chronos in Greek mythology, being the
same word for “time” in Greek language). So it is essentially the archetype of primordial
temporality, which decides that, since Zeus gave the spirit, then spirit should return to Zeus at
death; and since Earth gave the body, Earth receives the body at death; and since Care gave the
body shape, Care should possess the body as long as it lives.
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CHAPTER THREE
DASEIN’S WORLD EMPTYING AND WORLD GATHERING

3.1 The Embodiment of Primordial Angst: The Gaze
In the previous chapter we introduced a comparative hermeneutics between the Ptoan
Apollo and the Zeus of Artemision, respectively as the culmination of Greek Archaic statuary and
the insurrectionary disclosure of Dasein’s world programme in the idealized embodiment of the
Severe style. This comparison begun to address the two disclosive monuments in terms of their
founding, grounding, and bestowing discrete fundamental ontologies, literally incommensurable
worlds. In the last section of the last chapter we began discussing the collateral engendering of
subtle embodying permutations in the a-causal shift from the Ptoan Kouros to Zeus, due to the
in-corporation in the latter work of primordial temporality as muscle narrative. We understand
this as an a-causal shift in between these two monumental world-disclosures both in Heidegger’s
conviction that “the establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such as
never was before and will never come to be again” (Origin, 187), but also in observing, accordingly,
that nothing in the kouros embodiment foreshadows the fundamental ontological prescriptions
that manifest in Zeus.
The realist will object that the two works already share natural features of the human
body such as a “nose” and a “foot”, so that they must actually be no more than artistic
representations that do anticipate each other by belonging to the same world of substance
ontology. The realist will have to be reminded of her own perceptual bias, i.e., that the eidetic
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identity and epistemic facticity of the features in their origin and utility, their maintenance, their
interconnectedness and interdependedness in the human body in particular, as well as in their ties
to the natural world in general, this prerequisite and indispensable movement of the
understanding from the whole to the part and back to the whole which bestows to bodily features
with their suchness, is itself possible only within the disclosive horizon embodied by Zeus, and
within the exclusive perceptual field to which the realist himself belongs as a being-towardsdeath and a Heideggerian “preserver”. Bodily features, as all world features, are disclosed in
their suchness only in the dialectic-synthesizing movement of the understanding, where the part
belongs to the whole and the whole to the part. This cognitive kinaesthesis is patently embodied
in Zeus, but is absent in the kouros. Thus nothing in what we understand about the kouros
foreshadows what we understand to be embodied in Zeus. As we will further see in detail, Zeus’
unprecedented kinaesthetic appearance owes to its being no less than the embodiment of the
movement of understanding, as this movement is described by Gadamer:
[T]he movement of the understanding is constantly from the whole to the part and back to the
whole. Our task is to expand the unity of the understood meaning centrifugally. The harmony of
the details with the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. The failure to achieve this
harmony means that understanding has failed.
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We will return to see how it is possible for such an intelligible and intangible thing as
“the moving of the understanding”, itself to be embodied as art and thus become corporeal and
visible. What must be established at this point, however, is the observation that it is only in the
cross-examination of works like the Ptoan Apollo and the Zeus, where we can see that the
fundamental ontological values involved are not discernible on their own accord; that only in
comparative hermeneutics - where we remain vigilantly aware of our own perceptual biases - we
can discern how the accommodation of the primordial negativity affects the body and the gaze.
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This comparative hermeneutics, however, because of the typical imposition upon the artwork of
ontic facts, has thus far yielded only timid interpretations.
In the hindsight of their ontic project, art historians have typically seen an anticipatory
continuity of “representations”, until, as they say, the human body is finally understood, by the
Greeks. In this “progress” from the Late Archaic to the Severe styles, i.e., from circa 520 to 480
B.C.E.,

art historians have interjected a very small number of preserved works which are

typologically awkward and belong to neither styles, but are dated to have been carved within this
time span of some 40 years as a transitory phase in the sculptors’ contemporary understanding of
the human body. The best-preserved and most representative works at this threshold between the
Archaic and the Classical eras, which are showcased by more than 200 statues each, are just two
statues, the Kritios Boy [Figure 7] and the Blond Youth [Figure 8].
The Kritios Boy, about half-size of the average human, is preserved with most of its body,
while from the Blond Youth, a missing body of full size, we only have the head and part of the
torso. What connects these two works in our fundamental ontological analysis, is their partaking
the seminal abandonment of the archaic rigid frontality and the equally seminal sentiment for
structural torsion, a subtly higher definition of detail from what preceded them, a relaxation of
breath from the Archaic exuberance, and, most dramatically so, an uncanny facial expression
which shares nothing of the preceding Archaic gaiety nor of the forthcoming Classical harmony.
In these two preserved disclosures the exuberant smile of the kouros is radically decomposed
into a grim countenance, which, while it does not yet attain the maturity of the severe
determination and the sublimated wrath we meet with in the face of the Zeus of Artemision, it is a
frozen gaze into a dark abyss, as if the Boy and the Youth have just heard some very bad news.
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Figure 7: Kritios Boy, Greece, circa 485 BC
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Figure 8: Blond Boy, Greece, circa 485 BC
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Art historians discuss these two works in haste, as a brief and unceremonious transitional
phase from the closing relics of orientalism to the advent of naturalism, attention typically
focused onto what preceded and more so in what followed them. And although the economy of
our own agenda cannot pay justice to the hermeneutic challenge that these works pose under the
implications of Heidegger’s metaphysics and theory of art, we can at least introduce the idea
that, unlike the Greek Archaic statues which are the harbingers of a world alien to Dasein’s
existential project, these two works actually disclose something to the effect of the aes-thetic
prolegomena for Dasein’s embodiment. We may remain ontically naive and see only “technical
innovations” in the loss of the archaic smile, the darkening of the gaze, and the inceptive
structural torsion in all of its three spatial axes (slight tilt downwards, sideways, and to the right)
of the Blond Youth’s head (24.5 cm high); but in the light of what we have premised so far in our
fundamental ontological analysis, the artistic disclosure especially of the Blond Youth is arguably
the most dramatic and consequential ontopoetic shift in the history of Western art. Bruno Snell
must have instinctively felt that there is something very special about this otherwise underplayed
work, having chosen this face to illustrate the front cover of his 1953 classic book The Discovery
of the Mind – in Greek Philosophy and Literature, although only a remote of an implication,
since nothing about the Blond Youth is mentioned inside this important work.
There are at least three preliminary determinations we can postulate about the Kritios Boy
and the Blond Youth. First, that in our analysis of fundamental ontology these works are
evidently monumental; unlike their typical treatment as types of a merely historically authentic
transitory phase, these works are actually authentically historic (the critical distinction made in
section 1.2.), in the Heideggerian sense that they found, ground, and bestow a world as a
prescriptive horizon of disclosure. It is in the monumentality of these two works, I suggest, that
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Heidegger would have found to embody his claim that “Temporality first showed itself in
anticipatory resoluteness.” (BT 332) Second, that to these works’ insurrectionary gaze into the
abyss, belongs Dasein’s simultaneously fatal and world-productive absorption into the
deficiency of existence. And third, that these two works are the embodied, palpable proof which
validates Heidegger’s discourse regarding Angst as the primordial mood of world-throwness.
Heidegger looked for that primordial mood which would have disclosed the beingtowards-death as such. He found it in Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety, as a mood that owes its
exclusive primordiality amongst all other moods in its precipitating not out of fear for a
particular threat, but as a predicament at once less identifiable than the anxiety from some
specific threat, and even more burdensome. Heidegger argued that all other moods are possible
because of the initial unconcealment of nothingness by the primordial mood of anxiety. “In
anxiety I realize that I have been ‘thrown’ into the world and that my life and death - my Being
as such - is an issue I must face. In anxiety, Da-sein finds itself face to face with the nothing of
the possible impossibility of its own existence”, writes Heidegger. (BT 53)
This primordial “face” which allegedly faced the primordial Nothing, still according to
Heidegger, must be disclosed as art. I suggest that this alleged face is no other than the face of
the Blond Youth, since arguably no other idealized facial expression in the history of either
“Greek” or world art contains so precisely and monumentally the embodied primordial
predicament of the being for which its very being has become a burden under no specific threat.
Specific threat is implied where the tip of Zeus’ javelin is aimed at, and the Laokoön Group
struggles against the specific threat of Apollo’s sent serpents. But in the Blond Youth there is no
specific threat to cause angst and darken the gaze. While Zeus and the Laokoön Group bear out
the embodiment of Dasein as a temporal being, the Youth confirms Heidegger’s hypothesis
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regarding the pre-temporal primordiality of Angst, because the Youth has evidently cast his gaze
into a threat less identifiable than specific, and yet even more burdensome.
The horizontal ticking of time within which the being-towards-death must encounter the
engendering forms of the impossibility of existence, begins with this gaze into the Nothing, since
the negation of the negation to live which is apportioned in temporal succession must begin only
if this dark gaze into nothingness has been cast. This is the pre-ontological justification of
Dasein’s historical foregrounding, why the Blond Youth is befittingly understood by art
historians to have immediately predated the Zeus in Dasein’s datability. The gaze into the
nothingness of the Youth must have come “after” the kouros’ archaic smile and “before” Zeus’
“severe” gaze, because it is the seminal gaze into the nothingness which anticipates in anxiety
the possibility that Dasein would embody itself as a muscular being, so that it could resist, in
nature and as nature, the every this and that which forces it to stagnancy and resists its will to
live. This ultimate fundamental ontological prioritization was clear to Heidegger, who argued
cryptically in his essay What is Metaphysics? that: “[t]he nothing is the origin of negation, not
vice versa.”32
As suggested at the beginning of this section, the fundamental ontological values
involved are discernible only in comparative hermeneutics, not in the works themselves own
accord viewed separately. So it is only in the comparison with the historiographically bordering
gazes of the Ptoan Apollo and the Zeus of Artemision, where we find the Blond Youth’s facial
expression to be “uncanny”. Why “uncanny”? Because, here, in comparison, gone is the
saturated, Dionysian gaiety in the gaze of the kouros, and nowhere to be seen is the razor-sharp,
focused, lethal determination of Zeus’ Doric gaze. The gaze of the Blond Youth has been
summoned into a consummate silence. In facing the Nothing, the gaze has emptied itself.
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Nietzsche said it, that when we stare at the abyss, the abyss stares back at us. Abyssus abyssum
advocat. Heidegger’s elusive theory of embodiment anticipates the existence of this empty gaze
in the world’s art history, even if such works were to have been destroyed or yet to be found in
the world as art history. This art of the body escapes the imposition upon it of ontic facts, as this
utterly silent face finds a voice to speak to us meaningfully in the context of Heidegger’s
fundamental ontology. Writes Heidegger: “The call speaks in the uncanny mode of silence. And
it does this only because in calling the one summoned, it does not call him into the public idle
chatter of the they, but calls him back from that to the reticence of his existent potentiality-ofbeing.” (BT 277)
Although the kouros statuary was typically a funerary dedication, the Youth as all kouroi
is not a representation, a commemorative portrait of an actual Greek man who lived and died.
Portraiture depends on the possibility of individuality, as this individuality pertains to a temporal,
that is, finite being. The possibility of individuality is disclosed only because of and after the
Youth, rightly so in Dasein’s archaeological datability, and with the advent of Zeus. The gaze of
the Youth is the prolegomenon to Dasein’s disclosure as world, the embodiment of the preontological condition of individuation which Heidegger describes as the anxiety of being-in-theworld ahead of any world determination. “... [W]ith the phenomenon of Angst a distinctive kind
of attunement has become the theme of our interpretation. Angst individualizes and thus
discloses Da-sein as a ‘solus ipse’” (BT 188)
Havelock, Dodds, and Snell have comprehensively suggested, there is no sense of
individual self as a unified agent and knower in the Archaic world. Instead of representing the
facial characteristics of an individual man, what is actually unconcealed by the silent gaze of the
Youth, is the prescriptive mood of Dasein’s embodiment as a temporal being. As we saw above,
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Heidegger thought that primordial temporality is conditioned on the even higher primordiality of
unspecified anxiety, on Dasein’s threshold stare into the abyss, whereupon Dasein comes face to
face with the possible impossibility of existence. This is why “the nothing is the origin of
negation, not vice versa.”
In primordial Angst the gaze has emptied itself of world; when Dasein is not
katastatically situated in subjective fitness, the world has become irrelevant. The Youth’s gaze is
that art in which the embodiment of Dasein as the possibility for an emptied world is
monumentally disclosed for its preservers, and Heidegger anticipates this artistic disclosure of
Dasein’s encounter with an unattuned world when he writes that: “[t]he nothingness of the world
in the face of which Angst is anxious does not mean that an absence of innerworldly things
objectively present is experienced in Angst. They must be encountered in just such a way that
they are of no relevance at all ...” (BT 343)
Compared to the embodied world disclosures which preceded and followed in Dasein’s
“Greek” historical foregrounding, the Youth’s mood lingers under the spell of a debilitating
deficiency. Whereas the gaze of the general embodiment of the Ptoan Apollo transcends
necessity as if not acknowledging it, the Youth is the embodied gaze of Nietzsche’s Dionysian
man, who in The Birth of Tragedy has taken the first peek through the veil of Maya, having: “...
looked truly into the essence of things ... gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action; for ...
action could not change anything in the eternal nature of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or
humiliating that they should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint.”33 Heidegger is
more precise, his precision corroborated by Greek sculptic art, to have seen that knowledge is
possible because of the deficiency as the primordial mood, the reason why historically Zeus may
arrive only “after” the Youth: “In order for knowing to be possible as determining by observation
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what is objectively present,” writes Heidegger, “there must first be a deficiency of having to do
with the world and taking care of it.” (BT 62) Thus on either side of the Youth’s silent gaze, there
lie incommensurable worlds.
In the face of the Ptoan Apollo, the predominant hermeneutic feature is the mouth, the so
called “enigmatic archaic smile”. The lips curve to a consummate sensuality that tightropes
between a fresh-born desire and its imminent satisfaction. The lips softly constrict with
gratification, as if having tasted the ultimate sensual splendor. This mouth bespeaks of a world
young and yet unspoiled, still affording the enchantment with its own Dionysian frivolity. There
may be something carnal about this mouth, but the expression is carried with a sincere and naive
loftiness and just about enough measure. It has nothing of the orgiastic degeneration, the one
ridden with guilt we meet with in the comparable sculptic expressions of Roman bacchanalia. To
this sublimation of gaiety by the mouth, also contribute the eyes. Lush, almond-shaped eyelids
add to the face’s femininity and arch brightly around the eyeballs, unlike the world-denying,
heavy eyelids of the typical Buddhist and Hindu renditions. The gaze of the Ptoan Apollo mirrors
a trance into a region beyond the opaqueness of the fragmentary and contingent realm of
cognition, a levity over an eternal field of spring blossoms, and a mesmerization with that
implicit object of vision upon which this gaze is cast. The gaze of the Ptoan Apollo is that of
sagacious acceptance of reality, an intelligence which goes beyond circumstantial knowledge.
There is no reverence and no harmony with nature, and beings do not emerge on their
own terms in Dasein’s embodiment, as this embodiment takes shape to cast the gaze of the Zeus
of Artemision and “later” in the Laokoön Group. In Dasein’s world, beings do not emerge “on
their own terms”; they emerge on the whereupon of horizontal temporality, on the terms of the
being-towards-death. Left in itself, “nature” is untemporal. “The primordial ontological ground
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of the existentiality of Da-sein is temporality”, insists Heidegger. (BT 235) Thus the face of this
Zeus is the face in the Iliad of Phoebus Apollo, who, summoned by the hubris against his priest
Laokoön by the king of the Achaeans, rushes down mount Olympus: “with his bow and his
quiver upon his shoulder, and the arrows rattled on his back with the rage that trembled within
him, with a face as dark as night.” (Iliad, 1, 38-40) Zeus’ breath is Aeschylus’ “lungs gushing out
burning hot sleep.”34 Doric shadows chisel Zeus’ angular face, dwelling in the linear rendering of
his mouth and eyebrows, following the cutting edge of the “Greek nose” downwards to attend
the shrewd frontal outline of the beard, which projects like the relentless prow of a dreadnought.
Dark eye sockets with eyelids thin and sharp as aluminum foil, recede under eyebrows stern and
threatening as gun turrets. Zeus has lost sight of the Ptoan Apollo’s viewing the world as a
totality; his gaze if fixed over his spear’s tip to a consummately specific, eidetic target. This
frozen violence, this monumental sublimation of the resolute death instinct, is spelled out as the
muscle chronicles of a will immanent in the lapse of irretrievable time reaching out of itself to
resist its negated life. This is the triumph of the moment, but Zeus has lost eternity. And yet,
Ionian wit still runs under his skin, for Zeus’ beard is not the patriarchal beard of Michelangelo’s
Moses holding the Commandments, that wind-ruffled torment of a beard belonging to an
irresolute soul. “In resoluteness”, writes Heidegger anticipating the monumental gaze of Zeus,
“the most primordial truth of Da-sein has been reached, because it is authentic. The
disclosedness of the there discloses equiprimordially the whole of being-in-the-world - the
world, being-in, and the self that is this being as ‘I am’.” (BT 297)
Unlike in the Ptoan Apollo and the Youth, Zeus’ gaze is resolutely cast onto a specific
threat, because Zeus embodies Heidegger’s “I am” in its being categorically situated. The halted,
silent gaze of the Youth, and the accepting, all-encompassing frontality of the Ptoan kouros, have
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yield to the confrontational footing of Zeus’ being thrown, his being at a situational there. The
threshold between a world to which we have no access other than speculating over its discrete
ideal embodiment, and the world of the being which in its very being has made being an issue,
has been crossed. Zeus’ gaze is cast in the same way his javelin aims, from a situated there to a
situated there. “Situation has its basis in resoluteness”, writes Heidegger, envisioning Dasein’s
embodiment in the well-defined body of Zeus. “Situation is the there disclosed in resoluteness as which the existing being is there.” (BT 300)
In Zeus’ severity Dasein embodies itself first as a thrown, temporal being. And in the
numerous climaxing renditions of the great masters which follow from Zeus to Laokoön in
Dasein's horizontal datability, unfolds Dasein’s existential analytic as the embodied architectonic
of meaning. Zeus is carved before Laokoön in Dasein’s datability not because the sculptor who
rendered Zeus lived before that other sculptor who made Laokoön some three centuries later this order belongs to Dasein’s foregrounding and appears only in vulgar temporality since for
Heidegger it is the art which made the artists - but because the embodiment of care which, as we
will see, climaxes with Laokoön, is intelligible only in temporal terms, themselves originally
embodied in, or rather as the Zeus. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology anticipates this embodied
prioritization of primordialities in the datability of Greek art, having foreseen that, “[t]he
articulated structural totality of the being of Da-sein as care first becomes existentially
intelligible in terms of temporality.” (BT 235)
Heidegger saw the fundamental ontological structures of Dasein to have effused from the
ultimate primordiality of angst, to temporality, to care, in this order. As we saw earlier, the first
link of this fundamental ontological dependency is thus organized because “[t]he nothing is the
origin of negation, not vice versa”, while the second link is arranged because “[c]are itself has
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been ontologically defined and traced back to temporality as its existential ground.” Thus far we
have seen how both the primordial mood of angst, and primordial temporality as the punctuality
of the negation of the negation to live, embodied themselves in the history of “Greek” statuary
art in the very same datable order which Heidegger suggested.
3.2 Time Gathering Laokoön’s Knee
Whereas the thing, is substantiated by extending in regional space its what-for thingliness
in conjunction to the context of other thusly substantiated things, the constitutive tissue of the
agalma, the statue, is secreted as a disclosure from without regional space. As we will see
closely in the next chapter, the agalma is an aberration in nature, being the precept for the
possibility of thingliness and thus of spatial expansion. In their ontic delimitation art historians
and critics have indiscriminately seen only the thingliness of the agalma, not its “shining”,
having encountered the agalma as a thing, its “what-for” thingliness being its representational
function to copy as it were the ideal human form, without asking to themselves the question why
the odd need for such an ideal “representation” in the first place. But the agalma is not itself a
mere thing, inasmuch as it may be disclosing the precepts for the possibility of thingliness.
Laokoön’s body is itself substantiated by the patent spatial secretion of these precepts. From
Dasein’s ecstatic perspective, some works, like the kouros, may be legitimately encountered, to a
degree, as things, but others, like the Zeus or the Laokoön and many in between, should not.
In the kouros statue the lack of transitional planes between features results in fractional
rendering as an arbitrary selective process, so that the body is produced as the sum total of
various otherwise unrelated parts in space. In analyzing the New York Kouros (600-590 B.C.)
[Figure 9],

Boardman also found details such as the relief patterns of the front of the body, the

shoulder blades, the volute ears, hair, and knee-cups, to be “designed almost as independent
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patterns.”35 These characteristics are typical throughout the some 200 kouroi remaining from
more than a century of Archaic sculpture.
What is present in the Zeus and the Laokoön but missing from the kouros’ embodied
world disclosure, that which qualifies the existentiality of Dasein’s world and makes the two
embodied world-projects incommensurable, is the possibility of kinaesthetic motion from the
noein (intuition) to dianoein (thinking).
To circumspectively transverse the open range between body parts, and in this transversing to actually render the distance as a trail of articulated and defined in its what-for
thingliness body tissue left behind, is to “go-through-it” as an act of dianoia. Fundamental
ontologically speaking, and since space is not a vacuous container but a contingency of dedistancing within the horizon of disclosure, there is no other way of trans-versing the open range
without leaving behind a newfangled trail of phenomenological structures as the embodying
experience of the transversal.
Accordingly, classical art historian George Karo understood the overall effect of the
transversal which brought forth the shift from the Archaic to the Severe rhythm as a problem of
observation, where (my italics): “The entire body seems to shed a chrysalis. The interplay of
joints and muscles is freed of the last shackles of archaism. Turns of head or trunk entail shifting
of muscles which older artists had not observed.”36 And in her book Nationalism and Classicism,
Athena Leoussi preserves a precious moment of an inceptive and yet parochial reckoning with
these structures, in the voice of a neoclassical artist and member of the British Royal Academy
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Figure 9: New York Kouros, Greece, circa 580 BC
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reacting at the sight of the “Elgin Marbles” upon their arrival in nineteenth century England:
The first thing I fixed my eyes on was the wrist of a figure in one of the female groups, in which
were visible, though in a feminine form, the radius and the ulna. I was astonished, for I had never
seen them hinted at in any female wrist … and saw the outer condyle visibly affecting the shape
as in nature … That combination of nature and idea, which I had felt was so much wanting for
high art, was here displayed to midday conviction …

37

This member of the British Royal Academy already knew of the existence of the said
anatomical details as medically identified structures, but as we saw with Kuriyama, identified
structures of the Western embodiment have in the first place appeared in art, or rather as art,
before being acknowledged and given a name by medical science. The objectification of
anatomical entities such as the “ulna” and the “condylus” is possible only through conceptual
thematization, itself subject to the embodiment of the structures of care. As we will further see
with Heidegger, thematization as dianoisis objectifies.
In fact not only those body parts which are supposedly discovered by more observant
artists to lie in between more familiar landmarks in the body landscape become possible through
circumspective transversal, but all body parts are thus engendered even within themselves. In
pre-classical art not only the transitional planes are missing, but even the somehow defined
unrelated parts are merely stylized patterns, not the “real” thing, so not only there is uncovered
distance between the unrelated parts, but there is also uncovered distance within these unrelated
parts not having related themselves as themselves to their suchness. Art historians studying the
shift from the Archaic to the Severe rhythms first notice that fractionally and arbitrarily rendered
unrelated parts are brought together by “careful observation.” Buschor, Boardman, Karo, and
Steiner, share this view. But they also observe that those unrelated parts are in themselves
eventually brought together to their suchness. In the following excerpt Boardman sees in the shift
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both the integration of the whole through the transversal between body parts, but also the
integration of the part itself for itself, a movement of the understanding which for Heidegger
objectifies through the thematization of every motif.
The parts of the body become more accurately rendered. Ears are no longer patterns but begin to
look like ears. … Patterns of muscle and sinew which had been rendered by groove and ridge are
carved in subtler realistic planes and the patterns themselves take forms to life – a double division
between ribcage and navel, not triple or more, and over the knee-cups a proper symmetry of
muscles. All this accompanies a growing skill at integrating these pattern elements into a more
plausible whole …
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Dasein reckons with the embodiment of its own world project when it notices art world
disclosive events such that, as Boardman says, “ears begin to look like ears”, and “stylized
patterns take the forms to life.” The reckoning with this embodiment is tragic, inasmuch as the
quest for verisimilitude yielding the expansion of the body through the multiple structures of care
is itself grounded in primordial, finite temporality. The engagement to trans-verse the distance by
the dianoia (thinking) can only accrue in the punctuality of the lapse of irretrievable time, thus
grounding in temporality the structures of care which are employed in this engagement. By
circumspectively trans-versing and thus engendering the suchness of the distances into
newfangled phenomenological structures, the embodiment of dianoia engages into a sequential
negation of the negation imposed by the transversal of these distances and by the implications
that must be anticipated when the distances between more than two - in fact at once between all
possible body parts for each other and for themselves - must be trans-versed.
The anticipation of these implications is most spectacularly embodied in Laokoön. While
in the kouros embodiment the figuration of body parts remains unchallenged, for it is not yet a
con-figuration by a con-sciousness, in Laokoön’s embodied disclosure of the possibility for
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thinking each and every identifiable body part, every one such part momentarily negates its own
identity in order to anticipate the identification of any other, in an integrating, circumspective
resolution towards the embodiment of the unification of consciousness. “For the first time”,
writes Karo in his analysis of the shift between Archaic and post-Archaic sculpture, “the
distinction of a straight carrying leg and a freely bent one is realized in its implications of a lower
shoulder over the former and subtle changes in hips and abdomen.”39 The synthesizing
transversal is dialectically reciprocal, so that all body parts anticipate all others, until “ears begin
to look like ears” and “stylized patterns take the forms to life.” Heidegger anticipates the
embodiment of Dasein as it is disclosed in this Greek art alone, when he expects that “Da-sein
understands its here in terms of the over there of the surrounding world.” (BT 108)
Heidegger, who does not discuss the trans-versing in terms of covering distances in
Dasein’s embodying landscape, but only in terms of Dasein’s spatiality of being-in-the-world,
employs essentially the same concept but coins it as “de-distancing”: “As being-in-the-world,
Da-sein essentially dwells in de-distancing.” (BT 108) As if describing precisely how post-Archaic
statuary art discloses the factical componentry (medical facts like the “radius” and the “ulna”) of
the kind of the ideal body needed to have projected upon, belong to, and populate Dasein’s
world, Heidegger understands de-distancing as “a constitution of being of Da-sein of which dedistancing something ... is only a definite, factical mode.” (BT 105)
Heidegger grounds the possibility of de-distancing in the fundamental existential
disclosure of the Blond Boy that we saw earlier, where we encountered the embodiment of the
possibility that the disclosure of the Nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa. The ecstasis
to de-distance is possible only because a primordial distance, a void that must be bridged, is
intuited in the first place: “De-distancing ... must be kept in mind as an existential. Only because
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beings in general are discovered by Da-sein in their remoteness, do ‘distances’ and intervals
among innerworldly beings become accessible in relation to other things.” (BT 105)
Dasein is only “when” it is ecstatic to de-distance, “when” the being in its being reaches
out of itself to heedfully associate remote beings in a factical mode. “Da-sein is ‘in’ the world in
the sense of a familiar and heedful association with the beings encountered within the world.” (BT
105)

The beings thus encountered in Dasein’s being-in-the-world are bestowed with their shape

through their what-for thingliness, precisely as in Dasein’s primordially disclosive embodiment a
medical doctor or a naive art critic would recognize the shapes of the radius and the ulna in their
utilitarian functions, their “what-for” thingliness.
Whereas in the world’s horizontal expansion it would be less palpable a search to find
exactly how distance disappears in between beings the thingliness of which obtains
phenomenological structure in, or rather as the, understanding of their utility, Dasein’s
embodiment is the primordial region that offers, especially in the Laokoön rendition, an
opportunity for precise observation of how distance as void disappears through de-distancing and
the dianoein. Heidegger’s seminal idea is that “De-distancing means making distance disappear,
making the being at a distance of something disappear, bringing it near.” (BT 105)
A closer analysis of Laokoön’s left knee, one of the “busier” regions in this embodied
manifesto of Dasein’s existential analytic, in comparison with the counterpart body part in the
New York Kouros, suffices to demonstrate how Heidegger’s metaphysics of the possibility for
space is embodied in post-Archaic Greek art and therein alone. Laokoön’s knee alone conforms
to Heidegger’s definition of the “region”: “... as that to which the context of useful things at hand
possibly belongs, a context which can be encountered as something directional, that is,
containing places and as de-distanced.” (BT 111) As is the case with each and every withheld
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region in Dasein’s spatiality of being-in-the-world, so it is in Dasein’s ideal embodiment:
Laokoön’s knee is de-distanced by ever more resolutive resolutions through circumspective
heedfulness, so that, as Heidegger predicted, art discloses for (medical) science this knee as an
ever more region within a region. Laokoön’s knee is a “perioche”, where as the Greek noun
reveals, a “withheld” region is opened towards “... the freeing of beings for a totality of
relevance.” (BT 111)
The left knee of the New York Kouros is made of componentry which, in all its lacking,
its falsity and irrelevance, embodies the disclosure of a world alien to being-there. As long as
Dasein’s circumspectively heedful perspective is concerned, from the total of four discernible
features that make up this knee, one is both undefined and wrong, another is outright wrong, and
two are irrelevant in themselves as well as to one another. Accordingly, the knee cup presents
itself rather as a ball, the downwards direction of the tibia bone veers too much to the left as if to
project its other end outside of the lower leg, the striations on either side of the lower leg’s
frontal area fail to render either the tibia bone or the muscles involved, while the chevron-shaped
object perched over the knee cup is reminiscent rather of a mustache than the anatomical
structures that ought to be there for the body needed by a being-towards-death.
Just as was the case with the Chinese embodiment in Kuriyama’s report regarding the
muscle, because of its essential lacking of a what-for thingliness this “knee” in particular as this
“body” in general remains as foreign an object to (Western) medical science, as because of its
essential lacking the disclosure of fundamental ontological precepts it is also foreign to Western
metaphysics. It is only due to Dasein’s ecstatic foregrounding that this body is courteously made
to belong to Dasein’s evolutionary ascendance. One may think that, since this archaic
assemblage is still made of somehow recognizable and more or less well-arranged components,
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eyes, nose, chest, abdomen, penis and extremities all put in the right place, we ought to conclude
that the kouros partakes at least an earlier form of the disclosure of Dasein’s existential analytic.
But such arguments come only from a consciousness which has lost sight of its own
productive prejudices, one constituted by structures of the understanding which, as we are
arguing here, are visibly absent in world-disclosive embodiments of non-Greek post-Archaic art.
Heidegger somehow anticipates the otherwise illegitimate grasping of foreign ontologies as
dissolvable within Dasein’s world interpretation, when he writes that: “[o]ntologies which have
beings unlike Da-sein as their theme are ... founded and motivated in the ontic structure of Dasein itself.” (BT 13) We shall later return for a closer examination of this point.
In Laokoön’s knee alone we can sample the objectification of the transcendental
structures of Reason appearing as Nature. From our frontal view, the region gathers and
withholds in definitive resolution, function and relevancy at least nine components, the what-for
thingliness of which assembles the body as the primordial space to authenticate what Heidegger
argued regarding Dasein’s spatiality in being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the knee cup is
distinguishable into a higher part, the patella, and the lower, the meniscus, while in between
them is clearly discernible the patellofemoral groove. Where the tibia meets the meniscus we can
see the formation of the tibial plateau, and from the inner thigh, clearly seen to run down beside
the knee is the femoral vain. In our frontal view three of the four muscle ligaments which hold
together the femur with the tibia around the knee, (medial collateral, lateral collateral, anterior
cruciate) are bulging around the knee, the fourth one (posterior cruciate) not being visible, but
even so strongly implied by the rest. That much would a medical doctor see at first sight.
Heidegger saw the origin, the range, and the boundaries of the scientific project, but at
least in his seminal works he did not anticipate that his metaphysics could turn over a
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comprehensive theory of embodiment verifiable by ontic science through Greek art. The
conceptual armature with which Heidegger builds up Dasein’s existential analytic, just because it
is thoroughly exchangeable to a fundamental ontological theory of embodiment that patterns the
actual human body as “discovered” in its ideal form by “Greek naturalism”, avails itself to
confirmation by (Western) medical science, the science of the body.
The launching pad Heidegger provides for this confirmation, are the two ideas that the
substance of things, including the human body as disclosed by Greek art and discovered by
Western science, is the thing’s extension, and that spatial extension unfolds as care. For
Heidegger “what constitutes the being of the res corporea is extensio”, (BT 92) and “[t]he full
disclosedness of the There is grounded in care.” (BT 351)
If spatial “ex-tension” as the expansion-exteriorization of Dasein’s existential pressure is
grounded in the formal structures of care, and if care is itself grounded in primordial time as the
formal liability of the being-towards-death, and then if also what is liable to death is the self and
that alone because “[t]he they never dies because it is unable to die, since death is always my
own ...”, (BT 425) it follows that the self as a temporal and spatial being is the original creative
force of self and of world; Dasein’s world initially and essentially is a self interpretation. And
yet, as we saw in section 2.4, Heidegger also observes that initially the self is lost in the they, and
in being resolutive the self is thrown into the factical possibilities bestowed to it as the heritage
of the they. (BT 385) What appears here as a contradiction needing to be clarified by the point
where the initially lost self as a potentiality finds itself and creates world, can be elucidated by
the fundamental ontological structures that make up the body in Greek art. Greek art embodies
and discloses what Heidegger calls the “they-self”, (BT 268, 318) as it simultaneously discloses the
possibility of the they in the I and of the I in the they, by prescribing the blueprint of the
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individual’s ideal embodiment. In its ideality, Laokoön’s knee is the knee that every-one ought to
have, thus both the knee of the they and the knee of the I.
The binding together of the - at first glance - nine visible elements in Laokoön’s knee into
a rationally efficient and purposeful structure, the what-for thingliness of which hearkens to and
anticipates natural limitations, is signifiable only from the perspective of a situated being, a self.
In his Introduction to Metaphysics and his lectures on Heraclitus, Heidegger interprets
Heraclitus’ idea that: “Logos unifies by assembling. It assembles in that, in gathering, it lets lie
before us what lies before as such and as a whole.” (IM 142, 145, LS 70) At this point Heidegger also
agreed both with Plato that “logos is always logos tinos”, (BT 159) and with Kant in that “[a]ll
binding together is an ‘I bind together’. (BT 319) So that: “The ‘I’ seems to ‘hold together’ the
totality of the structural whole.” (BT 318) Laokoön’s monumental knee is our own everyday knee,
as the kouros’ knee is not, in that this knee extends itself spatially by the situated immanency of
the rational self as a being-towards-death. That which configures Laokoön’s knee is an
anticipation to something which itself is yet to materialize, something that lies in the priest’s
possible future being only a threat, so that the knee is gathered together as a what-for thingliness
which is ahead of itself in order to anticipate that which the threat threatens for. The recognition
of this physical anticipation of something noumenal is critical in arguing an existential reading of
Being and Time, and Heidegger describes the futural ideality of this knee when, in explaining
Dasein’s spatiality of being-in-the-world, he writes that: “Primordially constituted by care, Dasein is always already ahead of itself. Existing, it has always already projected itself upon
definite possibilities of its existence;”. (BT 315) It is with the potentiality of this knee that this
priest may succeed or fail to survive this threat sent by the god. It is with the potentiality of
exactly this knee that this priest has been freed to die. In comparison, the kouros’ knee, with all
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its anatomical lacking, falsity, and irrelevance, belongs neither to itself nor to any other parts of
the kouros’ body, a mirroring subtotal of a body not belonging to nature and a body to where
(Dasein’s) nature does not belong. The being dependent on the “knee” of the kouros, cannot die.
The whereto of the spatial expansion, i.e., the locating belongingness of the substance of
the parts that configure Laokoön’s knee, as well as to where the knee belongs as a whole, belong
not to themselves, but always to some other whereto. The observation mentioned earlier by Karo
that the rendition of any whereto of spatial expansion in the body of the statue carries onto itself
subtle changes from the implications of configurations in each and every other whereto rendered,
shows how Greek art embodies Heidegger’s idea that: “Da-sein understands its here in terms of
the over there of the surrounding world.” (BT 108)
This unique, embodied form of world-disclosure in Greek art has been commented since
the antiquity and institutionalized by historians ever since, as the “Polycleitus Canon.” Although
part of the literature amounts to nebulous references in posterity about elements with mystical
numerical proportions suggesting Pythagorean influence, Galen preserved an earlier testimony
by Chrysippos, who held: “.... beauty to consist in the proportions not of the elements but of the
parts, that is to say, of finger to finger and of all the fingers to the palm and wrist, and of these to
the forearm, and of the forearm to the upper arm, and of all the parts to each other, as they are set
forth in the Canon of Polykleitos.”40 This preliminary account suffices to demonstrate that
nothing mystical is needed to explain the “beauty” attributed to the implementation of the Canon,
other than the fact that the statue actually embodies and discloses Dasein’s spatiality, precisely as
Heidegger’s existential metaphysics describe it.
The Canonical commensurability, or symmetria, that we casually intuit as “beauty” in
Laokoön’s body, is no other than the blueprint of the belongingness which articulates the parts
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within a possible whereto, a whereto prefigured either as a subsumed local totality or as an
expansive general totality of purposeful heedfulness that determines Dasein’s spatiality of beingin-the-world. Laokoön’s knee in particular and his entire body in general, embodies Heidegger’s
idea that: “The belongingness is determined by the significance constitutive for the world and
articulates the here and there within the possible whereto. The whereto in general is prefigured
by the referential totality established in a for-the-sake-of-which of heedfulness.” (BT 111)
In the kouros knee, the here and the there do not belong. This is an a-schemon (“ugly”)
knee, ugly because it is not schematized. We saw that the tibial plateau which medical science
would recognize in the Laokoön knee to connect the tibia with the meniscus, is in the kouros
knee missing altogether, while the tibia projects itself out of the lower leg and the mustacheshaped object above the knee cup remains irrelevant to any functional purpose of a “knee”,
because the Archaic world-impulse which has somehow articulated the here and the there of this
“knee” is not a circumspective heedfulness for-the-sake-of-which. Instead of a Heideggerian
whereto, this “knee” is an u-topos, recognized as a “knee” only from Dasein’s foregrounding
consciousness which has lost sight of its own productive prejudices and cannot do otherwise but
- to remember Gadamer - “immediately ... recombine with what it has foregrounded itself from
in order to become one with itself again in the unity of the historical horizon that it thus
acquires.” And this holds for the rest of the kouros’ body.
In discussing Dasein’s spatiality of being-in-the-world, Heidegger understands that in
order to articulate the here and the there within a possible whereto, belongingness must be freed
to engender instances of spatial extension into a region as a totality of relevance. Only this
openness to total relevancy de-distances innerworldly beings and reveals them in their what-for
thingliness, not vaguely in space, but in an enframing region, a perioche. “The freeing of a
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totality of relevance is equiprimordially a letting something be relevant in a region which dedistances and gives direction. It is a freeing of the spatial belongingness of things at hand”,
writes Heidegger. (BT 111)
The suchness of innerworldly beings can be defined only through their what-for
thingliness, while their what-for-thingliness itself is decided with both meanings of a
“resolution” (as resolve and as definition) and only if innerworldly beings are made to belong to
one other by a heedful association within a region. The temporally grounded horizontal whereto
upon which beings appear in their suchness, is the “region”: “We call this whereto of the
possible belonging somewhere of useful things, circumspectly held in view in advance, and
heedful association, the region.” (BT 103)
We notice Heidegger saying that the useful things are circumspectly held in view “in
advance”. Something is already “held in view”, that is, determined in advance of the useful
things’ resolutive disclosure. It is a central tenet for Dasein’s spatiality in the world, the principle
that “[a] totality of useful things is always already discovered before the individual useful thing.”
(BT 69)

The blueprint of this totality being “held in view” before the particulars of this totality are

determined, is displayed in Laokoön’s body in general and his knee in particular, where the
primordial impulse for circumspective heedfulness, i.e. the grounding awareness of the
irretrievable time by the being-towards-death, must have “held in view” some early version of
the spatial appropriation of all body parts ahead of any particular definition. For the body to be
rendered otherwise than in this previewed heedfulness, would result in what we see in preclassical statuary, where body parts belong neither to themselves as useful things, nor to one
another: they have been rendered in and for themselves. Heidegger understands that there is an
“initial”, pre-figurative stage of spatial determination, where the spatiality of Dasein lingers (my
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italics): “In accordance with its spatiality, Da-sein is initially never here, but over there. From
this over there it comes back to its here, and it does this only by interpreting its heedful being
toward something in terms of what is at hand over there.” (BT 108)
Since this “there” must at some point and at least potentially be a somewhere else’s
“here”, that “there” as a “here” must await for its determination to yet another “there”, so that
this process of the object’s determination could potentially be carried on ad infinitum. In section
2.3, where we initially discussed the veiled identity between time and the muscle, we argued at
that point against Heidegger, that the will to determine an object is more primordial than the
determination of whether even the partially determined object is willed or otherwise. It is this
necessity, this more primordial resistance of determining the object, which incorporates and
integrates the muscle in Dasein’s embodiment as a fundamental ontological structure amongst
the other four embodied structures of care. A medical doctor only sees that the muscle connects
and activates all the otherwise disconnected and inert body parts. But, fundamental ontologically
speaking, the muscle is primordial temporality in disguise, resisting the resistance of connecting
and integrating the what-for thingliness between the here and the there in themselves and for one
another. The muscle narrative, as it is patently unfolding in Laokoön’s body, gathers the parts
into a whole where parts are hearkening to one another with the purpose to resist what resist’s
Dasein’s will to live. As we mentioned earlier, that which configures Laokoön’s knee in
particular and his body as whole, is an anticipation to something which itself is yet to
materialize, something that lies in this priest’s possible future being only a threat, so that the
knee is gathered together as a what-for thingliness which is ahead of itself in order to anticipate
that which the threat threatens for.
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Precisely as is the case with Dasein’s spatiality for innerworldly beings, the what-for
thingliness of body parts resists its determination until this pre-figurative resistance is overcome
by at least a contingent viewing of that for-the-sake-of-which the body part is itself determined
in heedful economy and accordance to the determination of the for-the-sake-of-which thingliness
of every other body part. In the blueprint disclosure of the Laokoön’s falling prey, that for-thesake-of-which the body parts of the being-towards-death are determined are the threatening
serpents. As we will see further, the serpents disclose in literal ontic form the entanglement or
falling prey as Dasein’s one of four structures of care.
What we see at the ontic level in Laokoön’s body are tremendous muscular masses
interconnecting and inter-activating highly defined body parts, which would otherwise be
disjunct and stale body parts embodying the literal sense of a u-topos. Heidegger addresses the
necessity for this connectivity, albeit only seeing it in time but not in the muscle, when he writes
that “[t]emporality makes possible the unity of existence.” (BT 328) And again: “Ecstatic
temporality clears the There primordially. It is the primary regulator of the possible unity of all
the essential existential structures of Dasein.” (BT 351) Heidegger succinctly asks: “... what makes
possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care in the unity of its unfolded
articulation?” (BT 325) It is the embodiment of time as the resisting transcendental motility which
con-figures the body for the understanding, since: “... its essence is temporalizing in the unity of
the ecstasies.” (BT 329) And: “[t]emporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and
falling prey and thus constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care.” (BT 328) The
empty space that surrounds this statue, though invisible itself, is nevertheless intelligible as a
topos, a perioche, that is, a region, in that every detail and the overall muscular, skeletal, and
anatomical configuration of this body is heedful to the threat imposed by and within this region.
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The prescriptive operation precipitating behind the ontic level, however, is the discharging flow
in between structures of care resisting their definition, of the irretrievable time lapsing at the
expense of the being-towards-death, for those resisting structures of care to be summoned, dedistanced in circumspective resoluteness, in order to form themselves in their particular and their
collective what-for thingliness. This temporal secretion cannot itself appear as anything else in
Dasein’s embodiment, other than as the muscle.
Civic awareness, philosophy, and history of art have come only close to understanding
this threesome relation of identity between Reason, time, and the muscle, but did not make it far
enough to the step where this relation bares at the nexus between Greek art, Being and Time and
Origin. Heraclitus and Heidegger come close by concurring, as we saw, in that “[l]ogos unifies
by assembling ... in gathering, it lets lie before us what lies before as such and as a whole.” And
so does Havelock in that “[l]ogos has something muscular about it.”41 Pericles’ funerary speech
Epitaph articulates the first preservers’ sentiment of Dasein’s absolute dependence to gather its
spatiality on the embodiment of temporality as masculinity, since the Athenians: “philosophize
without effeminacy and philocalize [embrace the noble] with economy.” Thus, where Heidegger
figured that “Da-sein can be spatial only as care”, (BT 368) we must now add that Dasein can be
temporal only as muscular agency.
The embodied shift from Archaism to Classicism, this world-shattering movement from
the noein to dianoein, is the tragic yearning to transverse the mystifying distances and their
implications which at once separate being from that which it is yet to be, and unify this being in
its own circumspective resolution. Laokoön, the work we have chosen as the consummation of
Dasein’s existential analytic, is taken to have been modeled after a supposedly more ancient
poetic narrative, the story of a Trojan priest attacked by serpents sent by Apollo to punish his
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irreverent questioning the real purpose of the Trojan Horse which was offered to the city by the
scheming Achaean warriors. And yet nothing can be more ancient than the perceptual
prescriptions which the statue of the Laokoön Group embodies and thus discloses as its own
world programme, prescriptions which determine the temporalization of temporality within
which there may be any historical narrative to define Apollo, this priest, Troy, and the Achaeans
as such.
The Polycleitus Canon alone, as it is profoundly implemented by the Laokoön,
legitimizes only an existential reading of Being and Time, for it discharges Dasein’s body as an
electrifying current grounded in the formal structures of futural temporality and the embodying
structures of care, the what-for thingliness of which stresses to the utmost the subject’s needs as
the needs of a being-towards-death. In his attempt to infer Heidegger’s elusive theory of
embodiment from the philosopher’s late work, Aho looks for an alternative reading, having
yielded to the critics who argue that Heidegger’s concept of angst entails extreme subjectivism
by overemphasizing individuation and the futurity of existence. But for as long as we medically
and aesthetically identify with the ideality of Laokoön’s body, Laokoön’s superlative muscular
narrative and the structures of care grounded on this narrative being the embodied primordial
temporality in disguise, palpably suggest that there is no more radical sense of authenticity for
Dasein’s world other than that of a threatened and thus anguished being. Winckelmann saw this
existential authenticity when he wrote that: “The action of these muscles in the Laokoön is
carried beyond truth to the limits of possibility; they lie like hills which are drawing themselves
together, for the purpose of expressing the extremest exertion in anguish and resistance.”42
The German romantics who revived antiquity and launched aesthetics as an autonomous
branch of philosophy, saw angst reaching monumental status in this work. But in their
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preoccupation to understand art even of this monumentality as a mere copy of the world, they did
not make the connection between angst and truth; this connection came only with Heidegger.
Winckelmann, Herder and Goethe went only as far as to see beauty in angst, while Lessing did
not even go that far. To see the beauty in the monumental idealization of suffering, is to reckon
with Dasein’s world-project, and Winckelmann does just that in seeing in Laokoön that: “... in
the representation of this intense suffering is seen the determined spirit of a great man who
struggles with necessity and strives to suppress all audible manifestations of pain.”43 As
Winckelmann’s commentator William G. Howard points out, “Winckelmann was emphatic in
declaring beauty to be the principal object of art.”44 If Winckelmann saw only beauty but not yet
truth in the Laokoön, Lessing fell even shorter, because he could see beauty only apart from
suffering. Heidegger’s connection with Greek art shows that the tragic essence of Dasein’s
idealized embodiment, which is grounded on temporality, derives from forms of struggle
embodying the consequences of being a being-towards-death. Greek art shows that the ugly as
the a-schemon, is the unschematized, the formless. Heidegger shows that schematization and
form is possible only from a being grounded in temporality as the being-towards-death. But
Lessing understands the embodiment of struggle as ugly in itself. In his treatise Laokoön and
How the Ancients Represented Death, he patently misunderstood schematization as
disfiguration:
The master aimed at the highest beauty compatible with the adopted circumstances of bodily
pain. The latter, in all its disfiguring violence, could not be combined with the former; therefore
he must reduce it; he must soften shrieks into sighs, not because a shriek would have betrayed an
ignoble soul, but because it would have produced a hideous contortion of the countenance. For
only imagine the mouth of Laokoön to be forced open and then judge! Let him shriek, and look at
him! It is a form which inspired compassion, for it displayed beauty and pain at once. It has
become an ugly and horrible shape from which we gladly avert our eyes; for the sight of pain
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excites annoyance, unless the beauty of the suffering object change that annoyance into the sweet
emotion of pity.”

45

Both Winckelmann and Lessing, along with the rest of the German romantics, understood
the statue strictly as a useful representation, a Heideggerian thing-at-hand. This convenient
shortsightedness allowed the neglect of the problem of the asymmetry between the ontic and the
ontological datability in the hermeneutic circle; it educated inauspiciously generations of art
historians and critics, and it likely influenced Heidegger’s inattention to statuary art. But
although the statue does appear within the immediate region of the temple, of the excavated
earth, or of the museum, the statue as Dasein’s embodiment does not occupy space, inasmuch as
Dasein itself does not occupy space the way beings at hand do. “... [T]his ‘occupying’ is to be
fundamentally differentiated from being at hand at a place in terms of a region”, writes
Heidegger, anticipating this condition for Dasein’s self-disclosure. (BT 108) The post-Archaic
Greek statue is the only innerworldly being wedged exactly in between and entirely occupying
the discretionary region between mind and world, embodying the primordial structures of time,
angst and care, through which de-distancing and thus space is possible. As such, the statue is the
elusive Heideggerian art which has disclosed in advance the possibility of a region within which
the statue itself may appear. Heidegger makes this distinction when discussing the spatiality of
Dasein: “occupying a place must be understood as de-distancing what is at hand in the
surrounding world in a region previously discovered circumspectly beforehand.” (BT 108)
What makes possible for the statue as a transcendental disclosure, for its “godly” essence
to appear casually within the region of mortal and perishable beings which itself prescribes, is its
being made of Dasein’s primordial grounding, Dasein’s “substance” as a finite temporal being.
There are no otherworldly deities to be somehow reckoned with here. This metaphysical “god” is
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of this world in the most physical and non-Christian sense, because it is the theo-s (“Deus” in the
Vatican’s inapprehensive Latin translation) that implements theo-ria as the only possibility of
world-view. The tremendous muscular masses gathering and activating highly defined body parts
disclosed as a There of a what-for thingliness through the structures of care in Laokoön, are
regionally visible because they are ideally expedient to the world project of resistance by the
tragic being held together and given a body by its own being having become an issue. “Care
summons Da-sein to its ownmost potentiality-of-being in the call of conscience”, writes
Heidegger, postulating the existential analytic of this embodied and physicalized summoning. (BT
317)

And again: “[Dasein’s] ‘content’ is not founded in the substantiality of substance, but in the

‘self-constancy’ ... of the existing self whose being was conceived as care.” (BT 303)
In having its godly essence appear casually as a body amongst other innerworldly
corporeal things, the statue brings forth what for substance ontology has remained an elusive
continuity between the metaphysical and the physical realms. Being the blueprint for Dasein’s
world disclosure, the statue is the test bed for checking Heidegger’s refutation of materialism in
terms of his cardinal argument that Dasein can be spatial only as care, (BT 386) and that the full
disclosedness of the There is grounded in care. (BT 351) Since the substance of all things, amongst
them the identifying parts of the idealized and the living human body, cannot be the parts’
material constituency, Heidegger sees the structures of care themselves as “phenomena”, that is,
things that appear, leading to “the phenomenon of the world.” (BT 335) To the dead ends of
substance ontology, Heidegger counterproposes that the res extensa is made of the structures of
care, themselves grounded separately in finite temporality.
Dasein is a unique spatial being, in that unlike the innerworldly beings which it itself
produces, compiles and retrieves, relinquishes, or inherits as world by means and under the

104

pressure of existential signification, in principle itself does not dwell confined in space, but exists
expansively as space. This existential pressurization is assembled by the fourfold structural
manifold of care, and in being accordingly fourfold-grounded in primordial temporality it is the
sole provision for self-constancy. Writes Heidegger: “Ontologically, Da-sein is in principle
different from everything objectively present and real. Its ‘content’ is not founded in the
substantiality of substance, but in the ‘self-constancy’ ... of the existing self whose being was
conceived as care.” (BT 304) If, as we have argued after amending Origin, statuary art discloses the
prescription of Dasein’s perceptual domain, this assembly of self-constancy must itself be
embodied in art. That which we must show to be embodied, if we are to produce the implicit
theory of embodiment of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, is the very definition of care, as
the: “‘being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in’ - as being-together-with ...” (BT 196)
Thus far we have shown that the primordial, finite temporality in which the structures of
care are grounded, has been promptly embodied as art, albeit in ontological and factical disguise.
This proof has prepared the grounds for the demonstration that all four structures of care are also
embodied in Greek art, so that Heidegger’s primordial prioritization can be upheld, because: “...
the constitutional totality of care has the possible ground of its unity in temporality”, (BT 375) and
because “... spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality ...” (BT 367) Care is
grounded in temporality because the structures of care are themselves ecstatic, that is, they
project Dasein’s definite possibilities into the future. Writes Heidegger: “Primordially
constituted by care, Da-sein is always already ahead of itself. Existing, it has always already
projected itself upon definite possibilities of its existence;” (BT 315)
Heidegger knows that, especially in view of his counterintuitive exposition marshaled
against the “reifying consciousness” and the traditional beliefs of substance ontology, the
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demonstration of Dasein’s constitution as a spatial and temporal being is far from a simple
matter. “The whole of the constitution of Da-sein itself is not simple in its unity, but shows a
structural articulation which is expressed in the existential concept of care.” (BT 200) Heidegger
concludes Being and Time mystified, wondering over questions he does not answer: “Why is
being ‘initially’ ‘conceived’ in terms of what is objectively present, and not in terms of things at
hand that do, after all, lie still nearer to us? Why does reification come to dominate again and
again?” (BT 437)
Yet the conceptual seeds to simplify the demonstration are themselves planted in Origin,
where the first principles are laid to interpret the palpable and visible proofs provided by Greek
art. To qualify for this demonstration, the disclosive body in Greek art must incarnate
equiprimordially several preliminary habituations. First of all it must be a tragic body, the
phenomenological structures of which are promptly housing a being-towards-death. This is
because “[Dasein’s] ontological constitution must be made visible by setting forth the concrete
structure of anticipation of death”, as Heidegger demands. “How is the phenomenal definition of
this structure to be accomplished? Evidently by defining the characteristics of anticipatory
disclosure which must belong to it so that it can become the pure understanding of the ownmost
non-relational possibility not-to-be-bypassed which is certain and, as such indefinite.” (BT 263)
Secondly, this disclosive body must be the ideated body of the they-self; that is, although
transcendent in its ideality, to still be the body of an individual, since from the first, tragic
requirement, death can only be one’s own. Our consummate identification with the physicality of
Greek art may simplify the demonstration, since Heidegger seeks an explicit deduction of
selfhood from the structures of care, “[b]ecause the self cannot be conceived either as substance
or as subject, but is rather grounded in existence ... selfhood has been explicitly taken back into
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the structure of care, and thus of temporality ...” (BT 332) To qualify for the task, Greek art must
disclose the foundation of individualization through the anticipation of death, as well as to
embody the proof that Dasein’s world is an exclusive club of individuals, because “[t]he nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation individualizes Da-sein down to itself.
This individualizing is a way in which the ‘there’ is disclosed for existence.” (BT 264) Thirdly, this
testament of a body in art must be essentially and fundamentally constituted by the experience of
resistance, if it is to have projected on itself, or rather as itself, its ownmost world project.
Heidegger underlines this necessity: “Reality is resistance ... The experience of resistance, that
is the discovery of resistance in striving, is ontologically possible only on the basis of the
disclosedness of world.” (BT 210) Fourth, this body must summon the axiomatic proof through its
own physical organization of how Dasein’s spatiality is ecstatic, thrown, and related, as these
three existential dispositions accordingly define care as “being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-beingin as being together with.” Fifth, and ultimately, as a spatial articulation of the above temporal
determinations, the embodied proof in Greek art of the temporal interpretation of everyday
Dasein must itself be constituted by the four structures of care. The statue is the existential
constitution of the Da of the human body as Dasein’s own world import, and as such it must incorporate the ecstatic existentials of understanding, of attunement, of entanglement, and of
discourse. As we will see in what follows, Laokoön is patently such a body.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EMBODIMENT OF CARE I

4.1 The Problem of the “Anthropopithique”
As we qualified in section 1.3., the spatial expansion of Das Man, that is, Dasein’s world,
must launch at the footing of the statue. The statue is the primordial center of the world as a
centered expansive circle, the fundamental ontological hub of the “surrounding”, since in the
most fundamental ontological way for Heidegger “[t]he closest world of everyday Da-sein is the
surrounding world … [where beings are] initially encountered within the surroundings.” (BT 66)
Given this center of expansive preservation of the perceptual possibilities disclosed by the statue
as the incarnation of Das Man, and if Dasein’s fundamental ontological world project must itself
be projected on the ideal human body because this body is instrumental and therefore must
somehow remain inherently interfaced and connatural to this project, then the prescriptive
provenance of that regional expansion as the articulation of that structural totality of the being of
Dasein must itself be embodied in monumental sculptic art. Further following this qualification,
and since the human body is the only innerworldly object exactly wedged and entirely occupying
the discretionary region between mind and world, the modulation of the human body as any set
of units to be variously fitted together must expand itself as space both differently than any other
res extensa, and, simultaneously, expand by the same rules of the temporally horizontal
expansion of the world within which this body acts, in order to maintain a body-world
compatibility.
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Was it otherwise, the human animal not to be distinguishable by means of its corporeality as the Aristotelian zoon logon echon from the non-rational animals with which humans
supposedly share the realist’s world as mere equals, then we, as the Heideggerian beingstowards-death, would end up with a body that does not belong to us, nor would we belong to it.
The need for this distinguishability became a pivotal problem at the peak of the controversy
which the nineteenth century discoveries brought forth in the human and natural sciences, where
converging fields of speculation unable to ask the right questions turned into a boiling pot of
conflicting ideas regarding the origin of man. The furry bodily contour of Darwin’s primordial
ancestor did not sit well with our gut feeling regarding our origins. As Leoussi lets be
understood, the core values of the nineteenth century rising European ethnocentrism felt better to
identify with a cold Greek marble statue, than with the living bloodline of the ape. In his 1886
Traiti d’ Anatomie, d’ Anthropologie et d’ Ethnographie Appliquies aux Beaux-Arts, Catholic
Frenchman Charles Rochet justifiably vented a vehement protest, though his protest was
inflamed by the unsustainable assumption that the “true” human body has biblical origins:
[Q]ui veut donner a l’Homme des origins simiennes … Cette école négative de toutes choses, qui
semble étudier l’Homme et ne voit que la … Cette école barbare et cruelle dont les plus ferventss
adeptes … inventent UN MONSTRE !! … moitii homme, moitii singe, qu’ils appellent
effrontement notre ancktre ; UN ANTHROPOPITIQUE ! qu’ils donnent comme ayant été le
Précurseur de l’ Homme : Le pére de tous les hommes, l’ affreux Adam de l’ ignoble Genèse ! …
Voilà ce qu’ on enseigne en pleine I école d’ Anthropologie, a Paris. … Voilà ce que les disciples
de Broca et les continuateurs de Darwin proclament, a travers le monde et dans tous les congrés
comme étant la grande vérité du dix-neuviime siècle, la bonne nouvelle des générations futures!
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Though impossibly ideal, it is not the warm-blooded body of our animal ancestor, but this
cold marble object, the assembled and assembling structures of Logos, which we recognize as
ours, the human body. Agalmatophilia describes the relation between Heidegger’s preservers and
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these cold marble things, which came to simultaneously populate and designate the secular and
religious sites of Greece as such: the city agora, the temples, shrines, sanctuaries and graveyards.
As Steiner reports, the cathectic engagement of the ancients with these otherwise strange objects
were “visual discussions of desire”, “illicit longings of the bodies of the gods.”47 “The statues
that populate Greek myth, poetry, and drama”, writes Steiner, “are from the first intimately
bound up with sentiments of love and fervent longing (pothos), and offer ways of exploring the
pathology of desire …”48
Paul Valéry pointed out that, (finite beings that we are) the body belongs to us a little less
than we belong to it. At first sight this higher dependency of the mind to the body may, indeed,
level mankind with the rest of nature. Yet that other body with which humanity so consummately
identifies in the aforementioned pronouncement by the art historian that “the Greeks finally
understood the human body”, i.e., the body composed in stone by the metaphysical decrees, one
amongst which prescribes the natural law that living bodies have an expiration date, now this
must be a special body. Strangely, by means of this law primordially disclosed in the body of the
statue as a world-founding, grounding, and bestowal, to this body now nature belongs more than
this body belongs to nature. The body of the statue may be equally susceptible to perishing, by
means of violent destruction or by simple wear and tear in its exposure to the elements. To have
noticed the aberrant body of the statue within nature, is to have administered Albrecht Dührer’s
prescription, mentioned by Heidegger in Origin, that: “... art lies hidden within nature; he who
can wrest it from her, has it.” (Origin 195)
The physical world accounts for the presence in it of no other embodied agency than the
perishable bodies of human and animal. Thus in nature the free-standing body of the Greek
statue appears as an anomaly. Even Heidegger does not provide a place for the body of the statue

111

in Dasein’s natural history, since this body does not fall into neither historical categories of
“useful things” or of “nature”, which Heidegger mentions as the “secondarily historical beings”
(the primary is Dasein), when he writes that: “… secondarily historical is what is encountered in
the world, not only useful things at hand ... but also nature in the surrounding world as the
‘historical ground.’” (BT 381)
Thus by all means, except by maintaining the defunct representational theory of art, the
statue must be seen an innerworldly anomaly, although the more “Greeks” we become - by now
“we are all Greeks”, Shelley figured in his poem Hellas - the more natural we find it to identify
ourselves with this anomaly in nature. In our post-structuralist days this identification has
become a complex and multifaceted issue.
Although the Christian doctrine of creationism maintains a common origin of all life, i.e.,
God, Western religion instinctively understands that there must be some essential difference
between the origin of the body of man and the origin of the body of the animal. It is only in the
making of Heidegger’s missing connection with the Greeks, and in Heidegger’s implicit theory
of embodiment as this theory is corroborated by Greek art, where we first realize that the human
body as a res extensa differs fundamentally from any other body in nature, because to this as
muscular as tragic a body now nature belongs more than this body belongs to nature.
The reversed dependency explains the essential difference between the human and the
animal body, and is established once we notice that the human body, as “the Greeks finally
understood it”, is nothing less than the embodiment of the transcendental laws that disclose
nature as a whole and nature as such. From this point on we begin to see that the origin of the
human body as such, is primordial temporality phenomenologically available in art, whereas the
origin of the animal body as such is in the understanding of man as the being-towards-death.
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Heidegger claimed in Origin that “art is the origin of both artist and work.” (Origin 143) If
Heidegger is right, it is art, not a Christian god nor a Big Bang, not religion, nor science, that
disclosed the engendering of both the human and the animal body.
Since art may disclose the animal body only through the intervention of the human hand,
this comparably higher proximity of the human body to art as the origin of predication, and the
dependency on art through the human body for the disclosure of all corporeal bodies, bears the
fundamental ontological explanation why the ideal human body as a res extensa differs from the
body of the animal. Unlike the animal body, the human body must reach out of itself in order to
understand and render the animal body in art. This ecstatic task is possible because the human
body is housing the being-towards-death and is thus katastatically situated. Ecstatic embodiment
manifests in the incorporation of primordial temporality, since for Heidegger “[t]emporality is
the primordial ‘outside of itself’ in and for itself.” (BT 329) This exclusive proximity of the human
animal to art as the origins of departure for the understanding, may be what Heidegger points to
in his cryptic, concluding lines from Hölderlin’s mysticism in Origin: “Reluctantly/that which
dwells near its origin abandons the site.”
The animal body may equally contain the muscle, and it is this equality which vouchsafes
that both human and animal bodies are spatial expansions obeying to the same homogeneous and
isotropic rules that maintain a compatibility between Dasein’s body and Dasein’s world. But this
equality is not fundamental; it is only ontically congenial, the construct of muscle consciousness
dwelling in the ideal Greek body. As we saw earlier with Kuriyama, the embodied influence of
the muscle in understanding nature is not a universal partaking amongst life forms which are
themselves physically emasculated, but contingent even in between presumingly cohabitant
human cultures. The fact that musculature appears - to our “Greek” eyes - in the bodies of other
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conscious life forms, from the mollusk to the ape and to the bodies of peoples from cultures other
than the post-archaic Greeks, should not lead us to believe that these other conscious forms of
life have embodied themselves as beings-towards-death. Alternative forms of consciousness may
either have no art to disclose them in the suchness of what they are, or even if they do have such
an art-world to disclose their embodiment as agency into a world, their art should be left alone to
speak to us of that world instead of us imposing on it ontic facts emanating from Dasein’s
compulsory foregrounding. This cultural contingency is what we just pointed to, having said that
the origin of the human body as such is primordial temporality made phenomenologically
available in art, whereas the origin of the animal body as such, is man the being-towards-death.
In the previous chapter we have thus far evinced the embodiment into the idealized
human form of the primordial mood of anxiety as the Nothing being the origin of negation, and,
consequently, the human embodiment of primordial temporality as the negation of the negation
to live in the world’s horizontal disclosure. But the in-corporation of these two
equiprimordialities into that regional res extensa which we recognize as the “finally understood”
human body, is still far from being sufficient to demonstrate how nature belongs to that body
more than that body belongs to nature. To complete the inference of Heidegger’s implicit theory
of embodiment by corroborating the embodiment in Greek art of the equiprimordiality of
Dasein’s existential analytic, we need next to demonstrate the embodiment of the structural
totality of Dasein as care.
4.2 Agalmatophilia
After primordial angst and horizontal temporality, care is the last most important concept
for the production of Heidegger’s theory of embodiment. It is through this fundamental
ontological concept that the expansion of Dasein’s idealized embodiment summons itself into a
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thingly thing, the statue, which, nonetheless, lies too close and looks deceptively too familiar to
be recognized for what it really is: the primordial prescription of space within the possibility for
spatiality which it, itself, founds, grounds, and bestows. It is this uncanny familiarity, the
essential Dasein itself staring upon the phenomenological structures of its own prescriptive
essence, which leaves Boardman dumbfounded: “Staring at these works, in picture, cast or
original, does not explain them; indeed their familiarity to some degree deadens perception.”49
The ancients themselves are said to have stood speechless before the incarnation of what
Heidegger talked of as Dasein’s “equiprimordiality of constitutive factors.” (BT 131) Steiner
reports so in her recent book Images in Mind – Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature
and Thought:
[L]ate archaic and classical sculptors seem to have responded by depicting their gods with bodies
that simultaneously declared their proximity to men and reminded the viewer of the breach
between a familiar surface appearance and an ineffable, invisible reality that could be neither
directly ‘imaged’ nor reproduced.
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Care is the intermediary concept between horizontal temporality and the disclosure in this
horizon as a thereupon of the res extensa; care is the concept which binds time with space. Space
is dependent for its disclosure as a region on the multiple structures of care. This is a threesome
dependence, because, on the one hand, for Heidegger, “[t]he full disclosedness of the There is
grounded in care”; (BT 351) and at the other end, “[c]are is being towards death.” (BT 330)
But what does this “care is being towards death” mean? It means that the being-towardsdeath, for which being has become an issue in that being’s very being, cares for its impending
loss of world in view of its world-dispersed and world-attached will to live being constantly
negated in the minutiae and at every turn of its head. The world is itinerant and “occurs” as a
spatial expansion, being handed down as a having-been-there, when Dasein first becomes aware
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of itself in the anticipation of resolving this constant negation. “In [anticipatory resoluteness] ...
Da-sein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-of-being in a way that confronts death in
order to take over completely the being that it itself is in its throwness. Resolutely taking over
one’s own factical ‘There’ means at the same time the resolve for the situation”, writes
Heidegger. (BT 383) This existentiell pressure from the lapse of irretrievable time in everydayness,
unites the constant and omnidirectional negation that must be taken care of, be dealt with, into
the constitution of one, ecstatic, threatened consciousness as a “being-there” in its spatial
configuration. “The temporality of factical being-in-the-world is what primordially makes the
disclosure of space possible”, writes Heidegger. (BT 417) And again, “[t]he constitutional totality
of care has the possible ground of its unity in temporality.” (BT 374) In his analysis of Dasein’s
“material” constitution, Heidegger wants to know what we also want to know in our quest to
explain the peerless articulation and the unification of this articulation of the ideal body in Greek
art. “With the question of the meaning of care, we are asking what makes possible the totality of
the articulated structural whole of care in the unity of its unfolded articulation?” Heidegger’s
answer is that “[t]emporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity and falling prey and
thus constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care.” (BT 324, 328)
The modal structures through which the ideality of care morphs into what is otherwise
immediately and unreflectively perceived upon the temporal horizon to be the rigid and alienated
materiality of the res corporea, are themselves complex. “‘[C]are’ means an existential and basic
ontological phenomenon which is as yet not simple in its structure”, notes Heidegger. (BT 196)
This is so, first because of Heidegger’s refutation of Aristotelian and Cartesian substance
ontology, and its replacement by existential ontology. “[B]eings having the kind of being of Dasein cannot be comprehended in terms of reality and substantiality ... the substance of human
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being is existence.” (BT 212) Consequently, just because space is more objectively experienced and
shared than time (the reason why Kant understood them respectively as “outer” and “inner”
forms of intuition), the derivation of the res extensa from its grounding on the subjectively
experienced primordial temporality, is counterintuitive. Space as the outer form of intuition
contained phenomenal entities, and time as the inner form or intuition contained the noumenal,
while the discriminating line between thoughts and things, between the ontic and the ontological,
remained unclear. Upon meeting with this tradition of the equivocations between the ontic and
the ontological understandings of the res corporea, this degenerative dichotomy between space
and time which Kant himself had maintained, Heidegger found a: “hazy mixture of the two ...
[where] behind this slight difference of meaning lies hidden the failure to master the fundamental
problem of being.” (BT 95)
Dasein is a structured being, so that our production of Heidegger’s implicit theory of
embodiment ought to address the embodiment of these structures. “All explications arising from
an analytic of Da-sein are gained with a view toward its structure of existence”, writes
Heidegger. (BT 44) The nexus between Being and Time and The Origin of the Work of Art tacitly
anticipates the primordial embodiment of the multiple structures of care in art, or rather as art,
and Heidegger himself was looking for a blueprint of these structures as a primordially unified
phenomenon. This very important requirement is evident in the following passage: “... This
would require a blueprint. The being of Da-sein, which ontologically supports the structural
whole as such, becomes accessible by completely looking through this whole at a primordially
unified phenomenon which already lies in the whole in such a way that it is the ontological basis
for every structural moment in its structural possibility.” (BT 182) What we have argued all along,
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is that this “primordially unified phenomenon”, this “blueprint” which “lies in the whole in such
a way that it is the ontological basis”, is the statue.
The statue must be seen as the primordial “region”, in which time and care fuse into the
disclosive res extensa. The representational interpretation of statuary art has no access to this
primordial region as the embodied prescription, hence all its various ratiocinations are ultimately
begging the question. Steiner’s research brings up the ancient belief of mortals that the statues
contained some indefinite “power”, a belief which itself is said to have “informed modes of
portraying the immortals in plastic form.”51 Carpenter followed up in trusting ancient
understanding (Galen and Chrysippos), who explained the “beauty” of Greek statuary as
consisting of “the working of Number”, so that “... the employment of a great many numbers
would almost engender perfection in sculpture.”52 Boardman thought that “the Greeks fashioned
their gods in the likeness of mem.”53 And Winckelmann attributed the “superiority” of Greek art
to the region’s climate and politics.54 Yet none of these seemingly endless ontic explanations of
the statue, can derive the origin of predicating “mortals”, of “region”, “the artist”, “climate”,
“Greece”, or “politics”, as such.
Contrarily, the presentational - or, to rather use Heidegger’s core concept – the disclosive
interpretation of statuary art, as validated in our making the double connection first between
Heidegger’s Origin and Being and Time, then also in between Heidegger and Greek Classical
statuary, explains the productive necessity and the provenance of all innerworldly eidetic
structures. The statue discloses itself as a blueprint, that is, it presents itself as a parousia,
(presencing being), not as eidolon (mirroring image), and by means of this parousia it casts the
essence of innerworldly beings in their suchness. In the statue’s presentation, ousia (the essence
of being) is par-ousa, (the essence of being is itself present).
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The representational approach to statuary may be the prevalent understanding today, and
its power may be traced as far back as Plato's critique of art as the eidolon of an eidolon (the
copy of a copy). But at least in the initial appearance into the world which themselves disclosed,
the statues were reportedly indeed experienced as the presence of the god’s essence.
Accordingly, and amongst other such suggestive instances, Steiner notices a section in the Iliad,
where “[a]t no point in the episode does the poet distinguish between the deity and the statue
standing in the temple.”55
Steiner also reports that “older” statues inspired much stronger cult functions, a deeper
cathexis to the preserver, and notices that some of those “older” statues resist specific
contextualization.56 Both these observations suggest that - while upholding Heidegger’s ecstatic
hermeneutic principle in the temporalization of temporality, where “the future is not later than
the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present” - we ought to make a
fundamental ontological discrimination between those “older” and generic, world-prescriptive
works, the type of Zeus or the Laokoön, and “later” world-descriptive statues. In the disclosure of
the possibility for individuality by the “older” works, the “later” ones must have themselves been
made to actually copy and represent the situated physiognomy of certain individuals, a trend with
the advent of portraiture of prominent figures in the Roman empire.
The disclosure of the “older” works is Dasein’s essence and substance of being; it is the
existential pressure in the lapse of irretrievable time, the embodied awareness itself that in its
being, being is negated. If Dasein’s world must be disclosed as art, as Heidegger argued, and if
that art is primarily Greek classical statuary, as I am arguing, then this world-disclosive essence
of the existential pressure must substantiate itself, must “materialize”, as the very flesh of the
abovementioned “older” and generically rendered statue. But how can a mere abstract idea, an
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“essence” turn into tangible flesh? Thus far it has been shown how the world-founding,
grounding, and bestowing essence of being, i.e., transcendental temporality, has embodied itself
in ideal semblance as the muscle, in order to act upon and resist its life’s negation in the physical
world. But the muscular narrative we meet with in Greek statuary from Zeus to Laokoön, is itself
a phenomenological structure the intelligibility and the appropriation of which as a spatial
expansion, what Heidegger refers to when he talks of the “substantiality, materiality,
extendedness, side-by-sideness” of things, (BT 68) is dependent on the fourfold articulation of
care. Encountering the serrated muscular clusters on the sides of Laokoön’s torso,
Winckelmann's attention is captured by this appropriative intelligibility, by this heedful care
through which muscular narrative must so and so develop, but he understands it as
preternaturalness. Heidegger points out both that “discourse articulates intelligibility” (BT 272),
and that the disclosed articulation of intelligibility is carried through by the structures of
attunement and understanding being the structures of care. (BT 220, 335) But then, besides the
muscle narrative, Dasein’s entire embodiment consists of more transcendental componentry, the
structures of care made intelligible only in their appropriateness.
For the body of the statue to appear as a disclosive innerworldly thing within Dasein’s
world, that is, within a perceptual domain that this body prescribes as this domain’s blueprint,
this thing’s transcendental componentry must be paradigmatically “gathered” into a definite
“region”, and only in this way to dissent from the indefinite and disjoined spatial expansions
with which we meet in Greek Archaic and other comparable world-disclosive art. Lacking this
regionalization, a kouros statue, though evidently a world-disclosing artwork itself, is a mere
innerworldly thing in Dasein’s world, a thing gathered, not a thing gathering. The regionalization
of space is enacted by Heidegger’s four structures of care, namely understanding, attunement,
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entanglement, and discourse, which gather and de-distance Dasein’s body, since in Dasein’s
world “thinging is a gathering”. Though this concept is absent in Being and Time, in his 1951
essay The Thing, Heidegger premised that Logos unifies by assembling, so that “thinging is
gathering”. (TT 172) The Greek statue, it could be Zeus or any competent intermediary work
between Zeus and the Laokoön, is in this primordial “gathering” Heidegger’s sought for
“primordially unified phenomenon”.
Laokoön patently discloses the “regional” constitution of space, in two conducts. First,
primordially so as its own embodiment, having gathered its own world-prescriptive decrees as
parts that reciprocally belong to one other. In this disclosure, this art-“thing” qualifies to
Heidegger’s sought “primordially unified phenomenon”. In having projected on its own body its
own world project, Laokoön also determines the perceptual possibilities within which this body
is thrown as a resolute agency to act upon the predication of its own predicament. Laokoön’s
body expands as space through the very same determinations which the world within which this
body acts itself expands spatially.
Ontologically speaking, there are only three distinguishable kinds of things as res extensa
in Dasein’s world: the human body as a thing, the statue as a thing, and any other man-made or
natural innerworldly being as a thing. The constitutive “substance” as the thingliness of these
three things, differs fundamentally. The “substance” of the human body is its existence; the
substance of an innerworldly object like the hammer, a boulder, or the human body as
instrument, is its usefulness. To these postulations by Heidegger, we now add that the
“substance” or essence of the statue is its world-disclosive prescription.
Accordingly, Heidegger postulates that the human body as a thing is made by its
existential pressure. “Essentially the person exists only in carrying out intentional acts, and is
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thus essentially not an object. ... The ‘substance’ of the human being is not the spirit as the
synthesis of body and soul, but existence.” (BT 48, 117, 212) The substance of innerworldly things
other than the human body or the statue, is made out of human involvement and action.
Heidegger noticed the common stock in the Greek language of the words “pragma” for “thing”,
and “praxis”, for “action”. (BT 68) He deduced that this language has preserved the fact that the
suchness of the “thing”, and the world overall, takes form only when intentionally acted upon.
Hence the thingly suchness of the hammer, its hardness, is disclosed in the what-for of the
hammer. “The act of hammering itself discovers the specific ‘handiness’ of the hammer.” (BT 69)
Regarding the constitutive essence, and thus the substance of the statue, Origin dedicates
a section, titled Thing and Work, but in it Heidegger fails to encounter a problem so pivotal for
the proof of his metaphysics because he asks the wrong question: “With what essence of what
thing should a Greek temple agree?” (Origin 162) But the temple falls into the category of useful
things, housing the god and the people, and hence that which the temple is made of, the essence
with which the temple “agrees” as a useful thing, is still the praxis. It is man-made, not manmaking, and this determination is randomly acknowledged in Heidegger’s understanding that
“[b]y means of the temple, the god is present in the temple.” (Origin 167)
Heidegger makes in that section from Origin a shy ontic-ontological distinction of
thingliness between the industrial arts (the shoes as equipment) and the fine arts (Van Gogh’s
painting of the shoes), of which the latter’s essence is “the truth of beings setting itself to work.”
(Origin 162)

But the aletheia of the work in unconcealing the truth of being in the fine arts - the

work letting us “know what shoes are in truth” (Origin 161) - is still world-descriptive, ontological
but not yet fundamental ontological, not disclosing the constitutional possibility for the quest for
truth, which for reasons that we have already argued, must itself be embodied. It is this
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fundamental ontological aletheia that the statue alone discloses as its own “substantiality”, which
Buschor understands in his On the Meaning of Greek Statues, that: “the particular sculptural
energy which breaks forth from the edges and from the pores of these statues is closely
connected with their vicarious power, with their concentrated substantiality …”57
Greek statuary alone corroborates Heidegger’s paradox claim that “... the road toward the
determination of the thingly reality of the work leads not from thing to work, but from work to
thing.” (Origin 165) This radical reversal from substance to existential ontology through art is not
supported by world-descriptive works, and thus leaves Heidegger exposed to the aforementioned
criticism. The critics of Heidegger’s metaphysics will be answered only if the thingliness of the
thing that discloses Dasein’s world is found to be constituted by no less than the embodied
prescriptions of time and space. So far in this chapter we saw how the tissue of the Greek statue
is made of primordial temporality disguised as muscular narrative. The statue’s being made of
space, instead of made in space, is due to its agalmatic quality.
The statue is not a man-made thing; it is an “agalma”. This Greek noun for “statue”
encompasses the ecstatic radiance of the work as a “shinning”, its agalmatic quality resting in its
capacity to disclose the essence of being. It is this agalmatic quality which breeds the
“theophany” of the statue, naively understood by both pagan ancients and doubting Christians as
the appearance of the “god” in the statue. For it is only through the metaphysics of Dasein, that
we are now able to make the connection between Greek art and our own origins, the connection
making any such naiveté and doubting a moot point. Steiner mentions Christian critiques from
Dio Chrysostom and Minucius Felix, the latter demanding the proof that: “the image is cast,
hammered, erected ... when does the god come into being?”58 For Steiner’s factical
understanding, agalmatophilia is the fervent longing, the pathology of desiring this essence; for
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Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, agalmatophilia would be the “preservation” of this essence.
This longing for, is the reckoning with the essence of being upon the encountering before their
embodiment in the agalma of primordial temporality and the transcendental structures of care
grounded in temporality. “Preserving” the essence of the statue is casting an identifying gaze to
the blueprint of our own possibility to exist, that is to be.
4.3. The Embodiment of Understanding
Dasein is a temporal being only inasmuch as it understands that it dies, for as long as it
understands what it is like to be dying. Heidegger characterizes this mode of being in
understanding as “authentic”, and distinguishes the mode’s absolute determination of death as a
death of one’s own. It is no other configuring impulse but the understanding as the experiencing
of its own finitude that “sets the factors”, that is, configures Dasein’s spatial expansion and
Dasein as a spatial being. So writes Heidegger:
Authentic being-toward-death cannot evade its ownmost non-relational possibility or cover it over
in this flight and reinterpret it for the common sense of the they. The existential project of an
authentic being-toward-death must thus set forth the factors of such a being which are constitutive
for it as an understanding of death-in the sense of being toward this possibility without fleeing it
or covering it over. (BT 261)

In Laokoön’s body the mere possibility of this authentic mode of being in understanding
death is made manifest so consummately and immanently, and its sight lying so close to us, that
we actually do not see it for the awesomeness of what the spatial configuration of this work
actually is, i.e., the embodiment of the understanding of death. It is the immediate familiarity
with the constitution of our own world project as a dwelling in the understanding of our own
finitude, which renders us rather unfazed to the meaning of this art, the reason behind
Boardman’s earlier concession that, “[s]taring at these works, in picture, cast or original, does
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not explain them; indeed their familiarity to some degree deadens perception.” Precisely as
Heidegger anticipates, the existentiell mode of the myth having the Trojan priest dying by
Apollo’s serpents, covers over and reinterprets death for the common sense of the they. But
hidden under our existentiell flight to tell the work what the work is about, is what the work is
trying to tell us, its preservers, as a fundamental ontological disclosure: namely the how of the
constitution of our own world comportment as spatial beings through the understanding of
ourselves as beings-towards-death. It is in this understanding, and therein alone, that the statue
configures itself as a res extensa, by the very same modality that Sein discloses its Da. (BT 144)
Promptly so, Heidegger initially distinguishes between two definitions of understanding,
one factical or existentiell and one primordial or existential. Later on we will encounter here a
third kind. In our case the factical is our understanding of the Laokoön as a representation of the
hero in the Trojan myth, a statue made by the sculptor Agesander of Rhodes and his sons
Polydorus and Athenodorus, using tools of such and such kind, carved at this particular period, at
this particular workshop, etc. Factical understanding is about the particular what, and as such it is
an “... existential derivative of the primary understanding which constitutes the being of the there
in general ... one possible kind of cognition among others ...” (BT 143) Primordial, or primary
understanding, on the other hand, is the existential understanding which Laokoön discloses to its
preservers by having embodied it. “In understanding as an existential, the thing we are able to do
is not a what, but being as existing”, notes Heidegger. (BT 143)
As it is the case with all four structures of care, primordial understanding is individually
grounded in finite temporality, so that in this temporal grounding Dasein discloses to itself the
finite being that it is. Accordingly, “[u]nderstanding is the existential being of the ownmost
potentiality of being of Da-sein in such a way that this being discloses in itself what its very

125

being is about.” (BT 145) The disclosure of what Dasein’s very being is about, is tautological, and
therefore existential, in the sense that, that which “sets forth the factors of such a being” is the
being itself, which in its being is setting the factors. And yet this being fails to recognize itself as
the being which in its being sets the factors of its own being, because of its inescapable
indebtedness to interpret itself through the scientific project and the hermeneutic circle.
This “Da”, Dasein’s world, although a there where Dasein does recognize itself albeit as
a finite and incomplete being, is for the same reasons also a there where Dasein fails to establish
its own identity as an absolute productivity. In having a world, Dasein has been rigorously
determined, that is, “attuned” to regional existentiell possibilities, and thus obliged to interpret
itself under the three aforementioned predicaments of the hermeneutic circle. Understanding is
equiprimordial with attunement: “Attunement always has its understanding, even if only by
suppressing it.” (BT 143) Writes Heidegger: “... since understanding is attuned and attunement is
existentially surrendered to throwness, Da-sein has always already gone astray and failed to
recognize itself. In its potentiality of being, it is thus delivered over to the possibility of first
finding itself again in its possibilities.” (BT 144)
The teleology of consciousness established by Dasein’s predicament does not get out of a
situation by thematizing every motive, but in taking in every occasion the consequential option
of the shortest cut; for as long as it lives, Dasein escapes one situation in such a way that it is
only to be thrown into another, thus remaining into a chain of situations that maintain the entropy
of the truth of the deficiency of its being. In this succession of situations Dasein projects itself to
exist as a mere potentiality of being, because “... understanding means: to be projecting toward a
potentiality-of-being for the sake of which Da-sein always exists.” (BT 336)
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Arguably alone amongst all monumental, world-disclosive art, Greek post-Archaic
statuary embodies both Dasein’s understanding of the deficiency of being and the understanding
of the summons. Laokoön discloses Dasein’s understanding of the deficiency of being through
its disclosure of a frozen moment taken out of one conceivable sequential con-figuration, where
in anticipating the threat of death in a particular situation this body has been thrown into
fragmentation and refraction, having chosen one rather than all possible body con-figurations, as
well as this rather than another attuned application of its summoned constituency to resist the
resistance against its will to live.
To the hermeneutic event of the threat, Laokoön’s body arrives with the retrieval of a
certain fitness, having brought to the event a certain physical past out of the possibility of a
certain future, confirming Heidegger’s expectation for the constitution of Dasein, where “...
acting in the direction of the future ... the past come[s] alive.”59 This certain fitness is not
arbitrarily gained and randomly brought to the hermeneutic event of the threat, but has been itself
accrued as a retained record of authentic understandings of death as a death of one’s own, being
the body’s own formative experience, out of which the thisness of this body has gained its
substantial fitness as a reified spatial expansion. The fundamental ontological disclosure of
Dasein’s ecstatic deficiency of being is possible only through an embodied authentic
understanding of death, understood by a body which is both negatively determinate and
positively indeterminate. A body is negatively determinate if it arrives before the hermeneutic
event of the possibility not yet to face, but at this point to understand death, with a certain
subjective fitness, where the fitness of this subjective fitness to understand may be decided only
by the body’s constituency having been freed to possibly fail the understanding of what threatens
it. Subjective fitness to understand one’s death summons the body into phenomenological
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structures disclosed for their serviceability, usability, and detrimentality the totality of which
discloses the body as a pathology of the desire to live. Conversely, objective fitness is a privative
definition of fitness as the absence of the pathology of that desire, and it is this homeostatic
fitness that we come across in the kouros and other non Greek world-disclosive art. We will see
more of the difference between homeostatic or objective, and heterostatic or subjective fitness
when we examine the embodiment of discourse. On the other hand, a body is positively
indeterminate if its potentiality to understand death depends on the body’s componentry having
been freed to possibly understand death by means of the body’s own intelligibility. In this
freedom to understand death the body becomes meaningful, because the body is disclosed as that
expediency in terms of which the understanding of death has become possible. This body is also
meaningful, that is, intelligible, because it discloses how the kinaesthesis of the body is possible
so that in this kinaesthesis the body can resist what resists its will to live. In Heidegger’s words:
“Meaning signifies that upon which the primary project is projected, that in terms of which
something can be conceived in its possibility as what it is. Projecting discloses possibilities, that
is, it discloses what makes something possible.” (BT 324) Negative determination and positive
indeterminacy are equally necessary for the embodiment of Dasein’s understanding of the
deficiency of being, because in freeing the body to either fail or succeed its embodied
interpretation of death through the body’s intelligible configuration, they are the conditions for
understanding as an ecstatic existential possibility grounded in primordial temporality.
Art historians have promptly acknowledged this fundamental ontological disclosure of
Dasein’s ecstatic deficiency of being as a Greek “invention”, but they have always understood it
in existentiell modes, accordingly as a certain “kinaesthesis”, a rendition “determined by lines
the center of which is constantly changing”, and as a “displacement of equilibrium.” Gisela M.A.
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Richter saw this thrust in Greek art, which starts decisively with the Zeus of Artemision and
arguably culminates with the Laokoön Group, as an escalating development of anatomical
definition resulting to movement, a development where “by 480 B.C. the Greek sculptor was”:
… in possession of a full repertory of anatomical forms. Such details as the serratus magnus, the
swelling of the trapezium, the lachrymal caruncle – which in the preceding period he had only
tentatively indicated – he now regularly featured. … Artists were ready for the new problem,
equally important in the development of sculpture, of adapting these forms to action and
movement.

60

Buschor, who curiously understood Greek statuary as being a misunderstanding, that is to
say, an “ingenious misunderstanding of Oriental-Egyptian prototypes”, nonetheless punctually
intuited the embodiment of Dasein’s deficiency of being in Greek art as a certain “displacement
of equilibrium”, where “... the center of gravity has ... shifted toward a more dynamic disunity”,
and where “... forms quietly ‘blossom’ forth toward their futures, while the Egyptian and Eastern
statues simply ‘are’.61
Winckelmann intuited the disclosure of the understanding of the deficiency of being in
Greek art as a “beauty” produced by an underlying non-mathematical geometry: “The forms of a
beautiful body are determined by lines the center of which is constantly changing, and which, if
continued, would never describe circles.”62 What does Winckelmann mean here? What is the
“center of a line”? How could a line possibly “describe circles”? And is it the center of the lines,
or the lines themselves that if continued would never describe circles? Winckelmann does not
explain, but it seems that for once someone had stepped beyond the factical understanding
typical to art criticism, to observe in the work fundamental ontology at work. Of course one can
only hypothesize over what Winckelmann saw here in Laokoön’s body. His mentioning of a
“constantly changing center” within Laokoön’s body, and of centered lines which “if continued
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would never describe circles” hint an awareness of two fundamental ontological events
Heidegger described and Greek art disclosed: first, that the center which decides the periphery of
this body as a regional expansion can be taken to be located at any given point of this regional
expansion, as if decidedness is self-assertively centrifugal from any point; second, that the
centered lines are so outwardly expansive out of the body, that their imaginary extensions would
never return to the body, in such a way that this exteroceptive vectoring is revealing something
about how the body relates to surrounding space as a horizon of disclosing other beings.
Essentially all three art historians cited are observing in an increasing understanding the
same two embodied fundamental ontological events. Richter’s adaptation of a higher resolution
of body parts towards action and movement, is what Buschor sees as a displacement of
equilibrium and a dynamic disunity, which is what Winckelmann understands as a shifting body
center expanding outwardly. Winckelmann’s insight comes closer than the other two art
historians to observing embodied fundamental ontology, because his sight of the “constantly
changing center” within the body recognizes Dasein’s constitution of the self within the “theyself”. If the center of Laokoön’s body as such can be located to decide the periphery as such from
any given point of this body, this is because Laokoön embodies and discloses Dasein’s
constitution of the individual as a central being-there-ness situated anywhere within the they.
Heidegger describes the constitution of individuation always within the Mitda-sein of others,
from which the individual emerges in anxiety. Thus while it is true that “[a]ngst individualizes
and thus discloses Da-sein as ‘solus ipse’”, (BT 188) and “[f]earing discloses this being in its
jeopardization, in its being left to itself [my italics]”, (BT 141) it is also true that “Da-sein is
individuated, but as being-in-the-world.” (BT 189) Writes Heidegger: “Here the fact can become
evident to Da-sein that in the eminent possibility of itself it is torn away from the they, that is,
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anticipation can always already have torn itself away from the they. The understanding of this
‘ability’, however, first reveals its factical lostness in the everydayness of the they-self.” (BT 263)
Winckelmann identifies aesthetically with Laokoön’s body as a body constituted by any center
that can decide the body’s periphery from any of this body’s given point, because Winckelmann
as an individual himself reckons with Dasein’s embodied world project disclosed by this art.
Dasein’s deficiency of being is obliquely understood in the embodiment of this
deficiency in Greek art, by Buschor as a displacement of equilibrium, by Richter as a definitive
adaptation toward action, and by Winckelmann as an uncentered ecstatic projection. The
summons is prescriptively manifest in Laokoön’s body, first because this body is our body, and
as such it prescribes the possibilities of our world comportment. But then the summons also
manifests as Laokoön’s body because the reified “substance” of this body is nothing more
“substantial” than the gathering of its what-for-thingliness which makes this body possible in its
applicability. This what-for-thingliness is gathered by the freed to be themselves distinct beings
which medical science understands as the componentry of the human body, beings recognized
strictly in their serviceability, usability, and detrimentality, disclosed as modes of spatial
expansion in understanding. Laokoön’s body is disclosed in the attunement from fear and as a
trenchant potentiality against the threat of the serpents, substantiating an embodied confirmation
of Heidegger’s hypothesis that understanding discloses the there as a mere potentiality of being.
(BT 145)

Heidegger refers to how Dasein’s world comes to being as a spatial expansion, but his

exposition fits precisely the mode of construction of Laokoön’s body, both as a body qua body in
general but also as this body’s parts: “[In the world’s disclosure by understanding] not only is the
world, qua world, disclosed in its possible significance, but innerworldly beings themselves are
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freed, these beings freed for their own possibilities. What is at hand is discovered as such in its
serviceability, usability, detrimentality.” (BT 145)
Both as its parts and as a whole, Laokoön’s body is constituted not for, but as a
situational hearkening for the summons first to understand and then to resolve the threat.
Summoning the body first of all means to gather its componentry of indefinite mode, that is, to
con-figure it. In this summons, for this body to have con-figured itself by having chosen this
rather than that con-figuration, or rather than having chosen all possible con-figurations (the
thematization of every embodying motive), this body must have understood the minutia of the
threat. Heidegger coins this summoned con-figuration through understanding, “attunement.”
Understanding and attunement are equiprimordial existentials, and Laokoön’s blueprint
summoning palpably shows how “Dasein is constituted by disclosedness, that is, by attuned
understanding.” (BT 261) In having understood the threat, and in being attuned for it, Laokoön
embodies Dasein as an authentic temporal being, since as we saw at the beginning of this section,
Dasein is a temporal being only if it understands the threat of death.
In view of Heidegger’s refutation of substance ontology, the ecstatic existential of the
understanding is most important for the analytic of Dasein’s constitution as a spatial being,
because it is primarily through the understanding that innerworldly beings must now attain and
maintain their “substantiality”. The world-constitutive project of understanding has its own
possibilities, a development Heidegger defines as interpretation. In interpretation understanding
appropriates what Dasein has understood in an intelligible way, where that which has become
understood always as a thing-at-hand does not show as something different, but rather as the
understanding itself. Interpretation is by its nature circumspectively resolutive, so that what has
been circumspectively interpreted according to its in-order-to as such, that is, what has been
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explicitly understood, obtains the structure of something as something. For Heidegger
interpretation does not acknowledge a distinct object to be understood aside from the object’s
understanding, but develops the possibilities projected in understanding as the object itself. This
understanding of “understanding” does away with the need to explain innerworldly beings in
terms of a material substance that obtains independently of perception. So writes Heidegger:
“What is at hand comes explicitly before sight that understands. All preparing, arranging, setting
right, improving, rounding out, occur in such a way that things at hand for circumspection are
interpreted in their in-order-to and are taken care of according to the interpretedness which has
become visible.” (BT 149)
As we observed in the previous chapter from the comparison of the particular embodied
region of the knee interpretation between the New York Kouros and the Laokoön, the former
rendition does not constitute a “region”, because the “understanding” which interprets to render
this knee is all lacking, false, and irrelevant. This is a “knee” rendered monumentally by an
embodied art-world disclosure evidently not grounded in finite temporality, because at the very
least it is not circumspectively heedful enough to interpret the knee as a knee expedient to an
embodied consciousness that has understood death as the death of one’s own. Contrarily,
Laokoön’s knee, and with this knee his entire body, is prepared, arranged, set right, rounded out
and occurring in such a way that this knee’s and this body’s constituents are things at hand
anatomically interpreted in their in-order-to so that they have become not only visible, but more
so, intelligible, and thus, for Heidegger, meaningful. And again: the fact that the kouros’ knee is
not intelligible in interpretive understanding, is a giveaway sign that its mere visibility rather
owes to Dasein’s compulsory understanding which cannot do otherwise but to immediately
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recombine with what it has foregrounded itself from in order to become one with itself again in
the unity of the historical horizon that it thus acquires (Gadamer).
Besides the qualification that Dasein’s embodiment as Dasein’s prescriptive spatiality
must be disclosed as interpretive, or existential understanding, as opposed to the factical
understanding which as we saw earlier is one possible kind of cognition among others,
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology requires the disclosure of Dasein’s spatiality at an even more
fundamental level of understanding, one he coins “pre-understanding”. This kind of
understanding will bring us to a closer examination of the Polycleitus Canon.
Heidegger notices that innerworldly beings cannot be disclosed one at a time, as if
“initially something objectively present is experienced which then is understood as a door, as a
house ...” (BT 150) “[W]hat is initially ‘there’ is nothing else than the self-evident, undisputed
prejudice of the interpreter ...” (BT 151) Innerworldly beings can be disclosed as things at hand
only in their relevance to every other being as thing at hand within an expansive region, a region
and its contents which must have somehow been “pre-understood” although not yet fully
disclosed in their suchness. “[W]hat is encountered in the world is always already in a relevance
which is disclosed in the understanding of world, a relevance which is made explicit by
interpretation. Things at hand are always already understood in terms of a totality of relevance”,
writes Heidegger, referring to the “pre-” of the pre-understanding. (BT 150)
A totality of relevance in pre-understanding is necessary because innerworldly beings
have to be “freed” if they are to appear in their what-for-thingliness, that is, to be signified in
their significance by the pre-understanding consciousness within a world as a totality of
relevance. “The discoveredness of things at hand and objectively present is grounded in the
discoveredness of the world; for if the actual totality of relevance of things at hand is to be freed,
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this requires a pre-understanding of significance”, writes Heidegger. (BT 297) It is not as if
innerworldly beings are objectively present and somehow kept somewhere enslaved and waiting
for their freedom, since as we are told, such an idea would only be the (false) prejudice of the
interpreter. And yet “dis-closedness” means that something closed “is” sub-is-ting in a privative
mode, awaiting to be opened up by the same way in which a-letheia rectifies the forgetfulness of
being. Innerworldly beings may not be kept before they are freed - that would be the false
prejudice of the interpreter - but they somehow “are” un-dis-closed in forgetfulness. But, the
only beings that could have been there in a privative mode, are the preexisting, retrievable
perceptual constructs of the they, Dasein as world, awaiting to be reinterpreted and taken out of
forgetfulness in their signification by the signifying needs of the interpreter as the solus ipse
being the being-towards-death. This there, where the “I” meets with the “they” as a mode of
interpretation, is an existential equiprimordiality. This is what Heidegger means when he writes:
“The disclosedness of the there discloses equiprimordially the whole of being-in-the-world - the
world, being-in, and the self that is this being as ‘I am’.” (BT 298)
But then, as we established above, since interpretation does not acknowledge a distinct
object to be understood aside from the object’s understanding, and since understanding
appropriates what Dasein has understood in an intelligible way where that which has become
understood always as a thing-at-hand does not show as something different but rather as that
understanding itself, and since what has been circumspectively interpreted according to its inorder-to as such, that is, what has been explicitly understood, obtains the structure of something
as something, then those preexisting and retrievable perceptual constructs of the they as world in
a totality of relevance cannot be anything more substantial or objectively present than that
understanding itself. In particular, that understanding is the “pre-understanding”, itself with its
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own structure and possibilities of interpretation. Thus in the last analysis what is “freed” to
appear signified in its significance, is no other than that which frees. That which frees is the “pre” of the pre-understanding. But what is it?
That understanding which both frees and then through two subsequent modes of
understanding appears as that which is freed, must be some kind of an understanding more
primordial than both the understanding which discloses beings in their significance (existential),
and the understanding which accumulates facts about beings in any given mode of interpretation
(existentiell). If it is really more primordial, then it must appear not as its own existential and
existentiell aftermath world construct, as an interpretation of the freed thing-at-hand, but outright
and already as the freeing disclosure. But if it is to be discernible, if indeed it is an actual
disclosive factor to Dasein’s spatiality, how can this higher primordiality of understanding
appear, and more so, how can it simultaneously appear as a higher primordiality? Fundamental
ontologically speaking, there is something, which being an understanding must itself have
attained the structure of something as something, something which goes back and forth between
the understanding of significance (ontological) and the understanding of the for-the-sake-ofwhich (ontic). This is because, as Heidegger tells us, “[t]he understanding of significance as the
disclosedness of the actual world is again grounded in the understanding of the for-the-sake-ofwhich, to which discovering of the totality of relevance goes back.” (BT 297) What we wish to
capture a glimpse of, is that understanding which in Gadamer’s earlier iteration “constantly
moves from the whole [Heidegger’s existential understanding having obtained the structure of
something as something] to the part [Heidegger’s existentiell understanding having obtained the
structure of something as something] and back to the whole”. An understanding without which
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Dasein cannot have a world, because “the failure to achieve this harmony means that
understanding has failed.”
Heidegger does not cast enough light here, perhaps justifiably so because Dasein’s
spatiality for which the modes of understanding obtaining the structure of something as
something are themselves explicated as the spatiality of the universal scale in Dasein’s totality of
relevance, while the modes themselves are abstract concepts to begin with, the objectification of
which is difficult to account for in the macrocosmic scale of Dasein’s world constitution. The
closest Heidegger comes to name the freeing pre-understanding, is as an “understanding of
world”, as in the following passage: “... that for which innerworldly beings are initially freed
must previously be disclosed. ... The previous disclosure of that for which the freeing of things
encountered in the world ensues is none other than the understanding of world to which Da-sein
as a being is always already related.” (BT 86)
But Greek art, having palpably and visibly disclosed Dasein’s original blueprint of all
modes of understanding in the most concentrating scale imaginable, is most revealing. In
Dasein’s embodiment that elusive something, the freeing “pre-” of the pre-understanding, the
“understanding of world”, obtains the phenomenological structure of the body in its entirety,
having correspondingly embodied no less than the prescription of Dasein’s spatiality as a world
in a totality of relevance. The body in its totality is the elusive higher primordiality,
corresponding to Heidegger’s demand that the world as a whole must have been disclosed before
the world’s parts. As we have already seen with Heidegger, in Dasein’s spatiality Dasein’s world
as a whole comes before the world as its parts, so that if there is a body both as art and as life to
embody this spatiality, this body must first manifest as a whole before its parts may be disclosed.
In this pre-understanding our body is that which in freeing its parts in their what-for-thingliness
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it frees our world, precisely because it can thus act upon it. Existentially speaking, without
having such a freeing body, Dasein cannot have such a free world. In the last analysis, what
makes us merely hopeful to capture a glimpse of the objectification of the “pre-” of the preunderstanding, is that this objectified consciousness lies the closest to us: it is our body as a
whole.
If as Origin argues, Dasein’s fundamental ontology in general must be disclosed as art,
then pre-understanding in particular must also appear originally as art. In our preliminary
analysis we have already postulated that this original disclosure begins to precipitate as the body
of the Zeus of Artemision, and in Dasein’s asymmetrical historiographical datability which reprioritizes the ontic ahead of the ontological, this original disclosure climaxes some three
centuries later with the Laokoön Group. In Laokoön’s body all of Heidegger’s three modes of
understanding obtain the structure of something as something, so that this body becomes
thoroughly transparent, that is, thoroughly intelligible and thus meaningful in its what-forthingliness. When we focused on the New York Kouros and the Laokoön knee, we observed that
only the latter knee is intelligible and meaningful, for no other reason than that this knee
objectifies as the understanding that has obtained the structure of something as something in
order to partake what makes body motion possible, so that this body can project itself as a
possibility of world action.
As a prescriptive totality of relevance, being the embodied disclosure of a world,
Laokoön’s body is a defined region. Within this region by means of the existential and the
existentiell modes of understanding spatial expansion can be ecstatically and endlessly subregionalized, through the existential mode in different interpretations of the body, and through
the existentiell mode as the region of the knee, of the chest, of the genitals, etc. It is this
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spontaneous, ecstatic sub-regionalization by the existential and the existentiell modes of
understanding which blinds us from seeing that body which lies the closest to us, our body as the
total region that we primordially are, i.e., a temporal, finite, embodied ultimate truth. Origin
anticipates that philosophy is an intermediary “happening of truth” between art and science.
(Origin 187)

Greek art warrants this anticipation. For whereas in the existentiell project of science

the body does not even have to exist – theoretical biologists are adamant that the body “exists”
only for-the-sake-of the genes without bothering to explain for whom would the genes exist - and
for the existential project of philosophy as dialectic materialism Engels may interpret the body as
a thermodynamic machine mustered to change an unjust world, it is only art at its highest
prescriptive monumentality that discloses the body as the freeing pre-understanding of death.
The reason why we do not notice Laokoön’s body for the embodiment of the world
freeing pre-understanding of death that it really is, the statue’s “familiarity ... deadening
perception” as Boardman reckoned, is that it is so thoroughly intelligible it has become
transparent. “The being that we ourselves always are is ontologically farthest from us. The
reason for this lies in care itself”, notes Heidegger, albeit not referring to Dasein’s body, but to
Dasein’s world. (BT 311) This transparency is negotiated through all three modes of understanding,
along with the remaining three structures of care. At times Heidegger discusses this transparency
of Dasein’s world as if it was a mere visibility instead of a transparency through intelligibility.
But there are beings in Dasein’s world which can be visible without being intelligible; in terms
of Dasein’s embodiment the kouros knee is visible, but not yet intelligible. Nonetheless, we
understand that in such instances Heidegger actually means transparency through intelligibility
and not mere visibility, because he refers to this visibility in terms of authenticity and totality,
always connecting this visibility to the ultimate primordiality of temporality as Dasein’s ecstatic
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need to anticipate and resolve the highest issue of its being: “In its anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein has been made phenomenally visible with regard to its possible authenticity and totality.” (BT
311)

A resolute body in monumental art is transparent to the view of a self-consciousness, by
being the prescriptive blueprint for a being which through this resoluteness to reach its ownmost
potentiality of being as a self, has itself become transparent to itself. As Heidegger shows, being
becomes transparent when “[r]esoluteness brings Da-sein back to its ownmost potentiality-ofbeing-a-self.” (BT 307) But first of all, both the ideal or prescriptive and the real or actual selftransparency through resoluteness depends on whether the self is freed by the pre-understanding
to be situated: “Resoluteness, transparent to itself, understands that the indefiniteness of its
potentiality-of-being is always determined only in a resolution with regard to the actual
situation”, notes Heidegger. (BT 308) We pointed out earlier that in our explication of Dasein’s
embodiment the term “resolution” must be addressed in both its congenital meanings, as resolve
as well as higher definition. This is because Dasein’s world-resolve embodies itself in no other
terms than as in forms of ever higher definition. Conversely, art historians may have seen that the
“evolution” of Greek art from Archaism to Classicism is “achieved” as “naturalism” mainly in
terms of an ever higher descriptive definition, but it is only through extrapolating Heidegger’s
analysis of Dasein’s world spatiality through the fourfold structures of care, that we learn both
why and how this resolution as higher definition became possible, albeit as resolve.
Heidegger shows that a world in its entirety becomes transparent for Dasein if its
innerworldly beings become transparent to themselves in being together with others. “We shall
call the sight which is primarily and as a whole related to existence transparency. ... Existent
beings glimpse ‘themselves’ only when they have become transparent to themselves

140

equiprimordially in their being with the world, in being together with others as the constitutive
factors of their existence.” (BT 147) But the glimpse beyond opaqueness to the transparency of
being is possible in the first place only because Dasein has understood what threatens it, by
means of the summoning by that understanding of the existent beings to come together with
other beings for-the-sake-of anticipating resolutely the universal threat. We already observed this
summoning in Laokoön’s body, manifesting as body parts that have become transparent to
themselves in having disclosed themselves to a high resolution through the attainment of a
certain serviceability, usability, and detrimentality.
We need now Heidegger’s help to see how these summoned body parts, still in
understanding, and not yet in attunement, throwness, and discourse, converge in their being
summoned. From the outset Heidegger’s analysis shows how crude and rather misleading is
Chrysippos’ account of the Polycleitus Canon, or at least of what has reached us about what the
ancients made out of it. The Canon itself is of course perfectly sound as a canon, but that only as
a mere recognition and an attempt to monumentalize an axiomatic truth as a singularity event in
art. What is erroneous about it, is first the Canon’s being attributed to the understanding of the
artist, who as such is made intelligible only by the singularity event axiomatized by the Canon
and not the other way around. But even more erroneous is “Chrysippos’” drawing our attention
away from the actual fundamental ontological events that take place in the work. As we saw in
section 3.3.3., Chrysippos’ formulation wants the beauty of the statue to have emerged from a
certain commensurability, a symmetria of proportions between all body parts. This definition
understands the “beauty” as an overall effect of proportionality, “of finger to finger and of all the
fingers to the palm and wrist, and of these to the forearm, and of the forearm to the upper arm,
and of all the parts to each other”. But “proportionality”, from pro and portio, at best merely
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means a “part-for-part” “comparative relation in size”, or “to put [something] in relation to
something else” (Webster). Thus Chrysippos’ formulation, although self-proclaimed and even
largely accepted by art historians as an attempt to explain the relation and the gathering of “all
the parts”, actually boils down the beauty of the Canon’s implementation as a relation of body
parts in terms of their size. How misleading is this understanding, an understanding evidently
grounded in substance ontology, can only be seen through Heidegger’s analysis of the spatiality
of Dasein, and through Heidegger’s, by our own analysis of Dasein’s embodiment in Greek art.
At this point, it becomes clear that the factical how of the parts being related, is
tautologically disclosed by Dasein’s primordial why.
From Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s world spatiality we understand that if Laokoön’s
knee is rendered, that is to say, if the knee appears as a “knee” in its regional suchness, this is
because that knee is implemented in its what-for-thingliness in order for that which needs the
knee to appear as well. This is because “[t]o expose that upon which a project is projected,
means to disclose what makes what is projected possible.” (BT 324) In other words, the projected
project tells us something about the knee (it “exposes” it), but since the knee is itself an
understanding as interpretation, through that knee the project can also tell us something about the
project which needs the knee. Heidegger sees the need to pursue this undeclared project as the
central research of his fundamental ontology. “This exposure requires that we methodically
pursue the project (usually an inexplicit one) underlying an interpretation in such a way that what
is projected in the project is disclosed and conceivable with regard to its upon-which.” (BT 324)
Now, what “project” would that be, in need of such a knee in particular, and such a body in
general? Heidegger explains: “What is projected is the being of Da-sein, disclosed in what
constitutes it as an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole.” (BT 324) Heidegger goes one step
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further to postulate that the being of Dasein is thus constituted as care: “The upon-which of what
is projected, of the disclosed being thus constituted, is what itself makes possible this
constitution of being as care.” To summarize this first step towards understanding how Dasein’s
body becomes transparent in its being a resolute body through embodying the why of the body’s
need for resolution, we postulate that that which needs the knee is the being of Dasein as care
seeking to assemble itself (“con-stituted”) as an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole.
What informs the Canon’s having defaulted its own call to deduce the work’s “beauty”
from the relation of “all the parts” in terms of their size, is Heidegger’s pursuing the
“inexplicitness” of care seeking to assemble itself as a whole: “With the question of the meaning
of care, we are asking what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care
in the unity of its unfolded articulation?” (BT 324) The primordial impulse which brings body parts
together in Greek art, that is, the “why” of the gathering as care, them parts being brought
together because Dasein cares to assemble its own embodiment as an authentic potentiality-forbeing-a-whole in the very same way it cares to assemble its own world, is also the “how” of the
gathering. We extrapolate this possibility of an existential assembly of body parts to rectify the
Canon, from Heidegger’s analysis of how innerworldly beings are themselves made to appear
through their approximation to other beings in anticipatory resoluteness. Heidegger sees that, in
the untenability of objectively present beings, the circumspective resoluteness as resolve which
brings one being near another in the summons for the disclosure of the beings’ what-forthingliness for the needs of the being-towards-death, makes one being adopt to the certain
serviceability, usability, and detrimentality of another, now in terms of resoluteness as definition
in making present. Heidegger provides that the movement of the understanding makes a world
for itself, and thus may embody itself, by going back and forth in between beings as just parts, or
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parts of parts, and in between beings as parts and beings as a whole. This ecstatic reciprocation is
a practically infinite process which simultaneously both maintains and adapts and through this
explicit maintenance and adaptation gradually bridges the distance and bonds the parts, in this
trans-versing process disclosing the parts for what they are, by depositing in the gaps between
beings the extension of their own “substance” as a what-for-thingliness. It is through the
provisional success of this maintenance and adaptation, that beings, either Dasein’s body or
Dasein’s world, may become thoroughly intelligible, and therefore transparent for the needs of
the being-towards-death. In Heidegger’s words:
Only because Da-sein, awaiting a possibility (that is, here a what-for), has come back to a for-this
(that is, retains a thing at hand), can conversely the making present that belongs to this awaiting
retention start with this retention and bring it explicitly nearer in its reference to the what-for. The
deliberation that brings near must in the scheme of making present adapt itself to the kind of
being of what is to be brought near. The character of relevance of what is at hand is not first
discovered by deliberation, but only brought near by it in such a way that it circumspectly lets
what is in relevance be seen as this. (BT 360)

The movement of the understanding which assembles innerworldly beings into Dasein’s
entire world so that a possible world can “be seen as this” world, is incomparably more readily
observable in the prescriptive blueprint of Dasein’s embodiment in Greek art. Laokoön
corroborates Heidegger’s pivotal contention that innerworldly beings are not objectively present,
by the same palpable proof which demonstrates that the “beauty” resulting from the
implementation of something called the “Polycleitus Canon” is not due to the proportionality of
the size of body parts. To observe the validity of Heidegger’s arguments at an even more concise
region than in Dasein’s entire embodiment, we return to Laokoön’s knee.
By describing the knee in medical terms, we saw that through its own development as a
discipline, medical science distinguishes the knee’s regional componentry by ever more closer
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definitions, a distinguishability which science may extend practically infinitesimally from the
mesocosm to the microcosm and beyond, through observations rendered from biology, to
chemistry, to physics. Remaining to definitions in biology, in terms of anatomy, one of the nine
immediately distinguishable parts to assemble Laokoön’s knee, the knee cup, was itself further
distinguishable into three subsequent parts, the patella, the meniscus, and in between them the
patellofemoral groove, whereas the tibial plateau was distinguished as a forth part precipitating
below the knee where the meniscus meets the tibia. Unlike in the case of the New York Kouros’
knee, where in all their lacking and falsity body parts remain irrelevant to the biomechanics of
motion and thus appear essentially disconnected, Laokoön’s knee parts seem to have effused out
of one other, for there is no clear point, the more so the closer we look, say, as to where the tibial
plateau ends and where the meniscus and the tibia begin at both ends of the tibial plateau, or
where the ligament ends and where the muscle and the bone begin at both ends of the ligament.
This continuity, so regnant throughout Laokoön’s body that it is through it that all the necessary
componentry effuses out of one other to produce the biomechanics of motion, squares out with
Heidegger’s idea of Dasein’s ecstatic reciprocation of pre-understanding. This preunderstanding, as we just premised with Heidegger, simultaneously both maintains and adapts,
and in the explicitness of this maintenance and adaptation gradually de-distances and bonds
beings to one another and to themselves, in the process disclosing the beings for what they are in
the transparency of their intelligibility by bi-directionally depositing in the gaps between beings
the extension of the beings’ own “substance” as a what-for-thingliness.
Were we to accept that the knee parts (and by principle of extrapolation also Laokoön’s
entire body), are primordially objectively present only to have been discovered by the observant
deliberations of the artist and the anatomist, not only we would by distant implication have to

145

remain clueless regarding the origin of the artist and the anatomist as such, but we would be
immediately unable to explain how these objectively present knee parts are themselves
connected to one another. For once we accept the empiricist doctrine that the objectively present
in space body parts are connected by our understanding - what else? - we would have to show the
point where those objectively present knee parts end, and where begins the understanding that
connects them. And this is impossible. As we already premised in multiple contexts with
Heidegger, interpretation cannot acknowledge a distinct object to be understood aside from the
object’s understanding; that which has been explicitly understood obtains the structure of
something as something; understanding appropriates what it has understood in an intelligible
way where that which has become understood always as a thing-at-hand does not show as
something different than as the understanding itself.
As already suggested by Steiner’s research regarding the ancients’ beliefs on statuary, the
Greeks’ account of the Canon as a harmonious combination of sizes betrays belief to the same
old empirical and realist view of art. But after Heidegger we know better: were we to be satisfied
with Chrysippos’ doctrine that the knee parts are beautiful because they are brought together by
means of their proportional size, we would remain clueless as to how it is the size of the patella
which attaches it to the size of the patellofemoral groove, and how the size of the patellofemoral
groove is attached to the size of the meniscus, and how the size of the meniscus is attached to the
size of the tibial plateau, and so forth. By their size, the knee parts would still remain distanced
and irrelevant, just as parts are detached and irrelevant no matter their size in the New York
Kouros knee, where the stylized object above the knee cup shaped as a chevron or mustache
remains an alien object, or where the tibia bone projects itself out of the lower leg. Both these
objects remain as detached as they are irrelevant to the inexplicitness of care seeking to assemble
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itself as an embodied whole, an inexplicitness which would constitute a “knee” for its what-forthingliness.
At this fundamental ontological level of world disclosure, the “beautiful” is that which
we may existentially identify with. This is the reason why consciousness, as explained by
Heidegger’s existential analysis, finds post-Archaic Greek art more “beautiful” than whatever
may have preceded it in Dasein’s foregroundings.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE EMBODIMENT OF CARE II

5.1 The Embodiment of Attunement
At this point we have offered a preliminary analysis of the embodiment of the three
modes of understanding as the first of the four structures of care, and may move on to see how
Greek art embodies now care’s second structure, attunement. Understanding is immanently
connected with attunement because these two ecstatic existentials are equiprimordial.
“Attunement always has its understanding, even if only by suppressing it. Understanding is
always attuned”, notes Heidegger. (BT 143) In its ontic appearance as mood, attunement delivers
Sein to its Da. “All understanding is attuned. Mood brings Da-sein before the throwness of its
‘that-it-is-there.” (BT 266) Heidegger defines “attunement” as “dwelling”, as “one if the existential
structures in which the being of the ‘there’ dwells.” (BT 143)
In this “dwelling”, Dasein has now begun to explicitly deploy the formative acquisitions
of the freeing, inexplicit project of pre-understanding, to give itself a “housing”, as it were, a
world in which to live. Heidegger distinguishes three modes of attunement as mood, the most
primordial of which, still prior to world disclosedness, is circumspective heedfulness. We may
understand this mode of attunement as Dasein’s need to trip the inherent and inert inexplicitness
of pre-understanding and make “an effective move”, because “[l]etting things encountered in a
circumspect heedful way has ... the character of being affected or moved.” (BT 137)
Circumspective heedfulness, as the most primordial of the three modes of attunement,
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logically lies the closest to the most primordial of the three modes of understanding, the preunderstanding. This is because this equally most primordial mode of attunement is the one
through which pre-understanding frees beings so that these two primordialities can begin to
construct Dasein’s dwelling.
The other two subsequent modes of attunement are throwness or being-there-with, and
circumspective resoluteness, in this order of their corresponding pairing and deploying the
explicitness of the remaining modes of understanding as the existentiell and the existential. (BT
136, 137)

Heidegger distinguishes the primordiality of circumspective resoluteness as the

ontological mode of attunement, distinct from throwness and the being-there-with, these latter
two ontic modes being those that we casually understand as “mood”. (BT 134)
Heidegger describes the most primordial mode of attunement as primordial Angst. The
primordiality of Angst owes to that this is not yet anxiety about a particular threat deriving from
a world affair, since in the first place it is this primordiality which discloses the world as world.
“That about which Angst is anxious is none of the innerworldly things at hand.” (BT 187) We
already met with this mode of attunement, when in section 3.1. we discussed its original
disclosure in the gaze of the Blond Youth. We postulated there that this work alone introduces the
aes-thetic prolegomena of Dasein. Dasein’s temporalization of temporality has promptly
pigeonholed this world-disclosive art as a stage in its datability which follows archaism and is
prior to the Zeus of Artemision and the Laokoön. We suggested there that it is the facial
expression of the Blond Youth which embodies the Nothing as the origin of negation.
Heidegger’s analysis anticipates the embodiment of this face in art: “In Angst, Da-sein finds
itself faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence.” (BT 266) As an
existential ecstasis, primordial Angst is never objectively present in the world. “Angst as a
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fundamental kind of attunement belongs to the essential constitution of Da-sein of being-in-theworld which, as an existential one, is never objectively present, but is itself always in the mode
of factical Da-sein, that is, in the mode of an attunement.” (BT 190) “With the dominance of falling
prey and publicness, ‘real’ Angst is rare”, Heidegger notes, and yet the Blond Youth and the
Kritios Boy, the only works surviving to attest this rare disclosure, are palpable proofs of the
objectification of Angst in art, precisely as Origin argues.
In recognizing through our comparative hermeneutics of Greek art the Youth’s gaze as a
gaze into the abyss, and in constituting now the proof that the Greek art which immediately
postdated this gaze embodies the negation of the negation to live, we are confirming Heidegger’s
argument that (in Dasein’s datability) the Nothing is the origin of negation, and not the other way
around. The gaze into the Nothing is the condition for the disclosure of primordial temporality as
the constitutive grounding of all of Dasein’s ecstatic existentials, since it is this Nothing, the
primitive and primordial total loss of world, which discloses the world’s resisting Dasein’s will
to live in the irreversibility of time.
Now, since, as we previously premised, Dasein both as world and as embodiment is
originally disclosed in the they, or at most as the inauthentic they-self, which as such always
predate the authentic self, in the ontic modes of attunement primordial temporality must show
itself not finitely, but “in”-finitely in the already having-been. Heidegger makes a linguistic
observation that supports his metaphysics when he notes that, “[o]nly because primordial time is
finite can ‘derivative’ time temporalize itself as in-finite.” (BT 331) Accordingly, whereas
“[u]nderstanding is primarily grounded in the future; attunement, on the other hand, temporalizes
itself primarily in having-been.” (BT 340) As mood, attunement is grounded in throwness, in the
being-there-with, the self finding itself situated in particular ways that matter, thrown within a
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world “substantiated” by no other means than by the self’s own existential pressure, because in
the last analysis and at each and every moment this is a world perilously ticking away. “Being
thrown means existentially to find oneself in such and such a way. Thus attunement is grounded
in throwness”, writes Heidegger. (BT 340)
Primitive Dasein surrenders to world resistance and thus into self-constancy by attuning
to what is already there to resist its particular postures of living, that is, by trimming itself into a
certain potentiality towards a possibility to be-there. “... [R]esistance would be essentially
undiscovered, if attuned being-in-the-world were not already related to having things in the
world matter to it in a way prefigured by moods.” (BT 138) In this trimming, in tuning itself as a
self, Dasein hearkens as it were to that specific waveband that voices out the intelligible, definite
possibilities of its existence. Tuning itself onto the correct waveband, the self for the first time
encounters the world concretely, in existentiell mode as resistance. “In attunement lies
existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things that matter to us can be
encountered.” (BT 138) Once Dasein has been thrown and it is being-there-with, the two nonprimitive modes of attunement as mood affect Dasein by disclosing forms of definite threat:
[B]eing affected by the unserviceable, resistant, and threatening characters of things at hand is
ontologically possible only because being-in as such is existentially determined beforehand in
such a way that what it encounters in the world can matter to it in this way. This mattering to it is
grounded in attunement, and as attunement it has disclosed the world, for example, as something
by which it can be threatened. (BT 137)

Confronted by the threat that triggers the existentiell modes of attunement, Dasein reacts
initially by turning away. Turning away is induced by fear, itself not only a mode of attunement,
(BT 142)

but the primordial, pre-ontological mode of attunement, because “[a]ll modifications of

fear as possibilities of attunement point to the fact that Da-sein as being-in-the-world is ‘fearful’.
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This ‘fearfulness’ must not be understood in the ontic sense of a factical, ‘isolated’ tendency, but
rather as the existential possibility of the essential attunement of Da-sein in general ...” (BT 142)
The incarnation of fear in Laokoön has been a heated issue since the German romantics.
Goethe’s analysis is important in our context because it focused on whether the Group is in fear
as the apprehension of approaching danger, or in terror as the effect of the moment.63 Besides the
first and the most primordial “aspect” of fear as Dasein itself being fearful, Heidegger promptly
distinguishes between two more modes of fear, which correspond to Goethe’s, respectively as
the fear which “fearing itself ... discovers ... [something approaching] beforehand in its
fearsomeness”, and “that before which are afraid, the ‘fearsome’.” (BT 140-142)
In terms of the embodiment of Dasein’s fundamental ontology, we are for now primarily
interested in the first, pre-ontological aspect of fear, because it is at this stage of Dasein’s
constitution where being is delivered over to its being in such a way that it recognizes its own
being as already “fear-full”, independently of the existential and existentiell modes of fear.
Writes Heidegger: “As a being which is delivered over to its being, it is also delivered over to the
fact that it must always already have found itself, found itself in a finding which comes not from
a direct seeking, but from a fleeing.” (BT 136) We want to expose Dasein at this primitive worldstaging act, because since Dasein’s spatiality is constituted by the structures of care, and since
fear is the mode of being through which attunement “comes to the fore” as one of those
structures, it is at this primitive stage where Dasein would be disclosed by art as an embodied
blueprint that has made the prescription of space its own flesh. With the three modes or aspects
of fear, “what we are afraid of, fearing, and why are we afraid ... the structure of attunement as
such comes to the fore”, writes Heidegger. (BT 140) What we do not want, however, is to capture
Dasein as art appearing in space; we want Dasein’s embodiment as space.
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At the fundamental ontological level that we are investigating, there is no space to speak
of, aside of the space prescribed within the art as disclosure. A statue could not possibly disclose
Dasein’s fleeing, as it were, by taking a step back in space. Dasein’s fleeing must appear
enframed within the expansive spatiality of the statue that discloses the structure of care as
spatial prescription. Before Origin, our understanding of art remained naive. When this
appearance of the statue as space instead of in space occurs, as it does occur in Greek art, art
historians remain dumfounded and suitably perceive the essence of the work as having derived
from beyond time and space. Buschor does just so, when he writes that: “[post-archaic Greek art]
pulls us into a spiritual world, into a world without time and space …”64
With the emulation of Greek art by the Italian Renaissance came the concept of the
“Contraposto”, an observation which institutionalized the phenomenon unique in world sculptic
art, and which first appears as a negligible hint with the Blond Youth and the Kritios Boy. This
“Greek invention” matures with landmark Classical statuary works such as Polycleitus’
Doryphoros and the Diadoumenos, or Pheidias’ Warrior of Riace, and perhaps climaxes with
Agesander’s Laokoön. The phenomenon is so prevalent throughout Classicism, and so driven
more or less into all works by the same impulse, that it made Winckelmann talk about one
unseen “master” behind it and all artists playing the same violin: “... all the works appear to have
been executed by followers of one and the same school. As a connoisseur would recognize in
different violin-players who had been taught by one master the style of their teacher, so the same
general principles are visible in the drawing of the ancient sculptors, from the greatest to the
least.”65
“Contraposto” is defined as the rotation of the body’s five horizontal axes, imaginary
lines drawn through the ears, shoulders, hips, knees, and ankles. Throughout Archaic statuary
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these lines had firmly held horizontally parallel to one another, one of the reasons for the statue’s
rigid frontality, whereas in the “evolution” from the Severe to Classical to Hellenistic works the
lines gradually turn like the needle of a compass so that one axis may point at angles of different
degree or even opposite to other axes. In the limb-spanning balanced Zeus this torsion is not as
apparent as it is in later works, but it is there, subtly subsumed in relatively low degrees by the
rotating body weight balancing itself for the hurling of the spear. In the aforementioned works by
Polycleitus and Pheidias, as well as in works attributed to other contemporary masters, the
contraposto attains monumental “beauty”. In Laokoön the axis through the ears sinks much
steeper downwards to the left than the following axis of the shoulders, while the axis through the
torso counter-rotates slightly to the right. The axes running through the knees and the ankles
counter-counter-rotate again to the left, and run somewhat parallel to one another. In Laokoön
the torsional effect is much more complex and thus disclosive than in the aforementioned works
which deploy mainly only the Contraposto, because in Laokoön’s body the Contraposto is
combined with torsion on the vertical axis, and in fact in all three of the body’s rotational axes,
as the body also leans slightly forward. To realize what these “tricks”, “modellings” and
“conventions”, as art critics routinely understand them, really mean in terms of Dasein’s
embodiment, we must return momentarily to Heidegger’s analysis of the primitive mode of
attunement.
In our earlier discussion of the Ptoan Apollo as the apogee of Archaism at circa 520 B.C.,
we first met with the rigid frontality which characterizes all of the some two centuries of Archaic
Greek statuary, itself attributed to strong Egyptian influence. By circa 500 B.C. this frontality
suddenly disappears from Greek statuary, and the reason for this total disappearance in Dasein’s
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foregrounding datability is that Greek art discloses as it embodies the existential structure of
attunement.
We postulated above that Dasein’s fleeing and turning away as an existential structure of
spatial disclosure cannot be embodied by the statue taking a step back in space, as it casually
happens in all other world art, as this other art is appearing in Dasein’s disclosed world, since
that space would be an ontic aftermath, and the possibility of ontic space must first be disclosed
by Dasein’s prescriptive embodiment. In other words, the fleeing and the turning away must
somehow precipitate and manifest within the body as the body; the fleeing and turning away
cannot appear as the body taking a step back in space, but as embodied spatiality. How is this
possible?
For Heidegger being finds itself not only in seeking itself, but primarily in fleeing from
itself; thus to locate Dasein’s constitution of spatiality in its primitive mode of attunement we
must capture it simultaneously engaged in that finding as well as in the fleeing. We want to bring
up that attunement as mood in art which discloses Dasein as the original embodiment of an
existential, pre-existentiell torsion, that is, ahead of Dasein’s throwness, because this
simultaneous finding and fleeing, the toward and the away, is in the last analysis a contrapostal
and torsional effect. Dasein’s “[m]ood does not disclose in the mode of looking at throwness, but
as turning toward and away from it”, promptly writes Heidegger (my italics). (BT 136)
Since attunement is a structure of care, and since primitive attunement is equiprimordial
with pre-understanding which itself is another structure of care, and since care is grounded in
temporality, the visibility of attunement in its most primitive mode must itself be temporal.
Hence Heidegger’s question: “How can the temporal constitution of attunement become
visible?” (BT 340)
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A closer look in post-Archaic Greek art reveals that Heidegger is getting a more visible
proof of the temporal constitution of attunement than he may have hoped for. Physics describes
“torsion” as “a measure of the tendency of a force to cause rotation.” Torsion is: “‘stress’
produced by two antithetical forces twisting a rod along its longitudinal axis [my italics].” The
definition from physics, the possibility of which is first disclosed by art, is counter-informing our
case in art. Primitive attunement embodies itself in post-Archaic Greek art - and there alone - as
torsion, because the “two antithetical forces” that twist the “rod” along its longitudinal axis, in
our case Laokoön’s body, are no other than primitive Dasein’s simultaneously finding and
fleeing, one end of the “rod”, the body, turning one way, the other end of the “rod” the other
way, thus stressing the body within itself, disclosing the turning toward and away within the
body, or rather as the body. The temporal constitution of attunement becomes visible as the body
resisting itself.
Gone now is the purposeless, exuberant levity of the Archaic kouros. Nowhere to be seen
is the disclosure of spatiality by means of objective juxtaposition in space either of body parts or
of entire bodies, which so thoroughly characterizes non-Greek and pre-Greek art, including
sculptic art as relief and in the open, and whose historical precedence by seniority has been
torpidly based on Dasein’s ontic datability and foregrounding by means of the aforementioned
third predicament in the hermeneutic circle. It is this torpidity due to the asymmetrical buildup
between the ontic and the ontological beginnings, to which Nietzsche points in his Philosophy in
the Tragic Age of the Greeks, having seen that: “[p]eople who prefer to spend their time on
Egyptian or Persian philosophy rather than the Greek, on the grounds that the former are more
‘original’ and in any event older, are just as ill-advised ... Everywhere, the way to the beginnings
leads to barbarism.”66
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To Heidegger’s question of “how can the temporal constitution of attunement become
visible?”, we answer that all we have to do is take a fundamental ontological look at Laokoön’s
body and see it twisted in all its axes, in its having embodied and within this body disclosed the
temporal constitution of attunement as the disclosive existential stress of the being-towardsdeath. Besides its contrapostal stressing on the horizontal level, Laokoön’s body is also torsioned
on its vertical axis. His “torso” (the pivotal body part literally embodying its torsional essence in
language) rotates as it simultaneously drops to the left to counterbalance the step down of the left
foot, while Laokoön’s chest is twisted upwards and to the right, heedful to anticipate the serpent
that has engaged the priest’s upper right arm. Here every possible muscle - and for some
commentaries even impossible muscles - every power-yielding fiber and sinew of the body, from
the curling of the toes to the contracting facial muscles, is purposefully and synergistically
appearing as prescriptive spatiality in pre-understanding and in primitive attunement to that
which resists this body’s will to live. Conceptually, torsional stress is itself a phenomenological
mode of disclosing resistance, (here the resistance of the two antithetical forces of seeking and
fleeing put against one another) and as such, just as the narrative of musculature that this bodily
torsion marshals throughout the body, it makes primordial temporality visible, albeit in disguise.
That evasive turning into and away within the body is primitive Dasein’s embodiment at its
earliest attunement, before the remaining two, existentiell modes of attunement, finally connect
Dasein with its factical world. In Heidegger’s words: “The first essential ontological
characteristic of attunement is: Attunement discloses Da-sein in its throwness, initially and for
the most part in the mode of an evasive turning away.” (BT 136)
Dasein’s remaining two, worldly modes of attunement, must also disclose themselves as
the Laokoön, if our hypothesis is viable. The rendition of the modes of attunement as mood is
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factically accountable by the myth of the fate of the Trojan priest. The story varies in ancient
literature, but the version in Virgil’s Aeneiad (II, 199 ff), which this work was mistakenly
understood to have emulated by Lessing’s anachronism, has Laokoön: “making a sacrifice at the
shore, where he suddenly sees his two sons overpowered by two huge serpents that come up out
of the waves, and hastening to their aid, he becomes himself entangled in the deadly coils.” The
stark nudity of the priest, being a priest, of course does not make sense in this-world-denying
Christian times; it actually caused outrage, and Lessing refers to “some [art critics?] who have
detected a gross absurdity in making son and priest officiating at a sacrifice being thus
represented.”67 This may very well be the case, since nor does the factical explanation of this
work make sense anyway. The fact that the priest is rendered naked, is rather proof that
transcendental Dasein has forced itself into and cannot be explained by the factical world.
The consuming factical disclosure in Laokoön’s body is this body’s dwelling either in
fear or in fear modification as terror, corresponding in Greek to either fovos or tromos, as also
recounted by Goethe. Heidegger holds that all modifications of fear are possibilities of
attunement, (BT 141) and we have already explicated the embodiment of the possibility of
attunement of fear at its most fundamental level being equiprimordial with pre-understanding, as
primordial Angst, where the fleeing Dasein recognizes its own being as already “fear-full”.
Heidegger differentiates ontological “fearfulness” from ontic attunement in that “[t]his
‘fearfulness’ must not be understood in the ontic sense of a factical, ‘isolated’ tendency, but
rather as the existential possibility of the essential attunement of Da-sein in general, which is, of
course, not the only one.” (BT 142) The other two, existentiell modes, we already introduced as the
modes which fittingly correspond to Goethe’s fear and terror, namely as throwness and being-
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there-with, or the fear which fearing itself discovers as something approaching beforehand in its
fearsomeness, and that before which are afraid, the ‘fearsome’.
In throwness Dasein prepares itself toward the final ecstatic mode of attunement, at
which point it will find itself already existentially determined beforehand, so what it may
encounter in the world can matter to it. In terms of this mode’s being an embodied blueprint of
Dasein’s spatiality, as The Laokoön, we should expect to visually encounter this mode as an
intermediary, inter-spatial effusion of physical configuration, since neither is throwness directly
involved with that worldly anticipation for which this mode of attunement prepares the body for
to encounter the world as a matter-of-fact, nor is it connected to the primitive mode of the body’s
contrapostal and the torsional stress as the disclosure of the fearful Angst against nothing in
particular. “It comes neither from ‘without’ nor from ‘within,’ but rises from being-in-the-world
itself as a mode of that being”, writes Heidegger about the second mode of attunement, albeit
addressing not Dasein’s body-spatiality, but Dasein’s world-spatiality. (BT 137) If Dasein’s world
disclosure is indeed, blueprinted as the Laokoön, this ideal body must have configured itself
ahead of this body’s being-there-with, disclosing forms of spatiality that encounter the world’s
fearsomeness ahead of the specific constituency of its configuration which will contact the
innerworldly fearsome. In other words, being in the world as a whole must attune, that is, configure, the body in its entirety, including body parts that are not immediately anticipating the
fearsome world as-a-matter-of-fact.
In remaining open to understand the priest’s fundamental ontological essence, we must
notice that in between, on the one hand, those body parts formally consumed by primitive
attunement (contrapostal and torsional configurations), and on the other hand those other parts of
the priest’s body which configure, that is, attune themselves to the world’s matter-of-factness
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(the left hand that grips the serpent, the hip area where the serpent is about to bite, the calf that
meets the knee of the son, the thighs following the altar’s angular contour, and the toes where
they meet the ground), there is body as otherwise undeterminable res extensa which must
somehow be formed not arbitrarily and at random, but hearkening to some principle related to
either end of the primitive and of the factical spatial dwellings within which this intermediary
spatiality itself dwells. In fact most of the priest’s body must somehow be configured, that is,
attuned, by this unaccounted principle, since the body parts attuned by primitive attunement or
attuned to anticipate the world’s immediate matter-of-factness are, in this particular work, much
fewer in number than those which are not. This embodying of mostly forms in their preparatory
averageness corresponds to the average everydayness of Dasein, and thus in comparison with
other candidate renditions in Greek art once again confirms Laokoön’s eligibility as a suitable
interpretation of Dasein’s existential analytic.
So we ask: How does that intermediary mode of attunement prepares the body so that the
world can matter to it? To be prepared, the body must already be thrown, and yet thrown only
into an average or generic configuration, since by means of the one extreme mode of attunement
to which the averageness must be related the body configures itself by simultaneously finding
and fleeing from itself, and on the other extreme mode of attunement to which the averageness
must also be related the body is configured to affect and be affected by the world. Preparatory
attunement cannot disclose either of these extreme dwellings in themselves, and yet it is needed
by both, because otherwise the extreme disclosures would be dwellings into a totality to which
nothing can matter. Without the preparatory mode of attunement embodying Dasein’s average
everydayness, Dasein’s primitive attunement discloses nothing that can matter since this is an
attunement in primordial Angst about nothing in particular. At the other end, if factical
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attunement would be left alone to disclose itself as itself it would once again disclose no-thing
that matters, since it would disclose the world’s absolute productivity as a truth aside of error and
doubt. But an average configuration preserves both the body’s ownmost potentiality of being in
primitive attunement, and remain preparatory to those modes of factical attunement where the
body, in its falling prey to the world, would expose this potentiality and phenomenologically
configure it as its ownmost deficiency of being. Heidegger anticipates this necessity, albeit not in
terms of Dasein’s body but of Dasein’s world: “Because it essentially falls prey to the world,
Dasein is in ‘untruth’ in accordance with its constitution of being.” (BT 222)
Throwness as Dasein’s second mode of attunement is disclosed in Laokoön’s body as that
intermediate, “average” tissue and skeletomuscular, organic apparatus, which although to the
third mode of attunement it relatively remains unmodified by the world, it is there to connect the
body’s torsional core with the body’s interface with the world. Before the body can be-therewith, in this case be-there-with the serpents, the sons, the ground and the altar, the body has to
be-there, to be thrown into the world’s fearsomeness, but not yet into the world as the fearsome.
In being-there, and ahead of being-there-with, the body contours to the form of an average mode
in mere formal anticipation to that which matters to it. For this formal anticipation the body must
have already been prepared by means of a physiognomy resolutely anticipating not yet the
fearsome, but something approaching in its fearsomeness. By means of this average formal
anticipation of Dasein’s everydayness, a certain connective body configuration is made possible,
as the body that has attuned not yet to the presently fearsome, but merely to the approaching
fearsomeness. It is this attunement to the approaching fearsomeness which renders Laokoön’s
physicality spreading in between the body’s existential, canonical core and the body’s
existentiell, local contour to deal with the fearsome. Physical localities which are not yet
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summoned to-be-there-with but are summoned to be-there for Dasein’s everydayness, physical
entities such as Laokoön’s penis, abdomen, nose, hair, etc., to only name a few immediate
phenomenological structures aside of muscular clusters, are forms attuned to Dasein’s
everydayness, which may not be immediately engaged to the fearsome, but without which
Dasein cannot be thrown because it cannot have the totality of a body.
In Laokoön’s body it is much easier to observe the throwness of Dasein’s indefinite
averageness as the forming of the possibility of a physical presumption yet unmodified but
available by just being-there, as a pre-symbiotic relationship with the world merely anticipating
it, in comparison with the embodiment of the immediacy of the being-there-with. Be that as it
may, Heidegger gives Dasein’s average everydayness a stronger, definitive throwness, already
entangled: “Being-in-the-world is always entangled. The average everydayness of Da-sein can
thus be determined as entangled-disclosed, thrown projecting being-in-the-world which is
concerned with its ownmost potentiality in its being together with the ‘world’ and in being-with
with others.” (BT 181)
Laokoön’s hand is spatialized by the last attuned stage of the by now non-primitive,
worldly Dasein, which, having begun from its ultimate grounding in primordial temporality and
having moved through three modes of understanding and three modes of attunement, connects
itself with an innerworldly being in space, with a “thing-in-itself”. We may understand this point
of convergence of body and world, in our case patently made by Laokoön’s hand grasping the
serpent, as the origin of the “There”, the spatial moment of singularity out of which all expansive
and formative being-there-ness is centrifugally effusing outwards. This “authentic There” and
“moment of unique totality” is the canonical point of departure in Greek art towards the rest of
the body and towards the rest of the world.
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The hierarchical transversal of Dasein’s spatial expansion from one existential structure
of care to the next, moving from the primitive to the worldly Dasein, that is, from attunement
(care’s second structure) to entanglement or falling prey (care’s third structure), has at this point
become manifestly seamless, inasmuch as the analysis of Dasein’s attunement as fearing is
simultaneously the analysis of Dasein’s falling prey to the fearsome. This is perhaps the main
reason that Heidegger at some point does not distinguish between the structures of attunement
and entanglement, reducing the structures of care from four to three. Whereas at the more
primordial transversal from understanding to attunement we were able to observe the syzygy of
Dasein as pre-understanding and of Dasein as fearful strictly within Laokoön’s body as the
embodied structures of primitive Dasein, now the existentiell structures of attunement as mood
disclose both the body in its what-for-thingliness and the world as a useful or a threatening
being. The inherent seamlessness of what we have dissected becomes now apparent because the
spatiality disclosed at the interface between mind and world in the entanglement of the fearing
with the fearsome is disclosed by means of a body which, being indispensably instrumental to
both mind and world, belongs equally to both.
5.2 The Embodiment of Entanglement
The sheer monumentality of the prescriptive disclosure of Dasein’s spatiality through the
third mode of attunement into the third structure of care as entanglement or falling prey owes to
the priest’s hand anticipating the shape of the serpent as a perceptual constancy even without the
priest looking at the serpent. The priest is reaching out in the opacity of sensation towards things
he has in advance no key and which he nevertheless carries within himself the project. This
synaesthetic normativity is disclosed exclusively at the zenith of post-Archaic Greek art.
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It is only in the “normal” mode of being in the world, the mode of attunement disclosed
by Greek art for its preservers, where the thing is inseparable from a person perceiving it and it
can never “be” by itself. Heidegger’s concept that pursues the otherwise abandoned question of
how significance translates into substance so that the fearful and the fearing as the human self
may meet with the fearsome as the human world by making themselves phenomenologically
available to each other in their interaction, is the concept of the “making present”, itself
originating in Husserl. Heidegger addresses the abandoned question by first answering the other
question, which derives from the highest moment in Greek art and connects man with nature,
namely “what ‘humanity’ is that which the priest may invest to things like the serpent?” The
concept of making-present elucidates the twofold structure of the “present”, the present as
presentation and the present as now.
Heidegger saw the illusionary origin of the Cartesian idea, that molecular edifices or
masses of cells are indissolubly, objectively present, by observing Dasein’s spatiality unfolding
in the phenomenological structures of falling prey, which is temporally rooted primarily in the
present, “making present of the Moment”. (BT 350) Heidegger implies that the objectification of
things such as molecules or cells is actually no more than an itinerant illusion projected by the
rigorous focusing of Dasein's dormancy as the fearful, awakened by Dasein's falling prey to
summon a distant over there into an isolation disconnected from the rest of Dasein's world and
cast into an immanent and concrete here. This cloistered casting is the “authentic There”, what
we otherwise transiently see as a molecule or a cell objectively present. In Heidegger's words:
[I]n falling prey, and thus also in the bringing near which is founded in “making present,” the
forgetting that awaits pursues the present. In the making present that brings something near from
its wherefrom, making present loses itself in itself, and forgets the over there. For this reason if
the “observation” of innerworldly beings starts in such a making present, the illusion arises that
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“initially” only a thing is objectively present, here indeed, but indeterminately, in a space in
general. (BT 369)

The rampant proliferation of innerworldly beings appearing objectively present originates
in the constant modification and subsequent cultural sedimentation of the over there to making
present and then once again depositing it back as an over there. This modification is grounded in
understanding as de-distancing, because as we mentioned in concluding the previous section,
falling prey is only technically distinguishable from attunement, itself being equiprimordial with
understanding. “Da-sein can fall prey only because it is concerned with understanding, attuned
being-in-the-world.” (BT 179) The present can be presented, that is, appear, as a now, only as
objectively present. The constant pursuing and dispersion of the nows originates in Dasein's
inability to be at once everywhere and nowhere; Dasein's primitive fearfulness is resolutively
yearning for the Moment to be authentically There. The collective effect of this dynamic of dedistancing under threat of loss of world results into the ecstasis from primitive Dasein and the
graduation from the second to the third mode of attunement towards the objective appearance of
the world, otherwise subjective in its foundations. In Heidegger's words:
Making present is left more and more into itself as it is modified by the awaiting that pursues. It
makes present for the sake of the present. Thus tangled up in itself, the dispersed not-saying turns
into the inability to stay at all. This mode of the present is the most extreme opposite
phenomenon of the Moment. In this inability Da-Sein is everywhere and nowhere. The Moment
brings existence to the situation and discloses the authentic “There.” (BT 348)

In having demonstrated how innerworldly things attain only a transient status of
objectivity in their presence as a now, Heidegger has promptly responded to the aporia of how
significance and intentionality “dwell” in molecules and cells. The molecules and cells of the
body appear objectively only where the body is present in the now as its what-for-thingliness, so
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that the body, complete with all its molecules and cells, can be instrumental for what has to be
done for and by the being-towards-death.
Heidegger’s “Moment”, the “authentic There”, describes the singularity event in
attunement where “objective substance” precipitates and may be epigenetically sedimented as
the eidetic suchness of the fearing encountering the eidetic suchness of the fearsome. “Fear about
as being afraid of always equiprimordially discloses, whether privately or positively,
innerworldly beings in their possibility of being threatening and being-in with regard to its being
threatened”, notes Heidegger. (BT 142) In the existential ecstasis of falling prey Dasein
understands itself both ontologically as an objective being and ontically as a threatened being
who must take care of the threat if it is to continue having a world: “... falling prey, show[s] that
this being initially and for the most part understands itself ontically in terms of the horizon of
taking care of things, but ontologically defines being in the sense of objective being.” (BT 293)
The reciprocal and dialectic - that is, discursive - disclosure of what is threatened through
the disclosure of what is threatening in falling prey involves Dasein's ontic and ontological
oscillation between the fearing and the fearsome. The roles of the fearing and the fearsome
remain fully reversible in each and every encounter between Dasein and its world. In being
thrown, primitive Dasein is at the same time both self and world, since that authentic self is itself
but it is also the world being there for any other possible authentic self. “In falling prey”, points
out Heidegger, “Da-sein turns away from itself. What it shrinks back from must have a
threatening character; yet this being has the same kind of being as the one which shrinks back
from it - it is Da-sein itself.” (BT 186)
When the self falls prey to the world, its ontic or factical constitution becomes
transparent as Dasein glimpses the smoldering truth at the core of its own being, while its
166

ontological constitution turns opaque and out of joint because in falling prey to the world Dasein
as self “flees itself to the they.” (BT 322) In order to disentangle itself from the they and back into
self-transparency, Dasein as a self must first be entangled in the existential modes of
everydayness, namely temptation, tranquilization, idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, and alienation.
(BT 175, 348)

“[Dasein] is continually surrendered to the ‘world’ and lets itself be concerned by it in

such a way that it somehow evades its very self. The existential constitution of this evasion
becomes clear in the phenomenon of entanglement.” (BT 140) The smoldering truth at the core of
Dasein's own being is that Dasein is true only as untrue, as a-letheia, a tragic plight which, on
top of that, is a deficiency that must be won at each and every Moment of its ecstatic existentiell
self-interpretations, themselves ontologically exacerbated by the threesome predicament of the
hermeneutic circle. It is this tragic truth disclosed by Greek art, which in his Birth of Tragedy
Nietzsche saw Hamlet resembling Dionysus: “[B]oth have once looked truly into the essence of
things, they have gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action; for their action could not change
anything in the eternal nature of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that they
should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint.”68
It is into this opaqueness of being that must be won where the self first escapes, in order
to free itself for the possibility to become that which is yet to be. “Because it essentially falls
prey to the world, Da-sein is in ‘untruth’ in accordance with its constitution of being”, notes
Heidegger. (BT 222) And again: “Truth (discoveredness) must always first be wrested from beings.
Beings are torn from concealment. The actual factical discoveredness is, so to speak, always a
kind of robbery.” (BT 223)
Heidegger has already told us that the existential constitution of the evading self into the
they becomes clear in the phenomenon of entanglement. The term does not involve a negative
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value judgment, but expresses Dasein's initial absorption in togetherness with the they of the
world that Dasein takes care of. The inauthenticity of entanglement is by no means a being of
lesser truth than the being in the authentic There of the self. Phenomenologically speaking,
authenticity can only emerge on the background of inauthenticity, and this fundamental gestalt
axiom is in the last analysis what drives the necessity of Dasein's initial fleeing itself into the
they. Inauthenticity is still a definitive being-in-the-world as a definite recognition that there is a
world in need to be taken care of. Thus the existential of entanglement must make
phenomenologically available the basic structures of Dasein as background, so that “it
constitutes precisely a distinctive kind of being-in-the-world which is completely taken in by the
world and the Mitda-sein of the others in the they. Not-being-its-self functions as a positive
possibility of beings which are absorbed in the world, essentially taking care of that world.” (BT
176)

Heidegger seeks the phenomenological structures into which Dasein as self falls prey.
These world background structures, the inauthentic Dasein, must be already given, that is,
structured in their inauthenticity. The eidetic suchness of an individual self, as an innerworldly
being that it is, can rise only out of such structured world background, because “the
discoveredness of innerworldly beings is grounded in the disclosedness of the world.” (BT 221)
Heidegger seeks the defined basic structures of the world as something that needs to be taken
care of by the self fleeing from itself in order to discover itself emerging out of these disclosed
structures. Thus he asks: “What structure does the ‘movement’ of falling prey show?” (BT 177)
Idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity and alienation are such worldly structures, but we should
notice at this point that categorically they are themselves a subset to the structured existentials of
entanglement and falling prey. The subset of idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, and alienation may
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be discovered as an existentiell phenomenological structure in any form of art, but the
existentials through the disclosure of which the discovery of the subset is possible are the
existential structures of entanglement and falling prey. From this prioritization we understand
that since our search for that art which embodies Dasein's fundamental ontology is a lookout for
disclosure, the subset belongs to a posterior, world-descriptive and not world-disclosive art and
therefore cannot be part of our agenda that seeks the embodiment of Dasein's structures of care.
Nonetheless, Heidegger cautions that falling prey, being an existential determination,
“says nothing about Da-sein as something objectively present, or about objectively present
relations to beings from which it is ‘derived’.” (BT 176) Be that as it may, Heidegger's cautioning
here is first of all contradictory to what he says at (BT 293), where we already read that in falling
prey Dasein initially and for the most part understands itself ontically and in the sense of an
objective being. The cautioning is also apparently forsaken by the sheer monumentality of The
Laokoön Group which, besides its disclosure of the structures of primitive Dasein as the fearful,
it does disclose the existential structures of entanglement and falling prey as factical, that is,
objective relations between beings. The Group suggests that Heidegger is rather correct at (BT 293)
than at (BT 176), or maybe more likely that he meant something different in each case.
Our suggestion that The Group discloses the structures of entanglement and falling prey
by having observed the too apparent entanglement of the three figures in the coils of the serpents
must not trivialize our case as if it is fortuitously overstating it. Heidegger himself understood
that at this, by now non-primitive stage of Dasein's constitution by the third structure of care
(Dasein as understanding, attunement, falling prey) and by the third and last mode of falling prey
(Dasein as fearful, fearing, fearsome), we stand before Dasein’s factical and objective
determination. As we already saw with Heidegger at (BT 293), in falling prey Dasein understands
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itself ontically as an objective being in terms of the horizon of taking care of things. Whereas up
to this point we had taken the radical stance to let the statue speak to us, we must now return to
the interpretive mode of the typical art historian who imposes to the statue Dasein's
temporalization of temporality with the facts that Agesander the sculptor created this art to
represent an archetypal legend from Troy’s history.
We should expect the aforementioned subset itself, phenomena of public absorption in
ambiguity, idle talk, alienation, curiosity, etc., to be casually taken as the theme of worlddescriptive art. And it usually is. But the larger structure, Heidegger's “movement” into which
the subset conforms to in order to release the public space for the ecstatic performance of
Dasein's primordiality of care, belongs to a more fundamental world disclosure, the disclosure of
entanglement and falling prey.
Since the subset as art is world-descriptive and not world-disclosive, it is the structures of
entanglement and of falling prey as such, that is, in their factical disclosure, which we ought to
seek the embodiment in art. The Group does make phenomenologically available in a
monumental exposition the existential structures of entanglement and of falling prey, as these
structures are imaged by Heidegger's fundamental ontology in the following expression: “Beingin-the-world is always entangled. The average everydayness of Da-sein can thus be determined
as entangled-disclosed, thrown projecting being-in-the-world which is concerned with its
ownmost potentiality in its being together with the ‘world’ and in being-with with the others.” (BT
181)

As a factical representation the Group describes Dasein's complete world, as earth and
sky (the altar), as nature (the serpents), as the they (the sons) and as the self (the priest). As a
fundamental ontological provenance the Group discloses all four modes of Dasein's average
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everydayness according to Heidegger's above expression: accordingly, Dasein's entanglement in
the world, Dasein's ownmost potentiality in its being together with the world, Dasein's ownmost
potentiality in being-with with the others, and Dasein's concern with its ownmost potentiality of
being. Dasein's average everydayness may be tantamount or at least constant to Heidegger's
fourfold dwelling in the retrieval of the ancestral regime, a late-Heidegger concept, except Being
and Time makes no reference to divinities, while Building Dwelling Thinking only discusses
earth, sky, divinities and mortals, leaving out animals.
Regarding Dasein's entanglement as a concern for its ownmost potentiality of being, this
determination is disclosed by the Group in the priest's immanent physicality. It is this concern
that makes Dasein visible to itself as a self. This imminence is what makes the physicality of the
priest's body more dramatically visible than the bodies of his sons. The concern for one's
ownmost potentiality of being requires a certain maturation of an embodied self-awareness,
which in the last analysis separates son from man as child from adult. This imminence is also the
reason, unintelligible as we saw to art historians, why a priest's body may be so irreverent as to
have shed its clothes, so that the body can escape its anonymity and free itself to disclose its own
potentiality-of-being as a physical entity comprised by the thisness of a given physiognomic
competence. It is this disclosed normativity, this existentially ideal body that both Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty anticipate; it is also this body as an aesthetic instrumentality to freedom that
Nietzsche sought, but due to his unwarranted bifurcation between Apollo and Dionysos, could
never attain. “When Da-sein is imminent to itself as this possibility”, writes Heidegger, “it is
completely thrown back upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being.” (BT 251) The priest’s body
discloses the possibility of the body as the fearing hearkening to the fearsomeness of the world
ahead of the actual encounter.

171

Regarding Dasein's ownmost potentiality in being-with with others, the Group discloses
the possibility of a relationship between bodies unmet with in pre-Classical Greek art. Where
Archaic statuary in the open always pertained to the kouros standing alone, here the fearing is
shared by the they encountering the fearsome as a communal threat. Two or more figures
appearing together was a rare occurrence in Archaic Greek monumental statuary in the open. The
genre was introduced in the second quarter of the sixth century with the Ramping Horseman
[Figure 10]

and the Calf-Bearer [Figure 11], but both these works involved man with animals and not

with other selves. Late sixth century renditions such as the Gigantomachy from the North Frieze
of the Sifnos Treasury at the Temple of Delphi involved multiple “human” figures in unison
encountering a common threat in battle, but the bodies are not rendered in the open, and as will
further see, they by no means share any of the disclosures of the embodiment of temporality and
the structures of care shown in our analysis of post-Archaic Greek art.
The Group discloses Dasein in its ownmost potentiality of being-with with others in two
factical steps: first by displaying the that as well as the how of Dasein as a body trying to evade
its having fallen prey being the body of a being-towards-death; second, in showing that this
evasion is possible only in a relationship with other bodies. The first step is disclosed by the
matter-of-fact posture of the priest's body. To the serpent’s head attack from the left, the body is
consummately staggered at the opposite direction to the right. As natural and commonsensical as
it may seem to us, this consummately staggered movement is monumental in that there is no
precedence to it either in comparative “Greek” or non-Greek world art. The second step of
Dasein's embodied spatiality disclosing the possibility of inauthentically evading death together
with others manifests in three embodying subsystems: first in the priest’s body being staged in
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Figure 10: Ramping Horseman, Greece second quarter of sixth century BC
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Figure 11: Calf Bearer, Greece, second quarter of sixth century BC
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between the bodies of others; second in that the bodies of the others are identical with the
priest’s body in at least their physiognomic capability to become full-fledged selves; and third, in
that all three bodies face the same threat. The involvement of others as identical copies of one’s
body in being one’s sons and in sharing the same threat introduces the possibility of an
inauthentic reinterpretation of the threat, a concealment through genealogical procrastination to
face the fact that being is always a being-towards-death. The disclosure that the evasion is
possible only together-with with other bodies is demonstrated by the underlying truth that the
priest can evade death only insofar as the other bodies around him evade death as well. Was the
priest to survive the serpents but his sons to have died, the priest has not really survived, since
the priest being Dasein’s self that dies depends on the survival of his offspring as Dasein’s thethey-that-never-die. Heidegger anticipates Dasein's world disclosure by such art as The Laokoön
Group, when he writes that: “Being toward the end has the mode of evading that end reinterpreting it, understanding it inauthentically, and veiling it. Factically one’s own Da-sein is
always already dying, that is, it is in a being-toward-its-end. And it conceals this fact from itself
by re-interpreting death as a case of death occurring every day with others ...” (BT 255)
Regarding Dasein’s entanglement and falling prey to the world aside from being
concerned about itself and from being-with with others, once again this is a matter-of-fact
dwelling where the itinerant objectification of innerworldly beings such as the altar (earth and
sky) and the serpents (nature) is an objectification of the fearsome bestowed by and for the
interests of the fearful fearing. For Heidegger, prior to sensory perception the body of the fearing
has already anticipated the outward appearance of the object. “Like the concept of sight, ‘seeing’
is not limited to perceiving with the ‘physical eyes’,” writes Heidegger. “Perceiving in the
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broader sense lets what is at hand and objectively present be ‘bodily’ encountered with regard to
their outward appearance.” (BT 347)
Since a body in the world can only be someone’s body, the possibility for a communal
body for which an object may exist in order to obtain its objectivity within a “concatenation of
perspectives” and through the generic modes of which anyone’s body may have access to the
object, this communal body can appear in the world only as a prescriptive idealization, that is, as
monumental art. The Laokoön Group is such a prescriptive idealization, for in the priest’s letting
the fearsome be bodily encountered despite of its being out of sight, and in this body’s
objectifying the object in encountering it as the fearsome, this art displays Heidegger's
concession for pre-sensory perception as well as that the object is objectifiable only inasmuch as
it exists by and for the interests of a body.
The access of the object through the normative modes of entanglement and falling prey of
the communal body discloses the possibility for the objectification of world and body through an
infinitely expansive range of phenomenological structures relating and thus signifying the
fearing to the fearsome. These structures themselves first appear as natural innerworldly beings
in this relation of making present. Entanglement and falling prey to the world objectify the
fearsome for the interests of the fearing but also the fearing for the interests of the fearsome
within this range and in the concatenation of perspectives. In the Group, this range patently
objectifies the outright fearsome as the serpents, but no less it objectifies the indirectly fearsome
structures of the earth and the altar upon which the bodies depend in order to encounter the
outright fearsome. The earth and the altar, as well as the draping clothes hanging from the three
bodies, are innerworldly beings objectified as indirect forms of the fearsome inasmuch as they
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are or may possibly be a factor in the outcome of the encounter with the currently appearing as
the outright fearsome.
This holds for any innerworldly being that may appear as a “natural” background to the
fearing encountering the fearsome, since as we already know from Heidegger, the fearsome as
part of the world may appear only within a world, that is, after a world has appeared as a whole.
The movement of the understanding from the whole to the part as a fundamental
phenomenological principle pertains to all regional de-distancing, whether towards the
purposeful objectification of the fearsome or of the fearing. The objectification of the earth as
ground and the sky as altar upon which the bodies have fallen prey in Dasein’s everydayness
may seem self-evident - that is the idea - but it is no less a tenuous and itinerant objectification of
natural forms out of Dasein’s concern which had to somehow be won, that is, disclosed by art in
Dasein's embodiment as an embodiment that anticipates a certain purposeful world. The
unassuming demand for the itinerant objectification of nature as naturalness is demonstrated
particularly by the intricate, as it were, precise, rendition of the phenomenological structures of
the Group’s draping clothes. The unmitigated necessity for objectification of structures which
otherwise are first seen as routine in Dasein’s everydayness, one mode of which is curiosity, can
be best shown in the comparison of Archaic and post-Archaic statuary, in our case of producing
Dasein’s communal body by comparing Laokoön with the New York Kouros. Whereas the
kouros’ feet lay flat and incurious to the shape of the earth which in this way remains generic and
unobjectified, Laokoön’s feet and buttocks objectify earth and the altar in their specificity by
contouring around them purposefully in encountering the serpents as the immediately fearsome.
Whereas the relaxed kouros’ body does not recognize the earth it stands upon because it has not
encountered in it the fearsome, the stressful curling of the priest's toes underscores the objective
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resistance of the earth and the altar's sharp ledge as objects to be reckoned with by this entangled
being-towards-death. In such modifications the body’s world may be absent, but the body is
telling what that body’s world is like.
Dasein always encounters and objectifies the eidetic suchness of the fearsome, of the
detrimental, or at least of the potentially detrimental. Heidegger provides that the objectification
of Dasein’s structures of everydayness as a definite regional background upon which the
fearsome is staged may itself remain absent, but it is at least implied: “Shrinking back from what
fear discloses, from what is threatening, is founded upon fear and has the character of flight. Our
interpretation of fear as attunement showed that what we fear is always a detrimental
innerworldly being, approaching nearby from a definite region, which may remain absent.” (BT
186)

Just as Dasein falls prey into an objectifying world background constituency by
extracting from the consciousness of art historians an interpretation through the temporalization
of temporality of the origin of the Laokoön Group as a cultural innerworldly object, in the same
factical dwelling Dasein seeks the objectification now of the natural history of the fearing and
the fearsome, as this history is monumentalized by the Group disclosure. This entanglement
assigns to the understanding the task of objectifying the primordial form of ontic fearsomeness, a
task now taken by natural historians. It is in this factical dwelling that the serpent appears as the
primordial form of ontic fearsomeness in the horizon of taking care of things by Dasein's
existentiell understanding. Heidegger postulates that what we fear is always a detrimental
innerworldly being; accordingly, the primordial existentiell form of this detrimental innerworldly
being is no other than the serpent, both in western science and in western religion.
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With the objectification of Dasein's natural history precipitating between the fearing and
the fearsome, we conclude the last step of the necessary proof that the entanglement and the
falling prey of being-there into an existentiell dwelling is an entanglement of body and world
such as the one prescribed by the Group. The normative prescription of this art is that the world
circumstantially objectifies through the investment into it of the body’s interests by the body’s
pre-sensory perception as anticipation. By making a literal case of both Dasein’s entanglement in
the serpents’ coils and Dasein’s falling prey to the serpents’ attack, the Group discloses the
origin of the world as earth, sky and nature, and monumentalizes the authentic There as the
cloistered casting of making present. Nothing preceding the Group in Dasein’s datability had
made public the embodiment of the tragic truth that Dasein is true only when untrue, that the
world objectifies at the singularity moment when the being-there is summoning its ownmost
potentiality of being against the negation of its will to live. The Group appears to the
understanding as the literal disclosure of the truth that fearful Dasein’s existential structure of
falling prey objectifies reciprocally both the body in its what-for-thingliness and the world as a
threat. This non-contingent, fundamental ontological proof establishes a foundation for the
defense against the criticism of the supposedly missing connection between man and animal in
Heideggerian metaphysics.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE EMBODIMENT OF CARE III

6.1 The Embodiment of Discourse
Heidegger examines discourse as the last of the four structures of care, because it is
through this existential that all others are maintained. As such, discourse is Dasein’s most
worldly and least primitive existential structure. The classification of discourse as the final step
of the world’s objectification may otherwise be seen as just a technical distinction for the sake of
the analytics of Dasein within the unity of the phenomenon of equiprimordiality as a constitutive
factor. This is because while attunement and understanding are equiprimordially determined by
discourse, (BT 133) Heidegger notes elsewhere that discourse itself is equiprimordial with
attunement and understanding. (BT 161)
Although Heidegger’s analysis treats discourse as communication in language - we recall
that for Heidegger the world-disclosive art is poetry - even there, this communication is sought to
be “made visible”. (BT 161) This call for visibility even where there is none, both simplifies and
amplifies our own demonstration of the embodiment of Dasein’s spatiality in statuary art, since
the discursive expansion of Dasein’s spatiality as care into a world of res extensa is naturally
visible in statuary, where in poetry it is not. Whereas in language the there can only appear as a
cognitive, that is, unobjectifiable narrative, on the other hand the human flesh, either as
disclosive ideation in art or as the subject of description by medical science, is literally made of
the there in its visible and tangible what-for-thingliness.
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Heidegger defines “discourse” as the articulation of the attuned intelligibility of the there.
(BT 161)

Discourse maintains the intelligibility of the there because in the compilation of the

multiple existential structures of care the there ends up to be the regionalized receptacle of
meaning shaping itself in this attuned receptivity. Innerworldly beings maintain their transient
objectivity, their cloistered casting as “substance”, in the authentic there, for as long and
inasmuch as they remain meaningful, because “[m]eaning is that wherein the intelligibility of
something maintains itself.” (BT 151) In Dasein’s world objects are either meaningful or they do
not appear, because meaning is not attached as an aftermath to objects already present, but is the
constitutive intelligibility whereupon and through which objects become present.
Furthermore, discourse is an attuned intelligibility, because as we already mentioned it is
through the three modes of attunement, namely circumspective heedfulness, throwness, and
being-there-with, that this intelligibility bestows Dasein with definite possibilities of existence in
what matters.
Whereas the prior three existentials of care were either underlying, withheld, or disguised
structures of primitive Dasein (as in the case of the pre-understanding, of circumspective
heedfulness, of the fearful, and of primordial temporality), finally discourse is an expression and
a disclosedness: “[t]he attuned intelligibility of being-in-the-world is expressed as discourse”,
writes Heidegger. And again: “[Discourse] is the primordial existential of disclosedness.” (BT 161)
Discourse articulates what is significant, and it is in this articulation where the significant
is signified in its eidetic suchness, or in other words, is objectively disclosed. Heidegger
distinguishes four constitutive factors of how discourse manifests and maintains the world’s
intelligibility: in the subject of what is discussed, in what is said as such, in communication, and
in making known. (BT 163) The constitutive factors of discourse are not factical and cannot be
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extracted empirically from language, but are themselves: “existential characteristics rooted in the
constitution of being of Da-sein which first make something like language ontologically
possible.” (BT 163) In other words, the factors are the formal, ontological containers of existentiell
experience expressed in language.
In our exposition of the embodiment of understanding as a world-disclosure in Greek art,
we established several modifications through which Dasein’s spatiality is disclosed. Amongst
them: that pre-understanding goes back and forth from the whole to the parts and in between
parts filling the gaps with the extension of beings in de-distancing; that pre-understanding
summons the disclosure of beings inasmuch as they are relevant to other beings in terms of their
serviceability, usability, and perishability; that the world’s intelligibility depends on being
together in the understanding of what is at stake; that the world’s intelligibility is a transparency
achieved through resolve both as resolution and as higher definition; and that through all three
modes of understanding (pre-understanding, existential, and existentiell understanding) the world
becomes transparent and intelligible. Heidegger observes that such communal modifications
cannot be maintained otherwise than through discourse: “Discoursing is the ‘significant’
articulation of the intelligibility of being-in-the-world, to which belongs being-with, and which
maintains itself in a particular way of heedful being-with-one-another.” (BT 162)
Dasein’s constancy, the world’s “substance”, depends in the last analysis on the ongoing
maintenance of discourse. Heidegger expects this maintenance to be originally disclosed in
language, where understanding and attunement may be expressed, because “[t]he existentialontological foundation of language is discourse.” (BT 161) But this may hold only for the needs of
a world which is already disclosed and has to be maintained, since as we premised in the first
chapter here, it is not as a poem, that is, in language, that the being-towards-death comports itself
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into and acts against a hostile world, nor could that world impose upon the self any threat if the
self somehow objectified in the narrative of even a tragic poem.
Thus whereas Heidegger defines discourse within the binding of speech with hearing in
saying that “... just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, acoustic perception is based on
hearing”, (BT 163) our task in demonstrating the disclosive embodiment of Dasein’s fourth
structure of care in Greek statuary, just because “discourse is constitutive for the being of the
there [my italics]”, (BT 165) is to show how the statue as the blueprint for Dasein’s spatiality
maintains the connection of itself within itself through discourse, and how the statue maintains
the connection of itself through discourse with its preservers.
Regarding the second task, the maintenance of this connection has been investigated by
Steiner, who as we have already seen, found the preservers “bound up with sentiments of love
and fervent longing (pothos) ... exploring the pathology of desire”. Steiner sites Heraclitus’
ridiculing those of his contemporaries who “pray to agalmata as if they were chattering with
houses”, and sees the preservers’ engagement with the statues as “visual discussions of desire”,
which “play centrally into some of the larger social and political currents in late sixth and fifth
century Greece, where eros ... becomes a matter of public as well as private concern. [my
italics]”69
Regarding the first task, at first sight the demonstration seems to depend on whether we
can confirm that it is the four constitutive factors of discourse which maintain the intelligibility
of the human body in statuary art. Not yet the maintenance, but the communication between
body parts which leads to intelligibility we already confirmed in the proof of the embodiment in
Greek art of the three modes of understanding, where we concluded that Laokoön’s body
becomes thoroughly transparent in objectifying as the understanding which has obtained the
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structure of something as something in order to partake what makes body motility possible so
that this body can project itself as a possibility of world action. The confirmation that the
communication of body parts is already articulated through the three modes of understanding
shows in that if discourse may be grounded in understanding, the latter structure must be at least
equiprimordial or rather even more primordial in primitive Dasein than the worldly structure of
discourse.
And so seems to think Heidegger, who may have said that understanding is determined
by discourse, and that discourse is equiprimordial with understanding, but said also that
“discourse and hearing are grounded in understanding”, and that “[o]nly he who already
understands is able to listen [my italics].” (BT 164)
Thus, finally, our task is not to show in terms of Dasein’s embodiment how “discourse is
constitutive of Dasein's being of the there”, but rather how discourse maintains, that is, services
the preservation of this being already structured in understanding. Our demonstration can begin
with answering the question why would Dasein’s structures of the there need maintenance, if
they are already thoroughly installed by the understanding. The answer is that maintenance is
needed because Dasein is foundationally an ecstatic being, to the effect that its existential
structures remain perpetually exposed to the possibility of spontaneous transmutation. Something
in these shifting structures of the there needs to be preserved, if Dasein is to survive the constant
corruption that it prescribes to its foundations.
We recall from our analysis of Dasein’s inceptive disclosure as Zeus of Artemision, that
we located Dasein’s original ecstasis for the foregrounding of consciousness, our postulation
there that Dasein breaks off with tradition at each and every hermeneutic event in the
temporalization of temporality since this event is always a rapture with the succession of the
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ecstasies. Unlike in Dasein’s ontic historiography, where there is an established epiphenomenal
succession from past to present to future, itself also in need of historiographical maintenance, in
Dasein’s fundamental ontological constitution primitive Dasein must remain open to any and
every perspective of reinterpretation so that in this openness and therein alone the future is not
later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. If in Dasein’s
ecstatic, that is, kinaesthetic world-comportment what may at one horizontal interpretation be
already established by the understanding remains subject to the constant and infinite possibilities
of reinterpretation and recombination, something must be maintained as is or at least as was, so
that in this kinaesthesis the being of the there, be that the factical Dasein as body or the factical
Dasein as world, moves and changes, and yet remains the same.
Heidegger notes that the maintenance-functioning constitutive factors of discourse are not
factical. “These are not properties which can be just empirically snatched from language, but are
existential characteristics rooted in the constitution of being of Da-sein which first make
something like language ontologically possible.” (BT 163) From this idea and from the
understanding that logos is always logos tinos, “any statement is somebody’s statement”, we
gather that in looking to find these factors integrated in Dasein’s embodiment in world-disclosive
sculptic art we should not be interested for their content, which as such would change in each
and every hermeneutical ecstasis of the self, but alone of their formal constitution and
appearance. The factical content of these existential characteristics as they would appear in
Laokoön, would be knowledge belonging to the discursive factors of “what is discussed”, “what
is said as such”, “what is communicated”, and “what is made known”. In our case they would be
facts such as that of the priest being attacked by the serpents (as that which is discussed), the
details of the attack (as that which is said), the possibility to communicate the narrative (as that
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which is communicated), and the possibility that the narrative may be established as knowledge
(as that which is made known). And yet we are not interested in this frozen moment of factical
knowledge, since if Laokoön’s body were to start moving this knowledge would change with
each and every kinaesthetic interpretation of Dasein’s ideational embodiment.
What we are interested in is not the that as factical content, but the possibility of that it is
discussed itself being embodied, that it is said being embodied, that is communicated being
embodied and that it is made known being embodied. Usually this formal that is not expressed in
language, but can be inferred from its having made possible a factical content. Heidegger points
to the undeclaredness of the discursive that in pointing that: “Discourse is discourse about ....
That which discourse is about does not necessarily have the character of the theme of a definite
statement; in fact, mostly it does not have it.” (BT 162) The undeclaredness of the that which as
Dasein’s existential form makes a factical content possible, is more visible when as a
background to what is stated it formalizes itself as a certain intonation, modulation, or tempo. (BT
162)

But, once again, these formalizations are not helpful as attributes that we may isolate in our

quest to identify Dasein’s structure of discourse in sculptic art. Thus if the factical content of
discourse is too transient to objectify as a prescriptive structure in world-disclosive art, and if the
undeclaredness of the that is not visible in statuary art being what it is, we are stuck.
However, a breakthrough is possible from a detectable division within the function of
discourse. A fundamental condition for Dasein’s ontological constitution requires both an
ecstatic but also a withholding dwelling for the constitution of the being of the there. These two
structures in the fundamental ontological division for the maintenance of Dasein’s
consciousness, are coined in Husserl’s phenomenology, respectively as protention and retention.
If there is direct correspondence between, on the one hand the two opposing functions buried
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single-handedly within the Heideggerian concept of “discourse”, and on the other hand the
Husserlian linguistic concepts of protention and retention, then it is these latter, purely visible
phenomenological objects of the phainesthai as “appearing”, not anymore strictly linguistic
structures, that may be identifiable as the embodiment of the existential structure of discourse in
Dasein’s blueprint as sculptic art.
In discussing the possibility of kinaesthesis as a condition for the world’s objectification,
Husserl points out that retention and protention are intentional linguistic modifications without
which perception would be impossible. “[T]he object gives itself as ‘there’, originally there,
present. But in this presence, as that of an extended and enduring object, lies a continuity of what
I am conscious of, what has flowed away and is no longer intuited at all, a continuity of
‘retentions’ - and, in the other direction, a continuity of ‘protentions’.”70 Husserl shows that the
horizontal appearing of the objectified there making itself present as now and as presentation
requires the function of these two other structures that remain implicit. Retention is the
reenactment of a present which has passed, towards the maintenance of self-identity. Protention
is the anticipation towards the maintenance of self-identity of a possibility of world
objectification from which arises the ontic meaning of that which is in the future. “[T]he static
‘now’ ... has a horizon with two differently structured sides, known in intentional language as a
continuum of retentions and protentions. These first prefigurations of temporalization and time,
however, remain in the background”, writes Husserl.71
We began by explicating Heidegger's idea that discourse provides Dasein with the
maintenance of its attunement and understanding. Our subsequent difficulty to locate the
embodiment of discourse as the last existential structure of care in Dasein’s spatial constitution,
surfaced in the realization that neither the factical content of discourse nor its formal structure
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could appear in Dasein’s idealized embodiment as statuary art. This is because the former
content pertains to existentiell modifications and is thus disqualified from the embodiment of
fundamental ontological structures, while the latter structure is indistinguishable from primitive
Dasein’s existential structures of understanding and attunement, appearing therein not as itself,
being the embodiment of discourse, but as that which it maintains. Aided by Husserl’s analysis,
where the concepts of retention and protention are still accounted for in terms of linguistic
discourse, our unburying the binary function of linguistic discourse in its ecstatic and
withholding modifications bestows to the Heideggerian concept of discourse the visibility to
appear in world-disclosive statuary as a fundamental ontological structure of the embodiment of
the they-self.
The withheld ecstasis does not initially reveal the retentive structure of discourse; it only
exposes Dasein’s dwelling as a-letheia in the world’s denied absolute productivity. But the
world’s denied absolute productivity as a futural determination is in the last analysis related to
the withholding of a present that has passed and may be reenacted. Originally the withheld
ecstasis pertains to Dasein’s being as a-letheia in the world’s lack of absolute productivity. To
reach the retentive structure in language, we need to look in what Husserl says about the retrieval
of the past as a necessity for the maintenance of self-identity. Whereas for Heidegger discourse
simply maintains the intelligibility of the there, Husserl’s deeper analysis at this point shows how
this maintenance of intelligibility supports self-identity through the recollection of a continuity of
presents themselves being withheld world determinations that lie in the past. So writes Husserl in
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:
[T]his ‘retention’ disappears, but the ‘disappeared’ passing and being past has not become
nothing for the subject in question: it can be reawakened. … if the originally self-evident
production, as the pure fulfillment of its intention, is what is renewed (recollected), there
188

necessarily occurs, accompanying the active recollection of what is past, an activity of concurrent
actual production, and there arises thereby, in original ‘coincidence’, the self-evidence of identity;
what has now been realized in original fashion is the same as what was previous self-evident.
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Husserl gives us the step for the necessary descent from the world to the self, of how the
retentive function of discourse, being the fundamental ontological withholding of the absolute
intelligibility of nature as a world interpretation for the they, trickles down into piecemeal
retentions for the possibility of the objective, that is, physical, self-interpretation of the self. It is
only from this point that Dasein can examine Laokoön’s body as its own, and as the ideal body
of the they-self, and see how discourse - comprised by actually two functions buried within
Heidegger’s last existential structure of care - is disclosed as a maintaining factor of both body
and world.
Heidegger unwittingly bundles up both the ecstatic and the preservative functions of
discourse into one existential structure, which is inscrutable in terms of Dasein’s embodiment in
art. The bundling up is apparent when some passages of Heidegger’s analysis bring up the
ecstatic function, while some others assume only the preservative. So it is the ecstatic function
that gathers Dasein’s world which is referred to when Heidegger writes that discourse as the
attuned articulation of intelligibility, “brings about the ‘sharing’ of being attuned together and of
the understanding of being-with. ... Being-with is ‘explicitly’ shared in discourse, that is, it
already is, only unshared as something not grasped and appropriated.” (BT 162) But it is the selfdetermination of the preservative, withholding function which is referred to when Heidegger
understands that something must be maintained, that is, momentarily held back as the form of an
“if - ...”, so that a “... - then” may be gained in discourse through circumspective deliberation.
This conditional form requires this maintenance of a previous articulation of the attuned
intelligibility of the there. The Polycleitus Canon is the primordial embodiment of the
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conditional as a rule of inference being the enabling function of pre-understanding that must be
deliberated in preservative discourse. Writes Heidegger: “We call the specific bringing near of
what is taken care of by interpreting it circumspectly deliberation. The schema peculiar to it is
‘if-then’: If this or that is to be produced, put into use, or prevented, for example, then we need
these or those means, ways, circumstances, or opportunities.” (BT 359)
We determine at this point that our task is to show how the statue, being the blueprint for
Dasein’s spatiality, maintains the connection of itself with itself within itself through the ecstatic
and the retentive functions of discourse. Since both the factical content and the formal structure
of discourse pertain to modifications that are either not fundamental ontological prescriptions or
they cannot appear distinguishably as the fundamental ontological prescriptions that they are,
and since the binary function of discourse translates to the protentive and the retentive
articulation of the attuned intelligibility of spatial expansion which maintains the self identity of
a body, discourse must have ideally em-bodied itself in terms of protention and retention.
The discursive body is the body which arrives to its world task having retained its own
past physiognomic experience so that this experience can be reenacted in anticipation of the
body’s summoning the objectification of its own physiognomic future in the kinaesthesis
demanded by the task. More precisely, the discursive body is the incarnation of the primordial
conditional as a basic rule of inference, and a proof of Heidegger’s argument against Descartes
of the instrumentalization of logical thought by the higher primordiality of the intuition of
finitude, where the “if - ...” is retained as past experience so that the “... – then” can be protended
to anticipate a kinaesthetic, threatened future.
Discourse being one of the four ecstatic structures of care, and since for Heidegger the
world’s history is reenacted afresh in every ecstatic world interpretation and the historiographical
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disclosure of what may become the subject of history temporalizes itself out of Dasein’s futural
concerns so that the past is not fixed and immutable, then both the substructures of discourse
must be ecstatic. For not only the protention into prospect embodying objectifications, but even
the retention of physiognomic experience requires an ecstasis attuned to an intelligible
recollection of only that past physiognomic experience which is germane to each specific
kinaesthetic task towards the possibility of a future. Since discourse is the articulation of the
attuned intelligibility of the there, only those kinaesthetic tasks can be anticipated which can be
idiosyncratically afforded by the body’s own perceptual history having objectified as subjective
fitness, since the attuned body is, by means of the third and most worldly mode of attunement,
the body which has attained its own fitness by having been-there-with.
The conditional is the primordial articulation of formal discourse, and the hypothetical
syllogism as a compound conditional is the expansive possibility of an ever more complex
articulation involving all the other applicable rules of logical inference. This ever more complex
articulation must be maintained by discourse as an existential structure of care in a body the
kinaesthesis of which “naturalizes”, that is objectifies and substantiates, the body, by keeping it
intelligibly dependent on the intercourse of the resolving rules of inference.
The hypothetical syllogism summons the body to its spatial presence as a now and as a
presentation incarnating the authentic There. This is because hypo+thesis (for “hypothetical”)
objectifies the thetic sub-stantiation of the situated I-posit out of which signification ensues from
what has become significant for the being-towards-death, while syn+logos (for “syllogism”)
gathers and maintains the inferential heedfulness of the being-towards-death as the being-therewith. These rational properties of the discursive body as a fundamental ontological disclosure,
are, only now, visible in some statuary art and absent in other.
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Regarding the retentive ecstasis, our comparative hermeneutics already exposed how it is
only Laokoön’s body that displays this ecstasis, but not that of the kouros. In closely examining
the statues’ knees, we observed that the kouros’ knee is a non-region, constituted by physical
objectifications that are irrelevant, lacking, or counterproductive to a “knee’s” world task. The
kouros’ knee, as his entire body, is not discursive, because it does not retain into a regionalized
body-space any physiognomic experience attuned to an intelligible recollection that is germane
to a specific kinaesthetic task. A knee cup that resembles rather a mustache and a tibia bone that
starts from the knee and projects itself out of the lower leg cannot summon the objectification of
a physiognomic future in the kinaesthesis of the self. This knee cannot possibly act upon the
world of the being-towards-death, for one reason because it cannot recall its being objectified
through being-there-with with past attuned physiognomic comportments. What discourse there
may be between each and every part of this knee does not discover what is factically possible in
a kinaesthetic summoning between parts where each part is a being with other parts as a beingwith-the-they. Nor does this kouros knee as a whole outside of itself shows any evidence that it
has formed itself in a resolutive heedfulness, that is, attunement, in being-with-the-they in the
world as a whole. The most that we as Dasein can say about the discursive objectification of this
world-disclosive knee, is that it does not belong to the body of the being-towards-death, and that
its recognition as a “knee” owes rather to Dasein’s ecstatic foregrounding, which just because
objects will be either bestowed with meaning or will not appear, reaches out and makes its own
even what is not.
Contrarily, Laokoön’s knee, as his entire body, maintains the self-identity of the priest’s
body in having ecstatically reenacted its own past attunements of physiognomic experience as an
objectified body part towards this mode of assail by these serpents. The conditional rule of
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inference objectifies into a body through a concatenation of physiognomic modifications such as
that: “if the serpent attacks from this or that direction, then these or those muscles alone must
move this or that part of the priest’s body, so that if ... then ...”, and so on. When Heidegger
writes that “if this or that is to be produced, put into use, or prevented ... then we need these of
those means [my italics]”, he points to Dasein’s deliberations which employ the substructures of
retention and protention of such a discursive knee and such a discursive body.
The embodiment of the discursive conditional objectifies the retention of past
physiognomic experience and the protention of this experience into anticipating the maintenance
of self-identity as a possibility of Dasein’s future existence. The embodiment of the conditional
entails the assumption of a subjective fitness, that is, an uncertain eligibility summoned from past
instantiations of entanglement into being-there-with-the-they towards the merely possible and
merely ephemeral escape of one’s own demise. “And to what is one summoned? To one’s own
self”, notes Heidegger. (BT 273) Since at both the fundamental ontological and the factical level
death can be experienced only as one’s own death - the they never dies - in the conditional
ecstasis which objectifies the body, the self is detached from the they: “Because only the self of
the they-self is summoned and made to hear, the they collapses”, writes Heidegger. (BT 273) We
observe the monumental disclosure of this detachment from the they in the priest’s body
objectified exclusively in its preoccupation of being-there-with primarily with the serpents rather
than with the bodies of the sons, although aside from their detached objectifications as selves, all
three bodies are bind in their facing the common fate of humanity.
We compare how the priest’s body objectifies through this discursive detachment, also
with the objectification of the bodies in the comparable work of multiple figures in the
Gigantomachy. [Figure 12] In this late Archaic deep relief where the figures almost stand out in
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the open, the bodies incarnate the privative definition of fitness, from which we may infer that in
the world disclosed to its preservers by this art, the death of the fallen soldier is not the death of
one’s own. The striking appearance of the soldier moving into the center of the scene from the
left with his head turned impossibly backwards, objectifies none of the four existential structures
of care, nor does it ground these structures in the incarnation of primordial temporality disguised
as muscular narrative. The soldier’s chest and abdomen, in which the pectoral muscles are
entirely missing and the abdominal ones are rendered as an unrealistic pattern, are also
impossibly twisted sideways a full 90 degrees to face us, while the torso and the legs continue
their stride straightforward. And there are no body parts on either level above and below of the
soldier’s belt to objectify themselves as the articulation of the attuned intelligibility of the there

Figure 12: Gigantomachy, Greece, last quarter of sixth century BC
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in circumspective resolution of threat and task, so that these parts would connect what body is
above to what body is below the belt. The same inexistentiality is disclosed and marks the
relation between the impossibly turned head and the statue’s neck. None of the multiple
discursive deliberations that should have been summoned into skeletomuscular modifications by
such an impossible torsion are there to provide the continuity of the upper to the lower body. To
render these skeletomuscular modifications at the discursive level, this body would need to
unleash and objectify the multiplicity of conditionals compacted into hypothetical syllogisms and
all the other pertinent rules of inference that determine Dasein’s body as spatial expansion. The
attunement to threat and task would de-liberate each and every circumspective if-this-then-that
of situational physiognomy, arriving protentively to the task as the reenactment of past
physiognomy into subjective fitness.
The presence of objective fitness is evidence to that the fundamental ontological impulse
made manifest as this body has not understood death. Heidegger’s dictum that reality is
resistance the experience of which is possible only on the basis of the disclosedness of world,
suggests that this idealization of body does not even have a “world”, and its placement by
naturalists and art historians within the history of the world, owes to Dasein’s gratuitous impulse
to make its own what is actually not. In our explication of Dasein’s embodiment of
understanding, a body which understands death arrives to the self-interpreting kinaesthetic event
negatively determinate and positively indeterminate, these determinations in understanding
themselves being equiprimordially determined by discourse respectively as retention and
protention. This binary function through which death is understood has to be deliberated by the
binary substructures of discourse. In the lack of this deliberation the monumental discontinuity
between body parts supports the factical impression that the head and the chest of the archaic
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soldier, as well as the upper and the lower body divided by the belt, could have been rendered
separately and even in entirely different contexts and just placed on top of one another. None of
the communal modifications by understanding are there to begin with, so that they could be
expressed and maintained by discourse. In fundamental ontological terms this art could not have
disclosed the being-thereness of the self, this is not Dasein’s world, since the parts that constitute
this body do not necessarily belong to one another into one retentive and protentive
consciousness.
The same privation for the possibility of the embodiment of self-identity is divulged by
the objectification of the central figure’s advancing left leg. Here the continuous arching striation
which tries to be both a femoral muscle and a tibial bone is thusly neither, and the ensuing lack
of intelligibility owes to the failure of this objectification to regionalize itself as the receptacle of
meaning shaping itself in an attuned receptivity. This leg is truly alien to Dasein’s world,
because it is not objectified as a “being-there”, where a recognition of threat and task afforded by
the subject’s physiognomic history would summon it. The leg’s non-understood, unattuned,
unthrown, and undiscursive constitution is not an articulation of body parts being-with-oneanother understandingly; this articulation does not objectify the sharing of being attuned together
and the understanding of being-there-with. Hence it is only through Dasein’s gratuitous temporal
foregrounding that this phenomenological objectification is recognized as a “leg”.
What makes the two disclosed worlds incommensurable, is the harnessing in postArchaic Greek statuary of “previously” squandered erotic impulse. The embodiment of
primordial temporality and of the structures of care is a psychological expenditure accompanied
by a certain “positive pathology”, where the embodied demand for control from the embodiment
of fear causes a bio-cultural endocrinological permutation, the speeding up of the body’s
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metabolism. The central figure in the Laokoön Group is a better athlete than the central figure in
the Gigantomachy, and so is Zeus compared to the kouros. Laokoön’s hypodermic fat has been
sweated out, the body’s weight-per-volume ratio is observably reduced by a great degree, and a
thinner skin wraps around muscle clusters and supportive skeletal structures in the most efficient
compactness. Much finer causal relations define the embodied spatiality reckoned as abdomen,
chest, legs and arms. What we have here appearing as efficiency and performance, is a profound
embodied repression of libidinal forces, where Apollo as sky harnesses Dionysian earth.
To our naive outlook the robust physicality of the bodies in the Gigantomachy appears as
the objectification of fitness. Thick and bulging limbs, trim trunks, and a regimented kinesiology
engaged in combative gesture all suggest monumental fitness. But if Heidegger is right to have
seen that art no less than discloses a world, and if the being of a being manifests in the ecstasis of
the subjective concern of that being for its own being, then the objective fitness evincing
everywhere in Greek Archaic and every other comparable world art, is the privative definition of
fitness as the absence of pathology. Heidegger’s existential analysis of primordial temporality
and of the ecstatic structures of care imply that in order to have lived, the body must first be free
to die. Freedom to one’s own death requires a body that is subjectively constituted, that is,
discursively de-liberated to sustain the retention of its own past physiognomic experience and
the protention of this experience as a mere possibility and an ultimate impossibility for future
existence. None of these conditions for the interdependent constitution of life and death, as
postulated in this chapter, objectify as art in Greek Archaic statuary, and arguably in any other
comparable world art.
In Dasein’s world beings objectify either in their what-for-thingliness for the beingtowards-death, or/and in their aes-thetic self-awareness as the being-towards-death. These two

197

qualifications alone determine that since the beings which make themselves manifest as a worlddisclosive embodiment in the Gigantomachy are not aes-thetically self-aware, their
objectification owes to their historical signification constituting their what-for-thingliness in the
temporalization of temporality by the being whose being is aes-thetic, that is, situated, because
its own being has become an issue. It is no other than this embodied un-aes-thetic worlddisclosure of the a-schemon, which makes the central figure in the Gigantomachy appear “ugly”
in comparison with the schematized “beauty” of the central figure of the Laokoön Group.
Endnotes
70. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 160.
71. Ibid., p. 169.
72. Ibid., p. 359-360.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
7.1 The Embodiment of Primitive Dasein as Greek Art: A Glimpse of the Invisible
A summary of Heidegger’s metaphysics reduced to the axioms of his fundamental
ontology disclosed as Greek art is finally in order. This will be an applicable conclusion from
which to launch future phenomenological projects based on our critical elucidation regarding the
recovery of the question of being. Issues within philosophy such as Heidegger’s defensibility
from feminist critique or against his philosophy as mere product of his Nazi affiliation can be
informed by our novel junction between theory of perception, theory of embodiment, and theory
of art; this new light should radically change our larger-scope views regarding the world’s buried
and unconferred origin, the obviation of the persisting schism between nature and culture, the
origin of Western metaphysics, the essential clash between Greece and Judeo-Christianity within
the purview of Western civilization, or the culture and identity wars and academic feuds from
Afrocentrism and Vindicationism against the Greeks.
Our comprehensive hermeneutics allows a conclusive isolation and reassembling as a
transcendental totality the world-determining primitive Dasein. In the reduction of the following
schematism, where in Heidegger’s three levels of inquiry the structures of care are grounded in
corresponding levels of manifestation of primordial temporality, primitive Dasein appears in
italics.
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Table 1: Schema
Horizontal Temporality
Level of Inquiry
Ontic:
Freeing Body
Ontological:
Muscle
Fund. Ontological: Tragic Body

Understanding
Existentiell
Existential
Pre-Understanding

Structures of Care
Attunement
Entanglement
Being-there-with
Fearsome
Throwness
Fearing
Angst
Fearful

.
Discourse
Factical Content
Formal Structure
Retention-Protention

The pre-existential and pre-existentiell structures of care that we see in italics in the
above schema, speculated in Heidegger’s philosophy and elusive if not entirely inscrutable in
other forms of monumental art, yet perfectly visible exclusively in Greek statuary, are as
primordial and prescriptive as is the horizontal temporality in which they are themselves
grounded. The transcendental unity of the they-self composed by the fourfold biases of primitive
Dasein, their grounding in horizontal temporality, and all that grounded in primordial angst, is
the ultimate reduction to the origins of reality in Western metaphysics. This unity “is” that
invisible ultimate cause which Heidegger alludes to in pointing out that the being of a being is
not itself a (sensible) being, since the appearance of each and every world-being absolutely
depends on whether that world-being’s what-for-thingliness has been recognized by the
underlying and unseen primordial unity of primitive Dasein.
It is this invisible determination, the proton kinoun aetion, which we find concealed
behind the otherwise trivial etymological sedimentation of the words “theory” and “theos”. Prior
to our glimpse of primitive Dasein, theo-ry remained critically unrelated to Theo-s. In Laokoön
the theates as the theater-going tragic being, theory as world-view, and Theos as world-creator
are as intuitively as conclusively shown, to be the one and the same existential equiprimordiality
that renders Dasein’s world’s dogged reification and religionization mere alienating
epiphenomena.
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To profile Dasein as a being that is not itself a being, we can imagine a quasimodal unity
forged by primordial temporality to precipitate into the primordial structures of Reason, breaking
through the doors of perception. In our case, however - and the contrasting comparison makes
the case - primitive Dasein is not a vague intuition begging a swarm of epistemological
questions, nor is it a causal essence nowhere to be found objectified prior to its phenomenal
appearance. Primitive Dasein is both definable in the condensing fourfold structures of care and
their traceable grounding in finite temporality and angst, and perfectly visible in disclosive
Greek statuary, albeit unnoticed in its lying so close to us as to have assembled the ideality of our
own body. The momentous difference between previous systems of inferring the origin of reality
and Heidegger’s metaphysics being corroborated by Greek art, is that now for the first time we
can observe in the Western embodiment a first cause, which while absolutely tautologous and
inalienable to what is human, it nonetheless does not appear amongst phenomena, itself being
only the possibility of appearances. The embodied objectification of primitive Dasein allows us
to profile that first cause as that intimate immanency, without reliance to the defunct causal,
cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments, in order to infer the possibility of a first
cause, accordingly from the world’s motion, from the world’s precedence, from its order, or from
that first cause’s essence. In the Western embodiment, primitive Dasein is fully visible,
describable and intuitively comprehensible.
Fearful at its core, and under the unremitting existential pressure for the gathering from
the intuition of finite temporality, pre-understanding is tripped through Angst for the loss of
world into abandoning the site of patterns of inauthenticity - this may be what Heidegger’s
cryptic quoting of Hölderlin means in: “that which dwells near its origin abandons the site”
(Origin, 203) -

and through circumspective resoluteness ventures back and forth between the whole
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and the parts of its looming circumstantial concerns. In this oscillating venture to summon and
gather, primitive Dasein de-distances and trans-verses into intelligibility the cognitive
expansions that draft and make manifest the object of perception, because the thing-at-hand
which is about to be explicitly understood through the trans-versal, for the first time obtains the
structure of something as something in its what-for-thingliness.
The “versing” part of our own introduced parallel concept of the trans-versal contains
what is missing from Heidegger’s otherwise evocative coinage of “de-distancing”, since dedistancing alone reveals the itinerant mode of the reification of the object of perception in the
finite temporal horizon, but does not describe how in the process of de-distancing the distance
itself in between any two points of reference obtains the structure of something as something.
This unacknowledged function becomes intelligible in the “trans-versal”, since this concept
contains both the ecstatic transitioning in between itinerant iterations of reification where the
object is made present, but also the intuition that the hollow distances in between objects - for
Heidegger space is an illusion - obtain substance in their discursive acknowledgment, having
become “versed”. Even if the fugitive pre-understanding encounters no object of perception
worthy of reckoning by its own circumstantial concerns, and even if the patterns of inauthenticity
where from the pre-understanding is fleeing provide no signifiable grounds of self-realization,
circumspective resoluteness credits that absolute empty space with quantifiability so that it is
understood in its what-for-thingliness as a formal container towards a totality of relevance.
The four modalities of primitive Dasein’s spatial expansion into obtaining a world,
remain elusive; instead of observing the pre-understanding, the torsional fleeing of consciousness
from itself, the circumspective resoluteness, and the discursive retention and protention, we are
immediately aware only of the world objects reified by the productive co-ordination of these
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primordial modalities. In the Greek statue, however, where Dasein’s disclosive productivity is
scaled down into obtaining a body to act upon its world, these modalities are perfectly
observable as a blueprint at work. To outline primitive Dasein’s profile is to observe it
independently of its perceptual productivity, to track down the being of a being which is not
itself a being working beneath the reified componentry that we ontologically and ontically
recognize as the human body. Observing Dasein at this level of disclosure entirely demystifies
the monumentality of Greek art: understanding the embodiment of primitive Dasein for what it
is.
In Laokoön the pre-understanding is observable as that totality of relevance which
necessarily precedes the interpretive (ontological) and the factical (ontic) understandings of body
parts in their efficient what-for-thingliness. Being pre-understood, each and every body part is
freed to hearken and heed the imminent con-figuration of each and every other part of the body,
so that it may commensurately affect and contribute to the con-figuration of all other parts, so
that it is itself as well thusly con-figured. The primitive cause of the pre-understanding is not as
tangible an affectation as are the rendering productions of the interpretive and of the factical
understandings, and yet Greek statuary reveals that without it the production of intelligible
kinaesthetic definitions such as those that must precipitate in the summoning of a body’s
componentry to counter-affect a threatening world, is impossible.
The grounding of the pre-understanding in primordial, finite temporality, as Heidegger
wants it, is also demonstrable in Dasein’s disclosive embodiment, from the intelligibility that the
freeing of body parts to the disposal of circumspective heedfulness can have no other cause than
the Angst for the impending loss of world in the priest’s fighting the serpents. Just as Heidegger
suggests, Laokoön authenticates that only primitive Dasein, that is, the pre-understanding alone,
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is grounded in primordial temporality, since the less primitive, worldly interpretive and the
factical understandings produce body parts as phenomenological structures that belong
accordingly to cultural (ontological) and scientific (ontic) dominions, themselves subjects only to
infinite temporality.
The proof of the grounding of the pre-understanding in primordial temporality suggests
that primitive Dasein is a metaphysical first cause of world disclosure which, whereas it
underlies and determines perception, it nevertheless does appear to perception, provided that we
know where to look for it. Heidegger’s brief art theory lead us almost to it, but his metaphysics is
authenticated only by Greek sculpture. To further inform under this elucidation Heidegger’s
axiom that “the being of a being is not itself a being”, we can say that primitive Dasein is an
observable being in Greek art, though it is not itself a being.
The primordiality of Dasein’s second structure of care is even easier to discern in Greek
art than the pre-understanding, since there is no worldly pressure for the body to torsion and flee
itself from within, as it is clearly observable in the contraposto. In Laokoön’s body the dramatic
breaking into a multiple axial refraction can be attributed to have been triggered from without,
from the imminent worldly concern of the serpent’s striking from the left. But in less worldaffected and equally monumental post-Archaic works such as the aforementioned Doryphoros
the Diadoumenos, and the Warrior of Riace, where, as Winckelmann reckoned the contraposto
ensues as if “all artists were playing the same violin”, and where the body stands alone and
relaxed, the pattern is as unmistakable as it is otherwise inexplicable.
In Laokoön, Angst, as the most primordial mood of attunement, is overlaid by Dasein’s
equally primordial dwelling into the torsional fleeing, as well as by the two subsequent worldly
modes of attunement, throwness and being-there-with, disclosing accordingly the possible and
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the definite threat. Heidegger concedes that pure Angst is rare, but we do see pure Angst
prioritized by Dasein’s datability to the emptied gaze of the Blond Boy, which in Dasein’s
interpretive datability promptly precedes Laokoön.
The prescriptive pre-worldliness of fearful Dasein is suggested by its observable dwelling
into a flight from itself, prior to the worldly concerns of being-there-with between the fearing and
the fearsome. Since the Nothing is the origin of negation, whereupon Dasein negates the thisand-that which denies its will to live, the emptying of world that we observe in the radical
adjustments of Dasein’s embodiment from the Archaic to the Classical style is the metaphysical
condition for the freeing by the pre-understanding of the world’s what-for-thingliness, so that
beings may present themselves in a totality of relevance. The pre-understanding, equiprimordial
as it is with the pre-worldly mode of attunement, needs that mode, which is circumspective
heedfulness, to trigger its inherent dormancy into encountering the world as a world that resists
and therefore matters and has to be at first hand perceptually resolved before it can be physically
encountered. We saw in chapter 5 how at this world-prescriptive stage Dasein is delivered over
to its being by turning away from itself as it recognizes itself as fearful, finding itself already in a
flight from nothing yet in particular.
Besides Heidegger’s dictum that attunement is equiprimordial with pre-understanding,
because pre-understanding is always attuned, the grounding of attunement in finite and therefore
horizontal - that is, transcendental - temporality is indicated by the attunement’s disclosing
Dasein’s still indefinite resistance. Prior to the embodied recognition of worldly resistance in
throwness and being-there-with, which are phenomenologically structured by the body’s
ontological and ontic configurations, the contrapostal stance at the body’s core divulges the
recognition of a resistance between two opposing forces determining that the body must be

205

subsequently configured ontologically and ontically. This evasive stance is primitive Dasein’s
turning away from itself in having recognized its potentiality as a mere finite being.
In the third existential structure of care, of entanglement or falling prey, primitive Dasein
discloses the fourfold possibility of the world’s natural history, a manifold possibility ultimately
grounded in horizontal temporality. Entanglement is primarily rooted in the present, as worldly
Dasein makes present of the Moment, but what is de-distanced, regionalized, and reified, is
ultimately grounded in horizontal, that is, finite temporality, because in the last analysis what is
made present objectifies strictly in its what-for-thingliness for the sake of the being whose being
is not itself a being. At its most primitive and disclosive mode, entanglement determines that the
world objectifies only for the being-towards-death. The condition for the intelligibility and
therefore of the objectification of the ever-effusing and evolving biotic and pre-biotic structures
between the fearing and the fearsome, which constitute Dasein’s natural world, is the situated,
fearful Dasein, itself invisible to the scientific project but detectable by our mediating
philosophical inquiry in the phenomenological disclosures of monumental art.
Accordingly, in the Laokoön Group, behind Dasein’s structures of factical dwelling, the
ontological and ontic determinations respectively of the work as myth and of the work as the
natural objects that assemble and contextualize it, we can observe the prescriptive mode of the
authentic There making present truth as untruth. The prescriptive mode of the objectification is
fourfold, because as we saw earlier with Heidegger’s compact formulation (BT 181) the manifold
brings together Dasein’s average everydayness in the structures of: (a) being entangled in the
world, (b) being’s ownmost potentiality of being together with the world, (c) being’s ownmost
potentiality in being-with with others, and (d) being’s ownmost potentiality of being.
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In the share of the fourfold where truth as untruth makes present being’s ownmost
potentiality of being, the priest’s body flees the convention of the they by shedding its clothes, so
that this body can bring to presence its imminent physiognomic competence as a mere
potentiality apart from the idle certainty of the they which never dies. Primitive Dasein’s
entangled embodiment is disclosed both in the irreverence of the priest’s nudity, and inasmuch as
this body has so fallen prey as to have engendered itself from having physiognomically
understood its predicament in encountering the fearsome. In the share of the fourfold where truth
as untruth makes present Dasein’s being entangled in the world, what is Dasein entangled to, i.e.,
the world, is made present as the authentic There being the itinerant circumspective resolution
that objectifies the eidetic suchness or the what-for-thingliness of the fearsome for the beingtowards-death, that is, for the being whose being is not itself a being. The entanglement is
structured by the prescription that since the world is of that being’s own making under the
circumstantial summoning of horizontal temporality, that being cannot avoid being involved in
the implications of its own ongoing world-project. Primitive Dasein is clearly seen in the
comparison of alternative art-world disclosures: whereas the Archaic body remains unfazed at its
interface with the world (our world, of the transhistorical observer’s historical consciousness),
Laokoön’s toes are curling in circumspective heedfulness and circumspective resoluteness
around the edging of the earth, thusly bringing forth the eidetic suchness of the earth to presence.
And in the authentic Moment of the priest’s left hand, the fearing anticipates and thus forges the
shape of the fearsome. In this presence the fearful discloses its ownmost potentiality of being
together with the world. Last, the share of the fourfold where the Group discloses the primitive
structure of being’s ownmost potentiality in being-with with others, that authentic There is made
present as a common and inextricable destiny between self and world. At the ontic level this
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disclosure makes present the phenomenon that the entanglement involves other natural bodies
and world objects; at the ontological level the still worldly Dasein presents that all entangled
natural bodies and world objects belong to beings which are themselves subject to decay; and at
the fundamental ontological level, primitive Dasein preordains that the ownmost potentiality of
being-with with others is for oneself to remain subject to decay, that is, to remain true as untrue
for one’s own interest and at the discretion of the other natural bodies and world objects with
which this being is being-with.
In all the four structures of falling prey, in all the basic structures of Dasein as
background that constitute the Mitda-sein, behind the ontic and the ontological dwellings of the
fearing and the fearsome Greek art shows that we always run into the fearful, primitive Dasein,
that for the sake of which the authentic There is made present in the fourfold entanglement. The
infinite open-endedness of Western metaphysics, arguably unaccountable by substance ontology,
is possible only because all the structures of primitive Dasein that we met with in Greek art, are
intelligible only as existential, that is, ecstatic and horizontal phenomenological structures, to the
effect that they instigate raptures from the Dasein that has-been-there and situationally
reconstitute and reify the Moment throughout the entirety of the manifold of the fourfold
entanglement. In the last analysis, all reality, all objectification, and all the ever-expanding
situational minutia that transmogrify significance into existence in the entanglement of worldly
Dasein, is solely due to the human investment, the capital of which is stored in the structures of
primitive Dasein and disclosed in the monumentality of Greek art.
Discourse is the most worldly and least primitive of Dasein’s ecstatic structures of care,
and yet behind the ontic and the ontological structures of discourse once again we find primitive
Dasein at work. The factical content and the formal structure of the attuned intelligibility of the
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there may enunciate what is articulated and that it is articulated, respectively, but the constitutive
structures of the maintenance of the attuned intelligibility of the there are themselves pre-ontic
and pre-ontological. The fundamental ontological structure of discourse is the conditional rule of
inference “if ... , then ...”, where the interdependent oscillation between retaining the antecedent
and protenting the consequent makes discourse possible. The maintenance of the attuned
intelligibility of the there towards the preservation and further employment of the formative
experience that has already been structured in the understanding against the constant and
spontaneous raptures of the ecstatic being to both its future and past, is possible only because
something may be retained (dis-currere) while something may be sought-after-together (synzetesis).
The ontic content of the structure of discourse in the Group pertains to what is intelligibly
articulated and made known by the physical presence of the figures and the world objects
involved, namely who is attacked by whom, where, how and when and the reasons why. The
ontological manifestation of discourse pertains to that there is a language, in the case of the
Group a physical, body language. This physical language makes intelligible the spatial
articulation of the there, expressed in the sustained, subjective kinaesthesis of bodies through
which this narrative of significance and resistance is possible in the first place. Both the ontic
and the ontological possibilities of the attuned intelligibility of the there are absolutely dependent
on the fundamental ontological structures of discourse, the retentive and protentive existentials,
without which neither the what the bodies are doing, nor that there are bodies, could be
maintained into a kinaesthetic identity.
In the Group, these existentials of primitive Dasein are most visible in the body of the
priest, for this is the one body in the Group that not merely is subject to death, as are the other
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involved living bodies of man and animal in Dasein’s intelligibility, but in its human aging has
through and through understood death. The embodiment of the conditional of discourse “if ...,
then ...”, and the hypothetical syllogism as an infinitely compound conditional along with all the
other applicable rules of logical inference, lie behind and make possible each and every
ontological and ontic manifestation of this body. The there where Dasein has-been-with may
have for ever passed away, but at least the more recent events of the concatenation of existential
situations which once brought it into presence are sedimented into a physiognomy of potentiality
and remain readily available for the enactment of the body’s kinaesthesis. The “if ...” part of the
conditional can somehow be ecstatically, that is discretionarily, reenacted by horizontal
temporality as the incarnation of Logos to summon the body into the kinaesthesis of life and the
freedom to die.
In order to protend its possibilities to exist in the future, and in order to remain free to die,
this body must retain its own past physiognomic experience (the antecedent of every possible
kinaesthetic instantiation “if ..., ”), in such a way that in the given circumstance the ongoing
kinaesthetic modifications between the retentive and the protentive (the consequent of the
kinaesthetic instantiation “ then ...”) the topo-graphic ecstasies are fully diadrastic. The priest’s
body that has-been-there-with (the body’s past), determines through its retained physical
potentiality whether this body may have a future, but simultaneously so that the protended future
of this attuned body determines which maintained events of the body’s retained physiognomic
experience may be reenacted in being applicable to the circumstance which is thusly made
spatially present. That the body itself exists (ontologically) and that the body exists in this or that
action (ontically), both these subjective determinations are absolutely prescribed by primitive
Dasein’s phenomenological structures of the attuned intelligibility of the there, respectively
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inasmuch as existence has precipitated out of situational significance, and inasmuch as any
motion and every action is ultimately accountable by and for the being-towards-death. Through
its pressing imminence, its godly immanence, and its utter intimacy to the human lot, Laokoön’s
monumental body as Dasein’s blueprint of spatiality discloses that neither the res extensa’s
factical content nor its formal structure are possible apart from the binary function of primitive
Dasein’s fourth ecstatic structure of care.
In this brief yet comprehensive account of primitive Dasein, the monumentality of the
Group which mystified art historians emerges inconspicuously due to its disclosure of
fundamental ontological structures, out of which spatiality and reification ensues as follows:
primordial angst empties, horizontal temporality summons, pre-understanding gathers,
attunement resolves, entanglement presents, discourse maintains.
7.2. Laokoön’s Body as the Origin of All Subjectivity
Our conclusion is the proof we have provided that the essential prescriptions for the
possibility of any subjectivity are themselves, and themselves alone, constitutive of that body for
which the world as such objectifies. And since our body is ontologically understood to be made
of the very same substance that all the other world bodies and objects are made, this is a rigorous
proof of the radical affinity between mind, body and world, inasmuch as it seeks to demonstrate
no less than that the structures which manifest as the operational blueprint for the constitution of
the human body are by necessity the very same structures through which the world is interpreted
and therefore constituted. It is from these grounds of certainty that we may launch the
reconciliation of the schism between nature and culture through the recovery of the question of
being. The embodiment of the conditions of subjectivity through which the world is thoroughly
interpreted beyond its biotic history as an epigenetic inheritance, lie too close for us to be easily
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recognized for what they are. Realist theories of embodiment cannot see the human body other
than as the object of an investigation by science. But the body in science is not my body.
When I take assertive action in the world, say when I kick-start my motorcycle to begin
my workday, it is not my stomach which is hungry, my brain’s frontal lobe figuring out that I
must go earn a wage, or my leg that pushes down the kick-starter; I am not all these quantifiable
things that get together to send me to work. It is that other peculiar object, my body, with which I
identify. My body is peculiar, in that unlike the aggregate thingliness of things that make it, like
my stomach, my brain, or my muscles, this body has no specific instrumental function other than
to equilaterally conform and consummately fit as a wedge in between my thoughts and my
world. It is this equidistancy which makes my body recognizable in the bathroom mirror as I’m
getting ready for work. Was I to look in the mirror and all I saw were the thingly components
whereupon my self is supposedly neurodynamically embrained or prenoetically embodied, that
is, my slimy gastrointestinal apparatus, my brain’s gray convolutions, strings of bright red
muscle fiber and stretches of epidermis covering up all that mess, I would have great difficulty to
identify with such objects, if not outright terrified. The body that I recognize as myself acting in
the world, the body that “stores the self”, to remain within empiricist grounds, and to which my
world-task comportment proprioceptively belongs, is the structured expediency which exactly
lies and entirely occupies the region in between my mind and my world. In this sense, any parts
of my body that inhere on this side of the boundary frontier between my body and my world,
(world objects such as my stomach, brain, muscles, bones, skin, etc.), are no less alien to who I
am than those world objects which inhere on that side of my body (world objects such as my
laptop, coffee cup, desk lamp, etc.) In fact my brain is even more alien to me than my coffee cup,
because the bare sight of it would force me into wondering “how can my thinking be coming out
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of this bloody mess?”, a question entirely unprovoked by the more familiar and comforting
coffee cup, which bears my university’s insignia.
But how is the ideal body in someone’s mirror, and that world object alone, the body for
which the world objectifies on either side of this body’s boundary frontiers? If the world’s
objectivity is through and through of subjective origin, and if the conditions of subjectivity
manifest as that instrumental body for which the world objectifies, then there is nothing left in
the world to be regarded as “nature” independently of culture.
Our interjection that the possibility of our world is disclosed as the ideality of Greek
classical statuary levels with Heidegger’s stipulation that the infinite regression for the discovery
of the unification of the manifold of perception in the brain must be preceded and enacted by a
more primordial unification of the manifold of perception, one that sanctions the disclosive
intuition of finitude. In other words, the body as the whereupon of the original unification of the
primordial manifold of perception must be a tragic body that has understood its own death,
appearing as that pre-scientific object which manifests in between the limitations of action in the
face of the human finitude, and the modifications that the recognition of these limitations have
inflicted upon the instrumentality of action itself. We already suggested that this body is the
Greek body.
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